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Event Notification Report for August 15, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/14/2004 - 08/15/2004

EVENT NUMBERS
40961409574095840959

General Information or Other
Event Number: 40961
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: PADUCAH BJC WASTE GENERATOR SERVICES
Region: 4
City: FLAGSTAFF   State: AZ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 08/16/2004
Notification Time: 13:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2004
Event Time: 13:20 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING RADIOACTIVE SHIPMENT

"Background: T-hopper containers holding approximately 5 tons of depleted UF4 were packaged for shipment to Nevada Test Site (NTS) as radioactive low specific activity waste. The T-hoppers are over packed in a sealand box holding either two or three T-hoppers depending on the total weight. The shipment package is prepared by spreading an absorbent material around the floor to absorb any condensation. After placement of absorbent, bags of vemiculite are added to fill void space. Sealands are loaded onto flat-bed trucks or pin-type trailers, one sealand per truck. NTS shipments #PDL-04-161, #PDL-04-163, #PDL-04-164, #PDL-04-165, and #PDL-04-166 left the Paducah site on Friday, August 13, 2004, via Tri-State Motor Transit. Each truck was loaded with one sealand. The T-hoppers and all internal materials were surveyed prior to leaving the site and no contamination was found.

"Incident and Response Chronology: At approximately 1030 hrs. on Sunday, August 15, 2004, the driver of the truck carrying shipment #PDL-04-161 reported finding a small quantity of a white, granular solid and a clear, gel-like material on the bed of the truck. The truck was stopped in Rio Puerco, New Mexico at a truck stop off Interstate 40 (I-40) West. The driver notified the Paducah Bechtel Jacobs Company (BJC) Transportation Specialist who instructed him to remain at his current location. The Transportation Specialist notified Paducah BJC Waste Generator Services personnel at 1130 hrs. Paducah team consisting of the Project Manager, Waste Generator Services, and Health Physics was assembled to determine appropriate actions.

"At approximately 1100 hrs on August 15, 2004, the BJC Transportation Specialist received a call from the driver of shipment #PDL-04-163 reporting similar conditions. This driver was located at Gallup, NM, Exit 16 off of I-40 West. Two other trucks carrying shipments #PDL-04-164 and #PDL-04-166 arrived at Gallup shortly after Paducah received the notification from the first driver. The drivers of these trucks were also instructed to remain in Gallup. Upon inspections by the drivers, one truck, shipment #PDL-04-164, also had material on the bed of the truck. At approximately 1400 hrs. the driver of the fifth truck, shipment #PDL-04-165, was contacted. He was located in Flagstaff, AZ and instructed to remain there. Upon inspection, the driver of this truck also reported seeing the white, granular solid and clear gel-like material.

"At 1330 hrs. BJC Oak Ridge Waste Operations personnel notified the Oak Ridge ETTP Park Shift Superintendent (PSS) who initiated emergency response actions. At approximately 1500 hrs, the DOE Region 2 Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Coordinator notified Paducah that teams of radiological technicians from DOE sites in the area were being dispatched to survey the trucks. A DOE Region IV RAP Coordinator notified Paducah that he would make notifications to the State Police in AZ and NM.

"Environmental, Safety and Health Impact: None Identified at the time of the initial report. Based on the initial information from the truck drivers, the description of the material matches that of the absorbent material (Quik-Solid) placed in the containers to absorb any condensation that might form. This material in non-hazardous."


Power Reactor
Event Number: 40957
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4     State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JAMES BOYLE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/15/2004
Notification Time: 08:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2004
Event Time: 04:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
CYNTHIA CARPENTER (NRR)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

"At 0405 on August 15, 2004, River Bend Station had a loss of 230Kv Line #353 (RSS #2, Port Hudson) feeding the plant's switchyard. This resulted in a generator trip and a reactor scram. Feedwater tripped on a Reactor vessel Level 8 signal. RCIC is operating to control reactor vessel level. SRVs were used to manually control pressure. Mechanical vacuum pump (ARC A) would not start to control condenser vacuum. The MSIVs were manually isolated in anticipation of a Group 6 isolation (low vacuum). There was no ECCS initiation. Power was restored to the mechanical vacuum pump ARC B. Vacuum was restored and main steam lanes are in use for pressure control. We are still investigating the root cause.

"The following ESF actuations occurred:

"- Division II Diesel Generator
"- Standby Gas Treatment System
"- Annulus Mixing System
"- Control Building Ventilation System."

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 8/15/04 AT 1340 EDT FROM JAMES BOYLE TO GERRY WAIG * * *

"River Bend Station is currently in Mode 3, Hot Shutdown. During the event, offsite power was maintained through Reserve Station Service Line #1 to Division 1 safety related equipment and 'A' balance of plant (BOP) non-safety related equipment. The 230 KV line from the plant's switchyard (RSS Line #2) that was lost during the event has been recovered and the Division 2 bus has been restored to its normal power supply. The Division 2 diesel generator has been secured from operation [and has been placed in standby]

"During, the event, main condenser vacuum was restored from the main control room by starting the 'B' mechanical vacuum pump. Feedwater Pump 'A' remained available during the event. The circulating water supply to the main condenser remained in operation throughout the event. RCIC [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] remains in service for reactor vessel level control. The ESF [Emergency Safety Feature] systems have been secured and placed in standby. A root cause team has been assembled to address the cause of the initial failure of the 230 KV Line #353."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector

Notified R4DO (Linda Smith) and NRR EO (Cynthia Carpenter)


Power Reactor
Event Number: 40958
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2     State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID JESTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/15/2004
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2004
Event Time: 13:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown
2 N Y 96 Power Operation 96 Power Operation
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE DUE TO INADVERTENT EMERGENCY SIREN ACTUATION


"On August 15, 2004, at approximately 1322 hours, the Brunswick site identified an inadvertent actuation of 1 offsite evacuation siren. There are a total of 36 sirens located in Brunswick and New Hanover Counties, NC. The siren in alarm is located in Brunswick County and was in an alarm condition from 1258 until 1341. In accordance with Brunswick operating procedures, the warning points (Brunswick County, New Hanover County and NC State EOC) have been notified of the inadvertent siren actuation. The remaining 35 sirens are operable.


INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION:

"Minimal safety significance. The loss of the single siren will not significantly impact the public notification system. The remaining sirens in both Brunswick and New Hanover Counties have been verified to be operable.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

"The siren was silenced at 13:41 EDT on August 15, 2004. The cause of the inadvertent actuation will be determined and the siren will be repaired.

"The (NRC) resident inspector has been notified."


Power Reactor
Event Number: 40959
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4     State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRUCE HUGO
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 08/15/2004
Notification Time: 19:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2004
Event Time: 13:03 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 18 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP

"With a reactor startup in progress at 1303 PDT, operators at Columbia Generating Station inserted a manual
reactor scram when the running Reactor Feedwater (RFW-P-1A) pump tripped. Reactor power was approximately 18% at the time of RFW-P-1A trip. The cause of the RFW-P-1A trip was a high RFW Turbine Drain Tank (MD-TK-1) level; the cause of the MD-TK-1 high level is under investigation. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) was used [manually started] to maintain reactor vessel water level until reactor pressure was reduced to within the capacity of the condensate booster pumps; the RCIC system has been returned to a standby lineup. The reactor is in mode 3 with both reactor recirculation pumps running at minimum speed (15 Hertz). Decay heat is being rejected to the main condenser via auxiliary steam loads.

"One control rod that indicated full-in immediately after the scram lost full-in indication eleven seconds after the
scram. This control rod indicated full-in again 84 seconds after the scram.

"This ENS notification is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.