Event Notification Report for September 25, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/24/2004 - 09/25/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
41070410724107341180
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41070
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDY DISMUKE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDY DISMUKE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 09/25/2004
Notification Time: 02:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2004
Event Time: 01:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2004
Notification Time: 02:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2004
Event Time: 01:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 35 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
GROUP 2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION ACTUATION
"Received Group 2 isolation signal on Low Reactor Water Level during initiation of manual reactor scram during planned shutdown. Reactor Water Level decreased to -0.5 inches. Group 2 isolation setpoint is +3.0 inches. All Group 2 isolation valves closed as required."
During the planned shutdown, all control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed to the main condenser via the main turbine bypass valves, ESF and ECCS systems remain available, and the electrical grid is stable. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Received Group 2 isolation signal on Low Reactor Water Level during initiation of manual reactor scram during planned shutdown. Reactor Water Level decreased to -0.5 inches. Group 2 isolation setpoint is +3.0 inches. All Group 2 isolation valves closed as required."
During the planned shutdown, all control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed to the main condenser via the main turbine bypass valves, ESF and ECCS systems remain available, and the electrical grid is stable. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41072
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TOM COSTE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TOM COSTE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/26/2004
Notification Time: 00:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2004
Event Time: 23:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2004
Notification Time: 00:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2004
Event Time: 23:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2004
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LEN WERT (R2)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
SUSAN FRANT (IRD)
BOSCOE (FEMA)
SWO (DHS)
LEN WERT (R2)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
SUSAN FRANT (IRD)
BOSCOE (FEMA)
SWO (DHS)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
"At 2356 [EDT], September 25, 2004, off-site power was lost for both units. At the time of the event both units were in mode 4 and cooling down to meet shutdown entry conditions. The shutdown of both units was due to hurricane conditions from hurricane Jeanne. All four emergency diesels (2 per unit) started and properly loaded. Both units are stable in natural circulation cooling. Efforts continue to place both units on shutdown cooling. All systems operated as expected. The plant was already in a Notification of Unusual Event due to the Hurricane. Shutdown Cooling was established on Unit 1 at approximately 0020 EDT on 9/26/04."
The licensee informed both state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. A conference call was held at approximately 0005 EDT with R2 Response Manager (Len Wert), NRR EO (Stu Richards) and IRD (Susan Frant) to discuss the loss of offsite power. The participants concluded that the NRC Monitoring Mode entered at 1515 EDT on 9/25 for the Hurricane was appropriate.
* * * UPDATE 0257 EDT ON 9/26/04 FROM TOM COSTE TO S. SANDIN * * *
"At 2356, September 25, 2004, St. Lucie Station, Units 1 and 2, experienced a loss of off -site power (LOOP). At the time of the LOOP all four emergency diesel generators started and loaded the safety related buses. In its initial notification of the LOOP (0035 09/26/04, EN# 41067), FPL reported that all systems had performed as expected. However, during its post LOOP walkdowns of the control room boards the control room operators determined that the 1 B Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pump had not automatically started as expected. The pump was subsequently started from the control room using the manual control switch. The cause for the failure to automatically start will be investigated and corrected prior to returning the unit to service."
Notified R2 Response Manager (Len Wert)
* * * UPDATE 2350 EDT ON 9/26/04 FROM R2 IRC (BENOI DESAI) TO S. SANDIN * * *
At 1050 EDT both units recovered offsite power exiting the criteria for the UE based on LOOP.
The licensee informed state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
HOO Note: See related ENs # 41067, 41071 and 41073.
"At 2356 [EDT], September 25, 2004, off-site power was lost for both units. At the time of the event both units were in mode 4 and cooling down to meet shutdown entry conditions. The shutdown of both units was due to hurricane conditions from hurricane Jeanne. All four emergency diesels (2 per unit) started and properly loaded. Both units are stable in natural circulation cooling. Efforts continue to place both units on shutdown cooling. All systems operated as expected. The plant was already in a Notification of Unusual Event due to the Hurricane. Shutdown Cooling was established on Unit 1 at approximately 0020 EDT on 9/26/04."
The licensee informed both state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. A conference call was held at approximately 0005 EDT with R2 Response Manager (Len Wert), NRR EO (Stu Richards) and IRD (Susan Frant) to discuss the loss of offsite power. The participants concluded that the NRC Monitoring Mode entered at 1515 EDT on 9/25 for the Hurricane was appropriate.
* * * UPDATE 0257 EDT ON 9/26/04 FROM TOM COSTE TO S. SANDIN * * *
"At 2356, September 25, 2004, St. Lucie Station, Units 1 and 2, experienced a loss of off -site power (LOOP). At the time of the LOOP all four emergency diesel generators started and loaded the safety related buses. In its initial notification of the LOOP (0035 09/26/04, EN# 41067), FPL reported that all systems had performed as expected. However, during its post LOOP walkdowns of the control room boards the control room operators determined that the 1 B Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pump had not automatically started as expected. The pump was subsequently started from the control room using the manual control switch. The cause for the failure to automatically start will be investigated and corrected prior to returning the unit to service."
Notified R2 Response Manager (Len Wert)
* * * UPDATE 2350 EDT ON 9/26/04 FROM R2 IRC (BENOI DESAI) TO S. SANDIN * * *
At 1050 EDT both units recovered offsite power exiting the criteria for the UE based on LOOP.
The licensee informed state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
HOO Note: See related ENs # 41067, 41071 and 41073.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41073
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TOM COSTE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TOM COSTE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/26/2004
Notification Time: 02:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2004
Event Time: 19:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2004
Notification Time: 02:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2004
Event Time: 19:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
LEN WERT (R2)
LEN WERT (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM
"At approximately 2315 [EDT], September 25, 2004, the NRC Operations Center reported that their link to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) had been lost. It was determined that the link had been lost at 1909 [EDT] that same day based upon the logged time of the last data update. The station was in constant communications with the Operations Center at the time due to the severe weather in the area due to hurricane Jeanne. The link was restored for both units at 2344 [EDT] the same day by performing the normal initiation procedure. It is suspected that the link was lost due to a momentary transient on the FTS circuit due to the weather conditions.
"The link was lost again at approximately 0103 [EDT], 9/26/04. The unit 1 ERDS link was restored approximately one hour later, troubleshooting of the unit 2 is in progress."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
HOO Note: See related ENs # 41067, 41071 and 41072.
"At approximately 2315 [EDT], September 25, 2004, the NRC Operations Center reported that their link to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) had been lost. It was determined that the link had been lost at 1909 [EDT] that same day based upon the logged time of the last data update. The station was in constant communications with the Operations Center at the time due to the severe weather in the area due to hurricane Jeanne. The link was restored for both units at 2344 [EDT] the same day by performing the normal initiation procedure. It is suspected that the link was lost due to a momentary transient on the FTS circuit due to the weather conditions.
"The link was lost again at approximately 0103 [EDT], 9/26/04. The unit 1 ERDS link was restored approximately one hour later, troubleshooting of the unit 2 is in progress."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
HOO Note: See related ENs # 41067, 41071 and 41072.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41180
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 11/08/2004
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2004
Event Time: 18:14 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2004
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2004
Event Time: 18:14 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION FROM LOSS-OF-POWER TO REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) BUS 3B
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
" On September 25, 2004, with Unit 3 operating at 100% thermal power, at 1814 hours CDT, a voltage regulator problem occurred on RPS motor-generator (MG) set 3B. The associated RPS circuit protectors sensed an undervoltage condition and opened, thereby de-energizing RPS bus 3B. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits powered from this bus lost power, and PCIS logic Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 were actuated.
"The following actuations/isolations occurred:
"Group 2: Isolation of the Pressure Suppression Chamber head tank pumps, Drywell Floor and Equipment Drains Isolation.
"Group 3: Isolation of the reactor water clean-up system.
"Group 6: Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System, Initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation, Isolation of the reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation systems.
"Group 8: This logic isolates the Traversing Incore Probes (TIP) if they are inserted. The TIPs were not inserted at the time of this event.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design, with the exception that Unit 2 refuel zone ventilation system supply inboard isolation damper 2-DMP-064-0006 failed to close. The series damper, 2-DMP-064-0005, fully closed, therefore there would have been no impact to secondary containment integrity had this been an actual event. The damper's failure to close resulted from a sticking solenoid valve which was subsequently replaced.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for resolution.
" The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
" On September 25, 2004, with Unit 3 operating at 100% thermal power, at 1814 hours CDT, a voltage regulator problem occurred on RPS motor-generator (MG) set 3B. The associated RPS circuit protectors sensed an undervoltage condition and opened, thereby de-energizing RPS bus 3B. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits powered from this bus lost power, and PCIS logic Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 were actuated.
"The following actuations/isolations occurred:
"Group 2: Isolation of the Pressure Suppression Chamber head tank pumps, Drywell Floor and Equipment Drains Isolation.
"Group 3: Isolation of the reactor water clean-up system.
"Group 6: Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System, Initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation, Isolation of the reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation systems.
"Group 8: This logic isolates the Traversing Incore Probes (TIP) if they are inserted. The TIPs were not inserted at the time of this event.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design, with the exception that Unit 2 refuel zone ventilation system supply inboard isolation damper 2-DMP-064-0006 failed to close. The series damper, 2-DMP-064-0005, fully closed, therefore there would have been no impact to secondary containment integrity had this been an actual event. The damper's failure to close resulted from a sticking solenoid valve which was subsequently replaced.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for resolution.
" The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified."