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Event Notification Report for August 24, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/23/2004 - 08/24/2004

EVENT NUMBERS
40981409824098340985

Power Reactor
Event Number: 40981
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1     State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: C. BAUER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/24/2004
Notification Time: 16:48 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2004
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 98 Power Operation 98 Power Operation
Event Text
NORTH PLANT VENT RADIATION MONITOR SKID TEST CONNECTION VALVE INADVERTENTLY LEFT OPEN.

"On Tuesday 8/24/04 at 1330 hours, a test connection valve on the North Plant Vent radiation monitor skid was identified to have been inadvertently left open. This configuration issue appears to have occurred sometime on 8/19/04 following corrective maintenance on the North Plant Vent radiation monitor skid. With this valve left open, the process flow path for the skid was effectively diluted as room air was drawn into the normal process flow from the North Plant Ventilation ductwork. The physical location of the valve left open on the skid was such that the High/Low Noble Gas Range Monitors Iodine Sampler and Particulate Sampler would have been affected by this oversight. Technical Specification section 3.3.7.5 for Accident Monitoring as well as Offsite Dose Calculation Manual section 3.3.7.11 would have been applicable for the condition described. The preplanned alternate method of monitoring (sampling) the parameters was not established. This is in contrary to the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Off Site Dose manual. This condition has been corrected and the North Plant Vent radiation monitor skid is currently operable. Though alternate sampling capability was available, it was not recognized that it was required. Should an accident have occurred during the time that the valve was open emergency assessment capability would have been compromised. This report is being made under Hope Creek Event Classification Guide RAL# 11.7.1.c in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

Local authorities will be notified of this by the licensee."

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 40982
Rep Org: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Licensee: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON   State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON S. POST
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 08/24/2004
Notification Time: 17:36 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
Event Text
PART 21 REPORTABLE CONDITION AND 60-DAY INTERIM REPORT NOTIFICATION: NON-CONSERVATIVE SAFETY LIMIT MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO

Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) and GE Nuclear Energy (GENE) have determined that the current GNF process for determination of the Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (SLMCPR) can result in a non-conservative SLMCPR. GENE has historically used a non-conservative SLMCPR impact of 0.01 as the threshold for reportability under 10CFR21. A preliminary screening evaluation has been completed for all plants operating with a SLMCPR calculated by GNF to determine those that have a nonconservative impact of 0.01 or greater. Verification has been completed for those plants that the screen showed to have a non-conservative SLMCPR impact of 0.01 or greater. Verification has not been completed for the plants that the screen showed had an impact of less than 0.01 or were unaffected, thus requiring a 60-Day Interim Report notification pending verification completion.

The plants for which GNF calculates the SLMCPR are identified [below]. Those plants for which the preliminary screen indicated that the current SLMCPR is unaffected are identified as a 60-Day Interim Report. Upon completion of verification (assuming the results of the screen are confirmed) the status of these plants will be changed to Not Reportable. GENE will provide a follow-up report to the NRC by September 29, 2004. The plants for which the current SLMCPR is non-conservative by 0.01 or greater are identified as a Reportable Condition under 10CFR21.21(d). These plants will take action to address the Reportable Condition.

GNF has notified all plants that have been confirmed to be affected. The plants that have a non-conservative SLMCPR for current plant operation will take action to mitigate the potential impact. Depending on the specific circumstances, mitigating actions to protect the SLMCPR may include increasing the OLMCPR to assure compliance with the low flow calculated SLMCPR. In some cases sufficient conservatism may exist in the OLMCPR at low flow to bound the increased SLMCPR. Each affected plant will notify the NRC and take appropriate action if their Technical Specifications are affected.

There are no actions necessary for the plants that are unaffected pending completion of verification. If, in the course of verification, GNF determines that there is an impact, the affected utility will be notified immediately. GNF will complete the verification and GENE, will provide a follow-up letter to the NRC by September 29, 2004.

Affected and 60-Day Interim Notification Plants:

60-Day Interim Report: Clinton, Oyster Creek, Brunswick 1, Brunswick 2, Nine Mile Point 2, Fitzpatrick (60-Day interim report for current operation, Reportable Condition for SLMCPR licensing submittal), Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, Dresden 2, Dresden 3, LaSalle 1, LaSalle 2, Limerick 1, Limerick 2, Peach Bottom 2, Peach Bottom 3, Quad Cities 1, Quad Cities 2, Perry 1, Duane Arnold, Monticello, Hope Creek, Hatch 1, Hatch 2, Browns Ferry 2

Reportable Condition: Nine Mile Point 1, Fermi 2, Fitzpatrick (60-Day interim report for current operation, Reportable Condition for SLMCPR licensing submittal), Cooper.

* * * UPDATE FROM JASON POST (VIA FAX) TO CROUCH @ 2354 HRS. EST ON 09/29/04 * * *

In part, the update reads:

"The evaluation for the potentially unaffected plants has now been completed. The results of the screening calculation have been confirmed: this is not a reportable condition for the plants that were previously identified as a 60-Day Interim Report notification in MFN 04-081" (See above).

Notified R1DO(Rogge), R2DO(Lesser), R3DO(Kozak), R4DO(Howell) and NRREO(Hodges).


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40983
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: STEVEN MENG
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/24/2004
Notification Time: 17:36 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2004
Event Time: 09:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 95 Power Operation 95 Power Operation
Event Text
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) DECLARED INOPERABLE

At 1128 hours on 8/23/04, the Division 3 Essential Switchgear Heat Removal System (VX) was removed from service and declared inoperable for performance of system flow verification and balance. The test includes an as found flow check on the Division 3 Essential Switchgear Heat Removal System Condensing Unit, rendering the Division 3 VX safety-related chiller 1VX06CC INOPERABLE. The non-safety VX subsystem remained OPERABLE during the test.

"At 0917 hours on 8/24/04, the non-safety Division 3 VX Heat Removal Supply Fan 1VX04CC, tripped due to the breaker for the safety-related fan being removed for replacement. The Main Control Room received alarm 5042-6A, Auto Trip Pump/Fan. Since both the safety and non-safety subsystems of VX were unavailable Operators declared the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System inoperable per Technical Specification 3.7.2, Action A.1.

"At 1153 hours, the breaker replacement was complete, 1VX04CC was restored to service, and the HPCS System was declared OPERABLE.

"The VX System maintains safety-related switchgear, battery and inverter room, and cable spread areas within the design temperature limits of the equipment. The VX system is support system for the HPCS System. With both subsystems of the VX System out of service, the HPCS System may not have been capable of performing its safety function to provide Emergency Core Cooling, aid in depressurization and maintain reactor vessel water level following a loss of coolant accident.

"An engineering evaluation is currently in progress to determine if the HPCS System would have been capable of performing its safety function with both safety and non-safety subsystems of VX out of service.

"This issue is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

* * * RETRACTION FROM BILL CARSKY TO BILL HUFFMAN AT 17:47 EDT ON 10/08/04 * * *

"Upon further review of this event, additional analysis has been performed which bounds the design bases heatup of the associated rooms cooled by the Division III Essential Switchgear Heat Removal System (VX). This analysis concludes that the areas cooled by the Division 3 VX subsystem would not have exceeded design temperatures while the cooling was secured, prior to cooling recovery, and that the supported systems remained operable.

"Based upon this additional analysis, it can be reasonably concluded that the safety function of High Pressure Core Spray, as a single train safety system, was fulfilled. Therefore this event is not reportable and Event #40983 is being retracted."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. R3DO (Clayton) has been notified.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40985
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: CARL SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/25/2004
Notification Time: 09:44 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2004
Event Time: 10:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
Event Text
24 HOUR 91-01 RESPONSE BULLETIN

An incorrect valve line-up caused a batch from the solvent extraction system to be pumped to the uranyl nitrate bulk storage tank without having the necessary sample results for grams U-235 per liter, percent free acid, and pH. It was determined that approximately 38 gallons of uranyl nitrate at 4.6 grams U-235, 8 percent free acid, and a pH of 1 was pumped to the bulk storage tank. These parameters meet the requirements for an authorized pumpout. The bulk storage tank contained approximately 1600 gallons of uranyl nitrate at approximately 1.4 grams U-235 per liter, 11.6 percent free acid, and a pH of 1.

Double contingency protection for the bulk storage tank is based on concentration control. Concentration control is based upon maintaining uranyl nitrate that is pumped to the tanks at less than 5 grams U-235/liter. The pH is maintained at a value of less than 2 to ensure that the uranyl nitrate stays in solution. The percent free acid is maintained at greater than 4 percent to ensure that the uranyl nitrate stays in solution and depresses the freezing temperature of the solution to prevent concentration by freezing.

It has been determined that less than previously documented double contingency protection remained for the system and that greater than a safe mass was involved, but a sufficient number of controls that were lost were restored within 4 hours. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification.

Summary of Activity

All pumpouts to bulk storage tanks were stopped immediately upon recognition. This action was initiated by operators monitoring system performance.

Samples for grams U-235/liter, pH, and %free acid were taken to ensure the tanks were in specification.

Before the end of the shift, sample results for grams U-235/liter, pH, and %free acid were confirmed to be acceptable.

At the beginning of each shift, operators are being informed of the incident.

The procedure is being modified immediately to incorporate an additional peer check.

Independent locks will be installed to require separate individuals to unlock the valve prior to pumpout.

Conclusions

Loss of double contingency protection occurred.

At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.

The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.

Notification was the result of an event, not a deficient NCS analysis.

A causal analysis will be performed.