Event Notification Report for October 06, 2004

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

SAFETY RELATED NEEDLE VALVES IN INCORRECT POSITION

POTENTIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY CONSEQUENCES:
"Potential vulnerability to workers and public of a high consequence event involving failure of safety controls that were designed to prevent a hydrogen explosion in the BLEU Preparation Facility U-Aluminum Dissolution gloveboxes/dissolvers.

SEQUENCE LEADING TO EVENT:
"Rotometers FIC-1F14A, 1C01, and 1D01 needle valves were closed on the U-Aluminum dissolver system. FIC-1C01 and FIC-1D01 or FIC-1F14A needed to be open to allow a nitrogen purge in the dissolver to protect against a Hydrogen explosion in the enclosure or at the dissolver/enclosure interface.

PREVENTION OR MITIGATION:
"Other controls were in place to partially mitigate a potential hydrogen explosion that was analyzed in support of the Integrated Safety Analysis for the operations at Bldg. [DELETED]. A nitrogen trickle system provides sufficient flow of nitrogen to the dissolvers during dissolution to provide 5 volumetric changeouts in 30 minutes. The trickle nitrogen flow was available for the operator to access the dissolvers one hour after dissolution. Enclosures 1C01/1C11 and 1D01/1D11 did have an air sweep to the enclosure ventilation system. Should hydrogen have leaked or migrated to the enclosure upon opening of the dissolver lid, the purge would have maintained the hydrogen concentration below the lower explosive limit.

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS:
"Upon discovery of valve closure, valves were immediately opened and Safety Department notified.

EVENT STATUS:
"Terminated."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

MISSING POLONIUM SOURCE

At 1520 ET on 10/06/04, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, DC was notified that a 0.5 milliCurie Po-210 source was missing at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. No other details were available at this time.

* * * RETRACTION FROM MAJOR REFOSCO TO W. GOTT AT 0922 ON 10/07/04 * * *

"Upon clarification of reporting requirements with NRC Region IV, this event is subject to 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) and must be reported within 30-days if the source is not found." The original report was based on the original activity of 0.5 milliCuries, whereas the current activity is 2.8 microCuries and is less than the immediately reportable activity.

Notified NMSS (J Hickey), R4DO (R Bywater), and R3DO (Louden)