Event Notification Report for September 18, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/17/2004 - 09/18/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41053
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: PAUL CHRISTIANSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: PAUL CHRISTIANSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/19/2004
Notification Time: 00:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2004
Event Time: 20:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2004
Notification Time: 00:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2004
Event Time: 20:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 80 | Power Operation | 80 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SAFETY PARAMTER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS)
"On 09/18/04, Units 1 & 2 a simultaneously lost their control room's Safety Parameter Display System monitors for approximately 70 minutes before their were returned to service. This is considered a major loss of assessment and communication capability for greater than one hour. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
"On 09/18/04, Units 1 & 2 a simultaneously lost their control room's Safety Parameter Display System monitors for approximately 70 minutes before their were returned to service. This is considered a major loss of assessment and communication capability for greater than one hour. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41205
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRUCE BREDEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRUCE BREDEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 11/18/2004
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2004
Event Time: 17:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2004
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2004
Event Time: 17:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
HO NIEH (IRD)
DALE POWERS (R4)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
HO NIEH (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION (UNUSUAL EVENT)
"At 1735, 9/18/04, Callaway Control Room received an alarm on K0008 (Fire Protection Alarm and Control Workstation) for the Communication Corridor Lobby 2047 elevation. Initial investigation found significant smoke in the area of the Communication Corridor Elevator Room. During the investigation, a report was received in the Control Room that a small fire had occurred on the roof and had been extinguished. At 1743, the Callaway Fire Brigade was activated to investigate the source of the smoke. Upon arriving at the scene, no flames were observed and the Brigade began removing visquene [plastic] to facilitate observing additional areas within the room. At this time, small flames were observed and plant Emergency Alarm Level (EAL) 3E, 'Fire within the Protected Area boundary not extinguished within 15 minutes of verification' 15-minute time limit was entered. The fire was extinguished using a single powder type extinguisher and declared out at 1754.
At 1910, an Operator reported that the Communication Corridor fire had reflashed. The Fire Brigade was reactivated and the fire was extinguished at 1919 using a single powder type extinguisher. After determining the temperature of the elevator room ceiling was 250 degrees F, water was applied to the ceiling from inside the room and from the roof above. After verification that the fire was extinguished, a continuous fire watch was established for both the affected room and roof area. Initial evaluation of the fire event concluded that the fire was extinguished within 15 minutes of discovery, and due to the size and location of the fire, the fire did not pose any safety significance. No safety systems had been impacted, Control Room habitability was not impacted, no safety system functions were required, and no safety functions were lost. Based upon this evaluation, it was decided that in accordance with guidance provided by EAL 3E, declaration of an Unusual Event was not required.
Upon further review of the event associated with NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000483/2004004, at 0925, 11/18/04, it was determined that a fire existed from the initial alarm at 1735 and lasted longer than 15 minutes. Because the initial fire lasted longer than 15 minutes, an Unusual Event should have been declared in accordance with plant Emergency Alarm Level 3E, 'Fire within the Protected Area boundary not extinguished within 15 minutes of verification.' Per guidance given in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, Section 3.1.1, 'Immediate Notifications', an ENS notification is being made within one hour of discovery of the event. No actual declaration of the emergency class will be made since the event has been concluded and the basis for the emergency no longer exists."
The licensee will inform both state and local agencies and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1735, 9/18/04, Callaway Control Room received an alarm on K0008 (Fire Protection Alarm and Control Workstation) for the Communication Corridor Lobby 2047 elevation. Initial investigation found significant smoke in the area of the Communication Corridor Elevator Room. During the investigation, a report was received in the Control Room that a small fire had occurred on the roof and had been extinguished. At 1743, the Callaway Fire Brigade was activated to investigate the source of the smoke. Upon arriving at the scene, no flames were observed and the Brigade began removing visquene [plastic] to facilitate observing additional areas within the room. At this time, small flames were observed and plant Emergency Alarm Level (EAL) 3E, 'Fire within the Protected Area boundary not extinguished within 15 minutes of verification' 15-minute time limit was entered. The fire was extinguished using a single powder type extinguisher and declared out at 1754.
At 1910, an Operator reported that the Communication Corridor fire had reflashed. The Fire Brigade was reactivated and the fire was extinguished at 1919 using a single powder type extinguisher. After determining the temperature of the elevator room ceiling was 250 degrees F, water was applied to the ceiling from inside the room and from the roof above. After verification that the fire was extinguished, a continuous fire watch was established for both the affected room and roof area. Initial evaluation of the fire event concluded that the fire was extinguished within 15 minutes of discovery, and due to the size and location of the fire, the fire did not pose any safety significance. No safety systems had been impacted, Control Room habitability was not impacted, no safety system functions were required, and no safety functions were lost. Based upon this evaluation, it was decided that in accordance with guidance provided by EAL 3E, declaration of an Unusual Event was not required.
Upon further review of the event associated with NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000483/2004004, at 0925, 11/18/04, it was determined that a fire existed from the initial alarm at 1735 and lasted longer than 15 minutes. Because the initial fire lasted longer than 15 minutes, an Unusual Event should have been declared in accordance with plant Emergency Alarm Level 3E, 'Fire within the Protected Area boundary not extinguished within 15 minutes of verification.' Per guidance given in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, Section 3.1.1, 'Immediate Notifications', an ENS notification is being made within one hour of discovery of the event. No actual declaration of the emergency class will be made since the event has been concluded and the basis for the emergency no longer exists."
The licensee will inform both state and local agencies and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41192
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID FOSS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID FOSS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 11/12/2004
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2004
Event Time: 03:57 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2004
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2004
Event Time: 03:57 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO OFF SITE POWER SOURCE FAST TRANSFER
"This 60-day optional report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of specified systems, specifically the Units 2 and 3 Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS).
"On 9/18/04, at approximately 0357 hours [EDT], the 343SU offsite-power source tripped resulting in a fast transfer of expected 4 kV emergency busses to the alternate offsite power source. The fast transfer resulted in system isolations on both units due to the affect on the PCIS instrumentation logic. The system isolations are an expected occurrence for a fast transfer. The isolations involved various process lines such as Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) and Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) / Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD). The Units 2 and 3 PCIS isolations were reset by approximately 0420 hours in accordance with procedures. All required isolation valves operated as designed.
"The offsite power source (343SU) was lost as a result of a momentary deenergization of the 220-34 Newlinville Transmission Line to clear a ground fault. The fault was approximately 29 miles from the PBAPS site and was caused by a lightning strike to a transmission tower near the Newlinville substation. Field inspections of the 220-34 Transmission Lines and Towers were performed and it was identified that there was a flash mark on the tower insulator confirming the lightning strike. It was determined that the protective relaying for the 220-34 Newlinville Transmission Line operated as designed. The 343SU offsite power source was returned to service by approximately 2115 hours on 9/18/04. This issue has been entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CR 254392) for evaluation and implementation of further corrective actions.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."
"This 60-day optional report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of specified systems, specifically the Units 2 and 3 Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS).
"On 9/18/04, at approximately 0357 hours [EDT], the 343SU offsite-power source tripped resulting in a fast transfer of expected 4 kV emergency busses to the alternate offsite power source. The fast transfer resulted in system isolations on both units due to the affect on the PCIS instrumentation logic. The system isolations are an expected occurrence for a fast transfer. The isolations involved various process lines such as Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) and Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) / Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD). The Units 2 and 3 PCIS isolations were reset by approximately 0420 hours in accordance with procedures. All required isolation valves operated as designed.
"The offsite power source (343SU) was lost as a result of a momentary deenergization of the 220-34 Newlinville Transmission Line to clear a ground fault. The fault was approximately 29 miles from the PBAPS site and was caused by a lightning strike to a transmission tower near the Newlinville substation. Field inspections of the 220-34 Transmission Lines and Towers were performed and it was identified that there was a flash mark on the tower insulator confirming the lightning strike. It was determined that the protective relaying for the 220-34 Newlinville Transmission Line operated as designed. The 343SU offsite power source was returned to service by approximately 2115 hours on 9/18/04. This issue has been entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CR 254392) for evaluation and implementation of further corrective actions.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."