Event Notification Report for September 28, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/27/2004 - 09/28/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41076
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TONY CHITWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TONY CHITWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 09/28/2004
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2004
Event Time: 10:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2004
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2004
Event Time: 10:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2004
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
SUZANNE BLACK (NRR)
SUSAN FRANT (IRD)
JUNE PAULEY (DHS)
BOB CAULDWELL (FEMA)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
SUZANNE BLACK (NRR)
SUSAN FRANT (IRD)
JUNE PAULEY (DHS)
BOB CAULDWELL (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO SEISMIC ACTIVITY
"Earthquake felt at plant site [at 1015 PDT] registering 0.012 g. No damage on plant site noted. Release to the environment remains within normal operating levels, and effluent radiation monitors did not alarm. No protective action required."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM T. CHITWOOD TO W. GOTT AT 1428 EDT ON 09/28/04 * * *
"Plant walk down in progress. No damage noted." The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM GLENN COELZER TO MACKINNON AT 2132 EDT ON 09/28/04
Information Call: No plant damage detected by walk downs or equipment testing. R4DO (Linda Howell) notified.
The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JEFF KNISLEY TO CROUCH AT 0313 EDT ON 09/29/04 * * *
Information Call: No plant damage detected by walk downs or equipment testing.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO(Howell) will be notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM GLENN GOELZER TO W GOTT AT 1532 EDT ON 9/29/04 * * *
The licensee terminated the NOUE at 1215 PDT. "No plant damage has been detected by plant walkdowns or equipment testing." NRC exited Monitoring at 1600 EDT
Notified R4DO (L Howell), NRR (Skeen, Borchardt), IRD (Frant, Wilson), Chairman Office (Holahan), EDO (Mitchell), PAO, Dir of Comm. (Outlaw), DHS (Morison), FEMA (Caldwell), USDA (Thomas), DOE (Wyatt), NRC DOT (Crews), and HHS (R. Harlan)
"Earthquake felt at plant site [at 1015 PDT] registering 0.012 g. No damage on plant site noted. Release to the environment remains within normal operating levels, and effluent radiation monitors did not alarm. No protective action required."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM T. CHITWOOD TO W. GOTT AT 1428 EDT ON 09/28/04 * * *
"Plant walk down in progress. No damage noted." The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM GLENN COELZER TO MACKINNON AT 2132 EDT ON 09/28/04
Information Call: No plant damage detected by walk downs or equipment testing. R4DO (Linda Howell) notified.
The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JEFF KNISLEY TO CROUCH AT 0313 EDT ON 09/29/04 * * *
Information Call: No plant damage detected by walk downs or equipment testing.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO(Howell) will be notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM GLENN GOELZER TO W GOTT AT 1532 EDT ON 9/29/04 * * *
The licensee terminated the NOUE at 1215 PDT. "No plant damage has been detected by plant walkdowns or equipment testing." NRC exited Monitoring at 1600 EDT
Notified R4DO (L Howell), NRR (Skeen, Borchardt), IRD (Frant, Wilson), Chairman Office (Holahan), EDO (Mitchell), PAO, Dir of Comm. (Outlaw), DHS (Morison), FEMA (Caldwell), USDA (Thomas), DOE (Wyatt), NRC DOT (Crews), and HHS (R. Harlan)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41181
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 11/08/2004
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2004
Event Time: 13:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2004
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2004
Event Time: 13:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION FROM LOSS-OF-POWER TO REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) BUS 2A
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
"On September 28, 2004, with Unit 2 operating at 100% thermal power, at 1302 hours CDT during maintenance work associated with protective relaying on 480 VAC Shutdown Board 2A, the board was inadvertently tripped. Associated RPS motor-generator (MG) set 2A lost power, and RPS bus 2A, which is powered from this MG set, was de-energized. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits powered from this bus lost power, and PCIS logic Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 were actuated.
"The following actuations/isolations occurred:
"Group 2: Isolation of the Pressure Suppression Chamber head tank pumps [and] Drywell Floor and Equipment Drains
"Group 3: Isolation of the reactor water cleanup system.
"Group 6: Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System [and] Initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation [and] Isolation of the reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation system.
"Group 8: This logic isolates the Traversing Incore Probes (TIP) if they are inserted. The TIPs were not inserted at the time of this event.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for resolution.
"The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
"On September 28, 2004, with Unit 2 operating at 100% thermal power, at 1302 hours CDT during maintenance work associated with protective relaying on 480 VAC Shutdown Board 2A, the board was inadvertently tripped. Associated RPS motor-generator (MG) set 2A lost power, and RPS bus 2A, which is powered from this MG set, was de-energized. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits powered from this bus lost power, and PCIS logic Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 were actuated.
"The following actuations/isolations occurred:
"Group 2: Isolation of the Pressure Suppression Chamber head tank pumps [and] Drywell Floor and Equipment Drains
"Group 3: Isolation of the reactor water cleanup system.
"Group 6: Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System [and] Initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation [and] Isolation of the reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation system.
"Group 8: This logic isolates the Traversing Incore Probes (TIP) if they are inserted. The TIPs were not inserted at the time of this event.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for resolution.
"The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41193
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID FOSS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID FOSS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 11/12/2004
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2004
Event Time: 01:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2004
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2004
Event Time: 01:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO BUS VOLTAGE DIP DURING RECIRC MG START
"This 60-day optional report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of specified systems, specifically the Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS).
"On 9/28/04, at approximately 0100 hours [EDT], a Group III Outboard PCIS isolation occurred during the start of the 2B Recirculation Motor / Generator (M/G) Set. The Recirculation M/G Set was being started to perform post-maintenance testing during the refueling outage subsequent to work involving the Recirculation M/G Set. This outboard isolation resulted in the closure of various valves associated with the Reactor Building / Refueling Floor Ventilation Systems and the start of the 'B' Standby Gas Treatment Fan. All equipment operated as designed. The isolation occurred as a result of a voltage dip on the 2B Reactor Protection System (RPS) / PCIS power supply while on its alternate feed at the time that the 2B Recirculation M/G Set was started. The 2B RPS / PCIS power supply was on the alternate feed in preparation for planned testing of the Emergency Diesel Generators (LOCA-LOOP testing). This RPS / PCIS power supply alternate feed was fed from the same startup transformer that the 2B Recirculation MG Set is fed from. The voltage dip from the start of the large Recirculation M/G Set was sufficient to cause the protective relaying on the 2B RPS /PCIS alternate feed power supply to shed the power supply from the 2B RPS / PCIS bus. Deenergization of the bus caused the Group III Outboard PCIS isolation. A ½ RPS scram signal was also generated. Just prior to the start of the 2B Recirculation M/G set, Operations personnel were briefed on the probability of the isolation and were prepared to take prompt action to reset the isolation and ½ Scram. The 2B RPS / PCIS power supply was returned to its normal power supply (i.e. 2B RPS M/G Set) and the Group III PCIS and the ½ Scram was promptly reset by 0105 hours. This issue has been entered into the Corrective Action Program (CR 257503).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."
"This 60-day optional report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of specified systems, specifically the Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS).
"On 9/28/04, at approximately 0100 hours [EDT], a Group III Outboard PCIS isolation occurred during the start of the 2B Recirculation Motor / Generator (M/G) Set. The Recirculation M/G Set was being started to perform post-maintenance testing during the refueling outage subsequent to work involving the Recirculation M/G Set. This outboard isolation resulted in the closure of various valves associated with the Reactor Building / Refueling Floor Ventilation Systems and the start of the 'B' Standby Gas Treatment Fan. All equipment operated as designed. The isolation occurred as a result of a voltage dip on the 2B Reactor Protection System (RPS) / PCIS power supply while on its alternate feed at the time that the 2B Recirculation M/G Set was started. The 2B RPS / PCIS power supply was on the alternate feed in preparation for planned testing of the Emergency Diesel Generators (LOCA-LOOP testing). This RPS / PCIS power supply alternate feed was fed from the same startup transformer that the 2B Recirculation MG Set is fed from. The voltage dip from the start of the large Recirculation M/G Set was sufficient to cause the protective relaying on the 2B RPS /PCIS alternate feed power supply to shed the power supply from the 2B RPS / PCIS bus. Deenergization of the bus caused the Group III Outboard PCIS isolation. A ½ RPS scram signal was also generated. Just prior to the start of the 2B Recirculation M/G set, Operations personnel were briefed on the probability of the isolation and were prepared to take prompt action to reset the isolation and ½ Scram. The 2B RPS / PCIS power supply was returned to its normal power supply (i.e. 2B RPS M/G Set) and the Group III PCIS and the ½ Scram was promptly reset by 0105 hours. This issue has been entered into the Corrective Action Program (CR 257503).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."