Event Notification Report for September 15, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/14/2004 - 09/15/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
41041410434118341152
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41041
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHIL SANTINI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHIL SANTINI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/15/2004
Notification Time: 03:13 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2004
Event Time: 01:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2004
Notification Time: 03:13 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2004
Event Time: 01:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
CATHERINE HANEY (NRR)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
CATHERINE HANEY (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 70 | Power Operation | 2 | Startup |
NEW YORK STATE NOTIFIED THAT UNIT 2 WAS TAKEN OFFLINE FOR REPAIRS
Unit 2 was taken offline for repairs to "21" Main Feed Discharge Check Valve. The licensee will maintain Unit 2 in mode 2 at approximately 2% power for the duration of repairs.
The licensee informed the NY State Public Services Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 1045 EDT ON 9/15/04 FROM JOHN BAKER TO ARLON COSTA * * *
The above report was corrected to remove inaccurate information.
Notified R1DO( Doerflein) and NRR EO (Haney).
Unit 2 was taken offline for repairs to "21" Main Feed Discharge Check Valve. The licensee will maintain Unit 2 in mode 2 at approximately 2% power for the duration of repairs.
The licensee informed the NY State Public Services Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 1045 EDT ON 9/15/04 FROM JOHN BAKER TO ARLON COSTA * * *
The above report was corrected to remove inaccurate information.
Notified R1DO( Doerflein) and NRR EO (Haney).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41043
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM BRITTIAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM BRITTIAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 09/16/2004
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2004
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2004
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2004
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF LICENSE CONDITION - OPERATION ABOVE LICENSED POWER LIMIT
"This 24 hour Notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per Operating License No. NPF-39, Section 2.F to report a potential violation of the requirements contained in Section 2. C of Limerick Unit 1 license.
"On September 15, 2004 at 1600 Hrs. it was determined during an investigation of megawatt output differences between the two LGS Units, that LGS Unit 1 secondary plant parameters were identified as being outside of their expected range. This change occurred over several months at the rate of 0.1 %/month for a total potential error of 0.4%. This data indicates that LGS1 could possibly be above the operating license limit of 3458 MWth. Unit 1 power was reduced to 99% power to 3423 MWth as of 1618 to provide margin to licensed thermal power limit.
"A written report is required within 30 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73."
The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector.
"This 24 hour Notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per Operating License No. NPF-39, Section 2.F to report a potential violation of the requirements contained in Section 2. C of Limerick Unit 1 license.
"On September 15, 2004 at 1600 Hrs. it was determined during an investigation of megawatt output differences between the two LGS Units, that LGS Unit 1 secondary plant parameters were identified as being outside of their expected range. This change occurred over several months at the rate of 0.1 %/month for a total potential error of 0.4%. This data indicates that LGS1 could possibly be above the operating license limit of 3458 MWth. Unit 1 power was reduced to 99% power to 3423 MWth as of 1618 to provide margin to licensed thermal power limit.
"A written report is required within 30 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73."
The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41183
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICKEY STOCKTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICKEY STOCKTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/09/2004
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2004
Event Time: 09:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2004
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2004
Event Time: 09:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION VALVE
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the WBN [Watts Bar Nuclear] Train A Containment Vent Isolation signal. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the Information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
"On September 15, 2004, at 0914 EDT, a Train A Containment Vent Isolation (CVI) signal was received when the A Train Containment Purge Radiation Monitor momentarily spiked above the High Radiation Trip set-point. The B Train Containment Purge system was in operation at the time of the CVI signal and automatically shutdown as designed.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"The actuation was considered complete. The CVI signal for Train A automatically isolated the containment ventilation system as designed. The A Train Containment Purge Radiation Monitor was removed from service and considered inoperable due to no supporting indication of actual radiation by redundant radiation monitors or recorded trend data.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"Train A Containment Vent Isolation signal automatically actuated and functioned successfully. The CVI signal was not in response to an actual plant condition. Maintenance on the Train A Containment Purge Radiation Monitor, revealed a loose connection in the detector cable. The radiation monitor was repaired and returned to service and the containment ventilation air cleanup unit was also returned to service."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this by the licensee.
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the WBN [Watts Bar Nuclear] Train A Containment Vent Isolation signal. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the Information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
"On September 15, 2004, at 0914 EDT, a Train A Containment Vent Isolation (CVI) signal was received when the A Train Containment Purge Radiation Monitor momentarily spiked above the High Radiation Trip set-point. The B Train Containment Purge system was in operation at the time of the CVI signal and automatically shutdown as designed.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"The actuation was considered complete. The CVI signal for Train A automatically isolated the containment ventilation system as designed. The A Train Containment Purge Radiation Monitor was removed from service and considered inoperable due to no supporting indication of actual radiation by redundant radiation monitors or recorded trend data.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"Train A Containment Vent Isolation signal automatically actuated and functioned successfully. The CVI signal was not in response to an actual plant condition. Maintenance on the Train A Containment Purge Radiation Monitor, revealed a loose connection in the detector cable. The radiation monitor was repaired and returned to service and the containment ventilation air cleanup unit was also returned to service."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41152
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY HARRINGTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY HARRINGTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/27/2004
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2004
Event Time: 09:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2004
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2004
Event Time: 09:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
"In accordance with the requirements and guidance of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), a telephonic report of an invalid signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system is being submitted. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), automatic actuation of a system listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B), in lieu of a written LER.
"At 0911 hours, on 09/15/2004, while operating at full power, the plant experienced a loss of power to eight process radiation monitors. The loss of power was caused by the failure of an internal radiation monitor system power supply, PS-100. The affected radiation monitors actuated, where applicable, their associated safety and non-safety related components. The safety related components affected included eight containment isolation valves and the plant's auxiliary building special ventilation system equipment. The containment isolation valves were:
"- 4 steam generator blowdown system isolation valves (inside and outside containment isolation valves for each of the plant's two, 'A' and 'B' steam generators).
"- 4 steam generator sampling system isolation valves (inside and outside containment isolation valves for each of the plant's steam generators' sample system lines).
"All the components affected operated as designed. The effect on plant operation was not significant. The power supply was replaced and the ventilation systems, sampling and blowdown piping systems were realigned to normal.
"The power supply failure and subsequent closure signal to the noted containment isolation valves is an example of an invalid signal. No full or partial containment isolation signal was generated. None of the valve closures were needed to mitigate the consequences of the power supply failure. The investigation to determine the cause of the power supply failure continues."
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"In accordance with the requirements and guidance of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), a telephonic report of an invalid signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system is being submitted. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), automatic actuation of a system listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B), in lieu of a written LER.
"At 0911 hours, on 09/15/2004, while operating at full power, the plant experienced a loss of power to eight process radiation monitors. The loss of power was caused by the failure of an internal radiation monitor system power supply, PS-100. The affected radiation monitors actuated, where applicable, their associated safety and non-safety related components. The safety related components affected included eight containment isolation valves and the plant's auxiliary building special ventilation system equipment. The containment isolation valves were:
"- 4 steam generator blowdown system isolation valves (inside and outside containment isolation valves for each of the plant's two, 'A' and 'B' steam generators).
"- 4 steam generator sampling system isolation valves (inside and outside containment isolation valves for each of the plant's steam generators' sample system lines).
"All the components affected operated as designed. The effect on plant operation was not significant. The power supply was replaced and the ventilation systems, sampling and blowdown piping systems were realigned to normal.
"The power supply failure and subsequent closure signal to the noted containment isolation valves is an example of an invalid signal. No full or partial containment isolation signal was generated. None of the valve closures were needed to mitigate the consequences of the power supply failure. The investigation to determine the cause of the power supply failure continues."
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.