Event Notification Report for September 04, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/03/2004 - 09/04/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
41018410194102041021
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41018
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN COLVIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN COLVIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 09/04/2004
Notification Time: 05:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2004
Event Time: 01:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2004
Notification Time: 05:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2004
Event Time: 01:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 21 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL OSCILLATIONS
"While reducing power in response to expected severe weather conditions from hurricane Frances, the reactor was manually tripped from 21% reactor power. The reactor was tripped because of significant swings in the 'B' Steam Generator level caused by erratic operation of the 'B' Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV). All Control Element Assemblies fully inserted. Decay heat is currently being removed by Main Feedwater using the low power FRV bypass valves and Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS), maintaining RCS temperature at 532 degrees Fahrenheit. The unit will be maintained in a shutdown condition until repairs to the FRV are completed and the severe weather from Hurricane Frances abates.
"All primary and secondary systems performed as expected with the exception of the SBCS. The SBCS consists of five pressure control valves, PCV-8801 through PCV-8805 with PCV-8801 a larger capacity valve and designed to open first. The remaining valves are designed to open in series with overlap through their operating ranges. PCV-8801 failed to open and PCV-8802, 8803, and 8804 did not appear to properly control RCS temperature. PCV-8805 was operated in manual to control [steam generator] pressure.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM K. FREHAFER TO W. GOTT AT 1549 EDT ON 9/17/04 * * *
"Florida Power and Light (FPL) is retracting this notification because the feedwater issues during the shutdown were not causal to the manual reactor trip. The St. Lucie Emergency Plan, requires that the units be taken offline prior to the onset of hurricane force winds onsite. In accordance with these requirements, St. Lucie Unit 2 was being taken offline prior to the arrival of hurricane Frances. Although automatic feedwater issues occurred during the downpower, the operators successfully took manual control of the main feedwater system. A reactor trip was not necessary to mitigate the condition, and continued operation and on-line troubleshooting would have been practical had the plant not been required to be shutdown for the approaching hurricane. The main feedwater control issues were not relevant factors during the planned plant shutdown/manual reactor trip. Therefore FPL is retracting this notification."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO(Boland).
"While reducing power in response to expected severe weather conditions from hurricane Frances, the reactor was manually tripped from 21% reactor power. The reactor was tripped because of significant swings in the 'B' Steam Generator level caused by erratic operation of the 'B' Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV). All Control Element Assemblies fully inserted. Decay heat is currently being removed by Main Feedwater using the low power FRV bypass valves and Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS), maintaining RCS temperature at 532 degrees Fahrenheit. The unit will be maintained in a shutdown condition until repairs to the FRV are completed and the severe weather from Hurricane Frances abates.
"All primary and secondary systems performed as expected with the exception of the SBCS. The SBCS consists of five pressure control valves, PCV-8801 through PCV-8805 with PCV-8801 a larger capacity valve and designed to open first. The remaining valves are designed to open in series with overlap through their operating ranges. PCV-8801 failed to open and PCV-8802, 8803, and 8804 did not appear to properly control RCS temperature. PCV-8805 was operated in manual to control [steam generator] pressure.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM K. FREHAFER TO W. GOTT AT 1549 EDT ON 9/17/04 * * *
"Florida Power and Light (FPL) is retracting this notification because the feedwater issues during the shutdown were not causal to the manual reactor trip. The St. Lucie Emergency Plan, requires that the units be taken offline prior to the onset of hurricane force winds onsite. In accordance with these requirements, St. Lucie Unit 2 was being taken offline prior to the arrival of hurricane Frances. Although automatic feedwater issues occurred during the downpower, the operators successfully took manual control of the main feedwater system. A reactor trip was not necessary to mitigate the condition, and continued operation and on-line troubleshooting would have been practical had the plant not been required to be shutdown for the approaching hurricane. The main feedwater control issues were not relevant factors during the planned plant shutdown/manual reactor trip. Therefore FPL is retracting this notification."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO(Boland).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41019
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN COLVIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN COLVIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 09/04/2004
Notification Time: 05:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2004
Event Time: 02:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2004
Notification Time: 05:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2004
Event Time: 02:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 42 | Power Operation | 42 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS - EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA ACQUISITION DISPLAY SYSTEM
"At approximately 02:12 on September 4, 2004, the St. Lucie Emergency Response Data Acquisition Display System (ERDADS) failed. At the time of the failure the communication link to the NRC was in use due to the unusual event classification for an approaching hurricane. The ERDADS was restarted and functioning correctly as of approximately 03:40. The NRC link to Unit 1 has been reestablished. The NRC link to Unit 2 has not been restored as of this time. There appears to be a problem with the Unit 2 modem and efforts are underway to troubleshoot and repair the problem."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At approximately 02:12 on September 4, 2004, the St. Lucie Emergency Response Data Acquisition Display System (ERDADS) failed. At the time of the failure the communication link to the NRC was in use due to the unusual event classification for an approaching hurricane. The ERDADS was restarted and functioning correctly as of approximately 03:40. The NRC link to Unit 1 has been reestablished. The NRC link to Unit 2 has not been restored as of this time. There appears to be a problem with the Unit 2 modem and efforts are underway to troubleshoot and repair the problem."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 41020
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 09/04/2004
Notification Time: 21:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2004
Event Time: 13:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2004
Notification Time: 21:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2004
Event Time: 13:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
SCOTT FLANDERS (NMSS)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
SCOTT FLANDERS (NMSS)
VIOLATION OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL IN THE PROCESS BUILDING
"At 1345 [CDT], on 09-04-04 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a violation of Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) control in the C-337 process building. During Inspection of the RCW (Recirculating Cooling Water) line to the RCW/ R114 Differential Pressure alarm switches (DP switches) for the C-337 #5 Low Speed P&E (Purge and Evacuation) Pump, Instrument Maintenance discovered that the instrument line boss was plugged. This condition rendered both Independent DP switches incapable of performing their intended safety, violating an SRI (Safety Related Item) in Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) 039. The SRI requires that both DP alarms are to be functional while the P&E pump is Isolated from the cascade process system. The purpose of the SRI is to alert an operator to take actions within a 28 hour timeframe to prevent high moisture R-114 from leaking into the process gas system. The DP alarms had likely been nonfunctional for more than 28 hours when discovered. Clarity of the Instrument line boss was subsequently re-established and both DP alarms were returned to service. The R-114 was sampled and determined to be dry (low moisture content) within 4 hours of discovery, thereby re-establishing double contingency.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
While the R-114 was demonstrated to be dry, both OF alarms relied on for double contingency were disabled without the knowledge of the operators.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS:
Double contingency Is maintained by Implementing two controls on moderation.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency is based on the DP switch alarming to alert the operator to take action to either verify the R-114 is dry or to isolate the RCW and remove the R-114 from the system in order to prevent water from leaking into the process gas system. This DP alarm was not maintained as functional. The DP alarm was put back In service and the R-114 was sampled and found to be dry. The SRI was not maintained and the control was violated but the process condition was maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency is based on the independent DP switch alarming to alert the operator to take action to either verify the R-114 is dry or to Isolate the RCW and remove the R-114 from the system in order to prevent water from leaking into the process gas system. The independent DP alarm was not maintained as functional. The independent DP alarm was put back in service and the R-114 was sampled and found to be dry. The SRI was not maintained and the control was violated but the process condition was maintained. This re-established double contingency.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Both DP switches were returned to service and the R-114 was sampled and found to be dry within four hours time of discovery.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-04-3602; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-22
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"At 1345 [CDT], on 09-04-04 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a violation of Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) control in the C-337 process building. During Inspection of the RCW (Recirculating Cooling Water) line to the RCW/ R114 Differential Pressure alarm switches (DP switches) for the C-337 #5 Low Speed P&E (Purge and Evacuation) Pump, Instrument Maintenance discovered that the instrument line boss was plugged. This condition rendered both Independent DP switches incapable of performing their intended safety, violating an SRI (Safety Related Item) in Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) 039. The SRI requires that both DP alarms are to be functional while the P&E pump is Isolated from the cascade process system. The purpose of the SRI is to alert an operator to take actions within a 28 hour timeframe to prevent high moisture R-114 from leaking into the process gas system. The DP alarms had likely been nonfunctional for more than 28 hours when discovered. Clarity of the Instrument line boss was subsequently re-established and both DP alarms were returned to service. The R-114 was sampled and determined to be dry (low moisture content) within 4 hours of discovery, thereby re-establishing double contingency.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
While the R-114 was demonstrated to be dry, both OF alarms relied on for double contingency were disabled without the knowledge of the operators.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS:
Double contingency Is maintained by Implementing two controls on moderation.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency is based on the DP switch alarming to alert the operator to take action to either verify the R-114 is dry or to isolate the RCW and remove the R-114 from the system in order to prevent water from leaking into the process gas system. This DP alarm was not maintained as functional. The DP alarm was put back In service and the R-114 was sampled and found to be dry. The SRI was not maintained and the control was violated but the process condition was maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency is based on the independent DP switch alarming to alert the operator to take action to either verify the R-114 is dry or to Isolate the RCW and remove the R-114 from the system in order to prevent water from leaking into the process gas system. The independent DP alarm was not maintained as functional. The independent DP alarm was put back in service and the R-114 was sampled and found to be dry. The SRI was not maintained and the control was violated but the process condition was maintained. This re-established double contingency.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Both DP switches were returned to service and the R-114 was sampled and found to be dry within four hours time of discovery.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-04-3602; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-22
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41021
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN COLVIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN COLVIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 09/05/2004
Notification Time: 00:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2004
Event Time: 23:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2004
Notification Time: 00:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2004
Event Time: 23:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER
"At approximately 2350 [ET] on September 4, 2004 the ENS [Emergency Notification System] direct connection with the NRC was lost and the Emergency Data Acquisition Display System (ERDADS) link between Unit 1 and the NRC was also lost. By 0020 hours the ENS connection had been recovered [using local Florida Power and Light telephones]. The ERDADS link to unit 2 was still out of service from earlier in the day due to a failure of the modem for this circuit. It appears upon initial troubleshooting that the unit 1 modem is also now failed. The ENS and ERDADS were in active use at the time of the loss for the Unusual Event condition resulting from the severe weather conditions associated with hurricane Frances. The modems are serviced by NRC contractors. Repairs will be pursued once weather conditions allow access to the site."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At approximately 2350 [ET] on September 4, 2004 the ENS [Emergency Notification System] direct connection with the NRC was lost and the Emergency Data Acquisition Display System (ERDADS) link between Unit 1 and the NRC was also lost. By 0020 hours the ENS connection had been recovered [using local Florida Power and Light telephones]. The ERDADS link to unit 2 was still out of service from earlier in the day due to a failure of the modem for this circuit. It appears upon initial troubleshooting that the unit 1 modem is also now failed. The ENS and ERDADS were in active use at the time of the loss for the Unusual Event condition resulting from the severe weather conditions associated with hurricane Frances. The modems are serviced by NRC contractors. Repairs will be pursued once weather conditions allow access to the site."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.