Event Notification Report for August 22, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/21/2004 - 08/22/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40974
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES SIBLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES SIBLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/22/2004
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2004
Event Time: 10:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2004
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2004
Event Time: 10:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
DAVID MATTHEWS (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
VICTOR DRICKS (R4PA)
GREG PICK (R4)
DAVID MATTHEWS (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
VICTOR DRICKS (R4PA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR TRIP DURING SURVEILLANCE TEST
"At 1010 CDT on 8-22-2004, during the performance of STS IC-211B, 'ACTUATION LOGIC TEST TRAIN B SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM,' Control Room operators received a reactor trip concurrent with power range flux lo [low] setpoint trip and intermediate range hi [high] flux reactor trip alarms.
"All safety-related equipment operated as required. The Steam Dump valves, which function to remove excess heat as the secondary systems shutdown, did not initially operate as expected, resulting in the operation of the Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) to control Reactor Coolant pressure for approximately three minutes following the reactor trip, at which time the Steam Dump valves responded as expected and the ARVs closed. The Steam Dumps are currently operating correctly in automatic.
"The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated as designed.
"The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 at Normal Operating Temperature and Pressure while plant personnel investigate the causes of the reactor trip and formulate the repair/ restart plan.
"A press release is planned."
During the reactor trip, all control rods fully inserted. The electric plant is in a stable shutdown plant lineup. Plant personnel also intend to investigate the unusual response of the steam dump valves.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * Update on 08/23/04 at 1635 EDT by Steven Gifford taken by MacKinnon * * *
"Upon data review related to the operation of the Steam Dump valves and the Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs), plant staff has determined that the ARVs and Steam Dump valves operated as expected. The Steam Dump valves opened immediately following the reactor trip, as designed, due to the difference between their setpoint and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature at the time of the reactor trip. The Steam Dump valves remained open for approximately 20 to 30 seconds, at which time the RCS temperature had decreased to a value within the control range for the Steam Dump valves, causing them to close. The opening of the ARVs was in response, as designed, to the increase in Steam Generator pressure that resulted from the turbine trip shortly after the reactor trip."
NRC R4DO (Tom Farnholtz) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee
"At 1010 CDT on 8-22-2004, during the performance of STS IC-211B, 'ACTUATION LOGIC TEST TRAIN B SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM,' Control Room operators received a reactor trip concurrent with power range flux lo [low] setpoint trip and intermediate range hi [high] flux reactor trip alarms.
"All safety-related equipment operated as required. The Steam Dump valves, which function to remove excess heat as the secondary systems shutdown, did not initially operate as expected, resulting in the operation of the Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) to control Reactor Coolant pressure for approximately three minutes following the reactor trip, at which time the Steam Dump valves responded as expected and the ARVs closed. The Steam Dumps are currently operating correctly in automatic.
"The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated as designed.
"The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 at Normal Operating Temperature and Pressure while plant personnel investigate the causes of the reactor trip and formulate the repair/ restart plan.
"A press release is planned."
During the reactor trip, all control rods fully inserted. The electric plant is in a stable shutdown plant lineup. Plant personnel also intend to investigate the unusual response of the steam dump valves.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * Update on 08/23/04 at 1635 EDT by Steven Gifford taken by MacKinnon * * *
"Upon data review related to the operation of the Steam Dump valves and the Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs), plant staff has determined that the ARVs and Steam Dump valves operated as expected. The Steam Dump valves opened immediately following the reactor trip, as designed, due to the difference between their setpoint and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature at the time of the reactor trip. The Steam Dump valves remained open for approximately 20 to 30 seconds, at which time the RCS temperature had decreased to a value within the control range for the Steam Dump valves, causing them to close. The opening of the ARVs was in response, as designed, to the increase in Steam Generator pressure that resulted from the turbine trip shortly after the reactor trip."
NRC R4DO (Tom Farnholtz) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41132
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WALLACE JUDD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WALLACE JUDD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/19/2004
Notification Time: 08:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2004
Event Time: 04:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2004
Notification Time: 08:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2004
Event Time: 04:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2)
DAVID AYRES (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60 DAY REPORT - INVALID ACTUATION OF SPECIFIED SYSTEM
"This 60-day optional report as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a specified system, specifically the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS).
"During TSM 158 work associated with W/O 98686671 a SPOC Relief Supervisor inadvertently caused a ground when disconnecting test meter leads from an energized circuit. This ground resulted in an unplanned RN [Nuclear Service Water] swap to the SNSWP [Standby Nuclear Service Water System].
"At 0450 on 8/22/04, a lo-lo level signal was received for B Train RN Pit and this initiated a swap to the SNSWP for both A and B trains. Prior to this event, both trains of RN had been aligned to the SNSWP on 8/16/04 for maintenance, and remained on the SNSWP due to 1RN-4B degraded condition (PIP C-04-3937)
"The lo-lo level signal did initiate a start of all four RN Pumps (1B and 2B started; 1A and 2A were already operating). RN crossover valves 1RN-53B and 1RN 54A closed as expected, separating RN trains A and B. Flow was manually initiated through all four NS Heat Exchangers to attempt to meet RN pump minimum flow demands. This was a complete actuation for Train B and the system performed as designed for existing plant conditions. This event was entered into the site corrective action program for resolution (PIP C04-04056).
"At 1629 on 8/22/04, a lo-lo level signal was received for B Train RN Pit and this initiated a swap to the SNSWP for both A and B trains. Prior to this event, both trains of RN had been aligned to the SNSWP on 8/16/04 for maintenance, and remained on the SNSWP due to 1RN-4B degraded condition (PIP C-04-3937). RN system response was as expected. The lo-lo level signal did initiate a start of all four RN Pumps (1B and 2A started; 1A and 2B were already operating). RN crossover valves 1RN-47A and 2RN-47A closed as expected, and return header isolation valves 1RN-53B and 1RN-54A closed as expected, separating RN trains A and B.
"Flow was manually initiated through all four NS heat exchangers to attempt to meet RN pump minimum flow demands. The reasons for the inadvertent actuation was a blown fuse. Performed Troubleshooting Plan to I/R Cause of Fuse HA-1 in 1EATC6 blowing under W/O #98686856-01 and 03. No cause for the fuse blowing on 2004-08-22 could be found. All data obtained under the plan were well within normal values.
"Thermography data indicate the fuse temperature was about 3 Deg F above ambient. The current through the fuse is 1.3 Amps. (Fuse HA-1 is a FLQ-3) Current alarm HF in 1EATC6 was calibrated, and was found in tolerance. No change in current through the fuse was noted during the calibration of the current alarm. The current alarm was cycled 5 times.
"This was a complete actuation for Train B and the system performed as designed for the existing plant conditions. This event has been entered into the site specific corrective action program for resolution. (C04-4060)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This 60-day optional report as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a specified system, specifically the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS).
"During TSM 158 work associated with W/O 98686671 a SPOC Relief Supervisor inadvertently caused a ground when disconnecting test meter leads from an energized circuit. This ground resulted in an unplanned RN [Nuclear Service Water] swap to the SNSWP [Standby Nuclear Service Water System].
"At 0450 on 8/22/04, a lo-lo level signal was received for B Train RN Pit and this initiated a swap to the SNSWP for both A and B trains. Prior to this event, both trains of RN had been aligned to the SNSWP on 8/16/04 for maintenance, and remained on the SNSWP due to 1RN-4B degraded condition (PIP C-04-3937)
"The lo-lo level signal did initiate a start of all four RN Pumps (1B and 2B started; 1A and 2A were already operating). RN crossover valves 1RN-53B and 1RN 54A closed as expected, separating RN trains A and B. Flow was manually initiated through all four NS Heat Exchangers to attempt to meet RN pump minimum flow demands. This was a complete actuation for Train B and the system performed as designed for existing plant conditions. This event was entered into the site corrective action program for resolution (PIP C04-04056).
"At 1629 on 8/22/04, a lo-lo level signal was received for B Train RN Pit and this initiated a swap to the SNSWP for both A and B trains. Prior to this event, both trains of RN had been aligned to the SNSWP on 8/16/04 for maintenance, and remained on the SNSWP due to 1RN-4B degraded condition (PIP C-04-3937). RN system response was as expected. The lo-lo level signal did initiate a start of all four RN Pumps (1B and 2A started; 1A and 2B were already operating). RN crossover valves 1RN-47A and 2RN-47A closed as expected, and return header isolation valves 1RN-53B and 1RN-54A closed as expected, separating RN trains A and B.
"Flow was manually initiated through all four NS heat exchangers to attempt to meet RN pump minimum flow demands. The reasons for the inadvertent actuation was a blown fuse. Performed Troubleshooting Plan to I/R Cause of Fuse HA-1 in 1EATC6 blowing under W/O #98686856-01 and 03. No cause for the fuse blowing on 2004-08-22 could be found. All data obtained under the plan were well within normal values.
"Thermography data indicate the fuse temperature was about 3 Deg F above ambient. The current through the fuse is 1.3 Amps. (Fuse HA-1 is a FLQ-3) Current alarm HF in 1EATC6 was calibrated, and was found in tolerance. No change in current through the fuse was noted during the calibration of the current alarm. The current alarm was cycled 5 times.
"This was a complete actuation for Train B and the system performed as designed for the existing plant conditions. This event has been entered into the site specific corrective action program for resolution. (C04-4060)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.