Event Notification Report for September 01, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/31/2004 - 09/01/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
41032410104100541003
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 41032
Rep Org: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Licensee: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: PRINCETON State: NJ
County: MERCER
License #: 2905185-24
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SUE DUPRE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: PRINCETON State: NJ
County: MERCER
License #: 2905185-24
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SUE DUPRE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/09/2004
Notification Time: 14:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2004
Notification Time: 14:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
CHARLIE MILLER (NMSS)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
CHARLIE MILLER (NMSS)
TWO TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS MISSING
The two signs were discovered missing when an electrical contractor failed to turn over the exit signs to the University's Radiation Safety Officer. The signs were removed during building renovation that started in June. The contractor apparently stored the signs in a box under his desk and the box was removed and believed disposed of as trash. The licensee will follow-up in a written report.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY S. DUPRE TO JEFF ROTTON ON 09/14/04 AT 1430 EDT * * *
On 09/13/04 at 1014 EDT, the licensee was notified by the electrical contractor, that the missing exit signs were located in a gang box used for the Alexander Hall job and stored in the contractor's warehouse. The signs were returned to the licensee into the custody of the Environmental Heath and Safety Office, where they are currently stored awaiting return to the manufacturer.
Notified R1DO (Doerflein), and NMSS EO ( Moore )
The two signs were discovered missing when an electrical contractor failed to turn over the exit signs to the University's Radiation Safety Officer. The signs were removed during building renovation that started in June. The contractor apparently stored the signs in a box under his desk and the box was removed and believed disposed of as trash. The licensee will follow-up in a written report.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY S. DUPRE TO JEFF ROTTON ON 09/14/04 AT 1430 EDT * * *
On 09/13/04 at 1014 EDT, the licensee was notified by the electrical contractor, that the missing exit signs were located in a gang box used for the Alexander Hall job and stored in the contractor's warehouse. The signs were returned to the licensee into the custody of the Environmental Heath and Safety Office, where they are currently stored awaiting return to the manufacturer.
Notified R1DO (Doerflein), and NMSS EO ( Moore )
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41010
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY P. DOSTAL
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY P. DOSTAL
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 09/02/2004
Notification Time: 12:43 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2004
Event Time: 13:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2004
Notification Time: 12:43 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2004
Event Time: 13:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
HEAT BALANCE INDICATION ABOVE LICENSED VALUE
"This is a 24 hour ENS notification of a failure to comply with section 2C of the license, which authorizes operation of the facility at steady-state power levels not in excess of 1930 MWth.
"Description of Event:
"At 13:50, upon installation of a new PC [Plant Computer] isolator Power Supply, the PCS [Plant Computer System] Heat Balance indicated 1936 MWth. Operations immediately lowered reactor power to maintain indicated power less than 1930 MWth. At 09:38 on 09/01/04, the Plant Computer System Isolator Power Supply had failed. Per procedure an admin rod block was installed and all reactivity manipulations were ceased. A prompt investigation was commenced. Initial results of the prompt investigation indicate that the PC isolator Power Supply began to degrade on 08/29. This degradation resulted in a slow lowering of indicated CRD Flow which provides input to the PCS Heat Balance calculation. Based on evaluations of the impact of the degradation, the 1930 MWth limit was exceeded on 08/30/04 at 18:41. Power peaked at 1937 MWth, to approximately 100.4%, on 09/01/04.
"Immediate Corrective Actions:
1- Reduced reactor power to <1930 MWth per the heat balance
2- Verified correct all computer inputs Into the PCS Heat Balance
3 - Established a PCS Point Group for Heat Balance Inputs which are being checked twice a shift."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee.
"This is a 24 hour ENS notification of a failure to comply with section 2C of the license, which authorizes operation of the facility at steady-state power levels not in excess of 1930 MWth.
"Description of Event:
"At 13:50, upon installation of a new PC [Plant Computer] isolator Power Supply, the PCS [Plant Computer System] Heat Balance indicated 1936 MWth. Operations immediately lowered reactor power to maintain indicated power less than 1930 MWth. At 09:38 on 09/01/04, the Plant Computer System Isolator Power Supply had failed. Per procedure an admin rod block was installed and all reactivity manipulations were ceased. A prompt investigation was commenced. Initial results of the prompt investigation indicate that the PC isolator Power Supply began to degrade on 08/29. This degradation resulted in a slow lowering of indicated CRD Flow which provides input to the PCS Heat Balance calculation. Based on evaluations of the impact of the degradation, the 1930 MWth limit was exceeded on 08/30/04 at 18:41. Power peaked at 1937 MWth, to approximately 100.4%, on 09/01/04.
"Immediate Corrective Actions:
1- Reduced reactor power to <1930 MWth per the heat balance
2- Verified correct all computer inputs Into the PCS Heat Balance
3 - Established a PCS Point Group for Heat Balance Inputs which are being checked twice a shift."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41005
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SCHREIFELS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SCHREIFELS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/01/2004
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2004
Event Time: 12:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2004
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2004
Event Time: 12:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
JULIO LARA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO APPENDIX R CRITERIA NOT SATISFIED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"Unanalyzed condition due to missing fire barrier and inadequate separation involving power supply cables for RHR and Core Spray pumps. During a review of the site Appendix R program, NMC Engineering personnel discovered that the credited Monticello Division I RHR Pump and Core Spray Pump power cables pass through a Division II fire area. A fire in this room could potentially damage both divisions of post-fire safe shutdown equipment.
"This condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety due to the lack of required separation of post-fire safe shutdown trains. As a compensatory action an hourly fire watch has been established in accordance with the Monticello Fire Protection Program.
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee is continuing their evaluation to determine the extent of the condition.
"Unanalyzed condition due to missing fire barrier and inadequate separation involving power supply cables for RHR and Core Spray pumps. During a review of the site Appendix R program, NMC Engineering personnel discovered that the credited Monticello Division I RHR Pump and Core Spray Pump power cables pass through a Division II fire area. A fire in this room could potentially damage both divisions of post-fire safe shutdown equipment.
"This condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety due to the lack of required separation of post-fire safe shutdown trains. As a compensatory action an hourly fire watch has been established in accordance with the Monticello Fire Protection Program.
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee is continuing their evaluation to determine the extent of the condition.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41003
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRAIN ROKES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRAIN ROKES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/01/2004
Notification Time: 07:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2004
Event Time: 00:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2004
Notification Time: 07:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2004
Event Time: 00:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO OSCILLATING STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL
"On September 1, 2004, at 00:01 hours, operations noticed the 22 Main Feedwater (FW) regulating valve operating erratically and FW and 22 Steam Generator (SG) level oscillating. Operators placed the 22 Main FW regulating valve in manual and attempted to control FW flow and SG level but were unsuccessful. A Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) in the plant reported water hammer in the Auxiliary Building that contains the FW regulating valves. At 00:05 hours operations initiated a manual trip of the reactor based on the degrading condition with FW flow and SG level. All control rods fully inserted and safety equipment operated as expected. Auxiliary Feedwater started as expected, the Emergency Diesel Generators did not start and offsite power remained available. The plant is in Hot (Standby) at Normal Temperature and Pressure and there was no radiation release. The 22 Main FW regulating valve was discovered to be partially stuck open. At 00:19 hours operations isolated the 22 FW flow path by closing the 22 FW line motor operated valve (MOV) BFD 5-1. The condition is under investigation and a post trip review is being conducted." State of NY was notified of this event by the licensee.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE AT 1113 ON 9/1/04 FROM B. ROKES TO W. GOTT * * *
"After further review of the reporting guidelines and discussion with the NRC R1, Licensing concluded the event notification should be reported under 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(iv)(B) for a 4-hour report. A Condition Report was initiated for the late notification."
Notified NRR (Reis) and R1DO (Henderson).
"On September 1, 2004, at 00:01 hours, operations noticed the 22 Main Feedwater (FW) regulating valve operating erratically and FW and 22 Steam Generator (SG) level oscillating. Operators placed the 22 Main FW regulating valve in manual and attempted to control FW flow and SG level but were unsuccessful. A Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) in the plant reported water hammer in the Auxiliary Building that contains the FW regulating valves. At 00:05 hours operations initiated a manual trip of the reactor based on the degrading condition with FW flow and SG level. All control rods fully inserted and safety equipment operated as expected. Auxiliary Feedwater started as expected, the Emergency Diesel Generators did not start and offsite power remained available. The plant is in Hot (Standby) at Normal Temperature and Pressure and there was no radiation release. The 22 Main FW regulating valve was discovered to be partially stuck open. At 00:19 hours operations isolated the 22 FW flow path by closing the 22 FW line motor operated valve (MOV) BFD 5-1. The condition is under investigation and a post trip review is being conducted." State of NY was notified of this event by the licensee.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE AT 1113 ON 9/1/04 FROM B. ROKES TO W. GOTT * * *
"After further review of the reporting guidelines and discussion with the NRC R1, Licensing concluded the event notification should be reported under 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(iv)(B) for a 4-hour report. A Condition Report was initiated for the late notification."
Notified NRR (Reis) and R1DO (Henderson).