Event Notification Report for August 04, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/03/2004 - 08/04/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
409314092740921409224092440925
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40931
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: AEROJET ORDNANCE TENNESSEE INC
Region: 1
City: JONESBORO State: TN
County:
License #: S-90009
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILLY FREEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Licensee: AEROJET ORDNANCE TENNESSEE INC
Region: 1
City: JONESBORO State: TN
County:
License #: S-90009
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILLY FREEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 08/06/2004
Notification Time: 15:11 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/2004
Notification Time: 15:11 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
"Event description: The licensee called to report a fire in the depleted uranium (DU) machining bay. The fire spread into the ventilation duct and filter housing. The fire was contained inside the ventilation duct and filter housing. The fire blistered the paint on the ventilation ducting and Torit filter housing and breached the ventilation system filters (bag and HEPA). A minor release to the environment occurred through the stack. Visible smoke was observed coming through the stack for a 6 - 8 minute period until the ventilation blast gate was closed. Air sample data indicated the uranium in air concentration in the machining area was 2% DAC. The air effluent concentration through the stack was 15% of the effluent limit. Personnel were evacuated from the DU machining area and from the office areas. Production at the grinder will not restart until the cause of the fire is known and corrective actions can be taken to prevent reoccurrence. A written report will be submitted to the Division.
Report number: TN-04-105
"Event description: The licensee called to report a fire in the depleted uranium (DU) machining bay. The fire spread into the ventilation duct and filter housing. The fire was contained inside the ventilation duct and filter housing. The fire blistered the paint on the ventilation ducting and Torit filter housing and breached the ventilation system filters (bag and HEPA). A minor release to the environment occurred through the stack. Visible smoke was observed coming through the stack for a 6 - 8 minute period until the ventilation blast gate was closed. Air sample data indicated the uranium in air concentration in the machining area was 2% DAC. The air effluent concentration through the stack was 15% of the effluent limit. Personnel were evacuated from the DU machining area and from the office areas. Production at the grinder will not restart until the cause of the fire is known and corrective actions can be taken to prevent reoccurrence. A written report will be submitted to the Division.
Report number: TN-04-105
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40927
Facility: BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: ADVANCED FUEL R&D AND PILOT PLANTS
NRC Notified By: JOE JACOBSEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: ADVANCED FUEL R&D AND PILOT PLANTS
NRC Notified By: JOE JACOBSEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/05/2004
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2004
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2004
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2004
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
THE LICENSEE VIOLATED LICENSE CONDITION 10 CFR 20.1703(a)
On 08/04/04 @ 0900 CDT workers were assigned to perform activities in the High Energy Radiation Cell (HEC) were observed using their new style of powered air purifying respirator (PAPR) in a configuration that is not approved by the manufacturer. The assigned crew, two laborers and a HP Tech, were instructed to pull out of the HEC. The crew spent approximately 15 minutes in the HEC. During the initial fact finding assessment it became evident that the incorrect configuration PAPR was not only restricted to the observed use in the HEC, but had been used periodically for work previously at the facility over the last few months. Individuals were questioned on the performance of prerequisite inspections and checks of the PAPR unit. Individuals stated that they had performed the required face piece fit check (negative pressure method) and flow test of the unit prior to each use.
In this improper configuration, the individuals were using uncertified equipment, however, no over exposure is expected to the individuals.
On 08/04/04 @ 0900 CDT workers were assigned to perform activities in the High Energy Radiation Cell (HEC) were observed using their new style of powered air purifying respirator (PAPR) in a configuration that is not approved by the manufacturer. The assigned crew, two laborers and a HP Tech, were instructed to pull out of the HEC. The crew spent approximately 15 minutes in the HEC. During the initial fact finding assessment it became evident that the incorrect configuration PAPR was not only restricted to the observed use in the HEC, but had been used periodically for work previously at the facility over the last few months. Individuals were questioned on the performance of prerequisite inspections and checks of the PAPR unit. Individuals stated that they had performed the required face piece fit check (negative pressure method) and flow test of the unit prior to each use.
In this improper configuration, the individuals were using uncertified equipment, however, no over exposure is expected to the individuals.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40921
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY STALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY STALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/04/2004
Notification Time: 11:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2004
Event Time: 10:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/04/2004
Notification Time: 11:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2004
Event Time: 10:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/04/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNEXPECTED REACTOR TRIP DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES
At 1024 EDT a reactor trip occurred during maintenance activities involving the control rod drive trip breakers. All control rods fully inserted. The unit is currently stable with decay heat removal via the main steam system through the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Post trip response was normal with the following exceptions noted:
1. #4 main turbine stop valve may not have fully closed.
2. A #2 Steam Generator Safety Valve may be lifting early (lifted at 1010 psi rather than the 1050 psi setpoint).
3. Turbine Bypass valve SP13A3 stuck slightly open - isolated.
All offsite power lines have been verified operable and both EDGs are available in standby, if needed. The licensee informed the local sheriff's department as required whenever a Steam Generator Safety valve lifts and the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1024 EDT a reactor trip occurred during maintenance activities involving the control rod drive trip breakers. All control rods fully inserted. The unit is currently stable with decay heat removal via the main steam system through the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Post trip response was normal with the following exceptions noted:
1. #4 main turbine stop valve may not have fully closed.
2. A #2 Steam Generator Safety Valve may be lifting early (lifted at 1010 psi rather than the 1050 psi setpoint).
3. Turbine Bypass valve SP13A3 stuck slightly open - isolated.
All offsite power lines have been verified operable and both EDGs are available in standby, if needed. The licensee informed the local sheriff's department as required whenever a Steam Generator Safety valve lifts and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40922
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY BROOKS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY BROOKS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 08/04/2004
Notification Time: 15:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2004
Event Time: 07:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/04/2004
Notification Time: 15:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2004
Event Time: 07:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/04/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION DUE TO INOPERABLE SIRENS
"At 0715 on August 4, 2004, Exelon was notified by Fulton Contracting that Braidwood Station had >[greater than] 25% of its emergency notification sirens inoperable. The cause of the inoperability [at 0626] for the sirens was due to a loss of power due to severe weather. As of 0708 on August 4, 2004, the number of inoperable sirens was less than 25%. Due to a major loss of emergency preparedness capabilities, this event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0715 on August 4, 2004, Exelon was notified by Fulton Contracting that Braidwood Station had >[greater than] 25% of its emergency notification sirens inoperable. The cause of the inoperability [at 0626] for the sirens was due to a loss of power due to severe weather. As of 0708 on August 4, 2004, the number of inoperable sirens was less than 25%. Due to a major loss of emergency preparedness capabilities, this event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40924
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS NEVE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS NEVE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 08/04/2004
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2004
Event Time: 08:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/04/2004
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2004
Event Time: 08:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/04/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY
A licensed employee was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a for cause test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A licensed employee was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a for cause test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40925
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: T. R. JONES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: T. R. JONES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/05/2004
Notification Time: 06:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2004
Event Time: 23:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2004
Notification Time: 06:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2004
Event Time: 23:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOW REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK LEVEL
"Following calibration of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) level indication, the as-left Control Room level instrument indicated 35.3 feet in the RWST. Tech Spec required level is 35.4 feet. Alternate indication including the local level indicator and the absence of a low RWST level alarm indicated adequate RWST level. A one hour Tech Spec AOT [Allowed Outage Time] was entered at 2324 EDT on 8/04/2004. Indicated level was restored to 35.4 feet at 0013 EDT on 08/05/04 and the AOT exited.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR.50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as the indicated level of 35.3 feet could potentially constitute an event or condition which at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems required to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
Indicated level was restored to 35.4 feet by adding water to the RWST. Licensee is investigating the initial calibration on the level indicator.
Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BRIAN ROKES TO W. GOTT AT 1658 EDT ON 8/5/04 * * *
Indian Point Unit 3 is withdrawing the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on August 5, 2004, at 0658 hours (EN Log No. 40925). The notification on August 5, reported an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function [10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)]. After calibration of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level indication (LT-920), on August 4, 2004, the Control Room As-Left level instrument indicated 35.3 feet in the RWST. The Technical Specification (SR 3.5.4.2) required level is 35.4 feet. Alternate level indication including a local level indicator and the absence of a low RWST level alarm provided indication of adequate RWST level. The one-hour Allowed Outage Time (AOT) of TS 3.5.4.C was entered at 2324 hours, on August 4, 2004. Water was added to the RWST and indicated RWST level in the Control Room was restored to 35.4 feet at 0013 hours, on August 5, 2004, and the TS AOT exited.
Subsequently, a calibration check of the level instrument was performed on August 5, 2004, and the instrument failed the calibration. The instrument was declared inoperable and the 7-day AOT of TS 3.5.4.13 was entered at 1231 hours. The notification is being retracted based on the engineering conclusion that the out of spec level indication was due to a failed level instrument. The RWST level was within spec as indicated by alternate level Indication including a local level indicator and absence of a low level alarm. These alternate level indication instruments are operable and within calibration. Therefore, Operations concluded the condition did not represent a RWST level below minimum TS level and the safety function of systems required to mitigate the consequences of an accident was met.
Notified R1DO (Shanbaky) and NRR (Imbro).
"Following calibration of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) level indication, the as-left Control Room level instrument indicated 35.3 feet in the RWST. Tech Spec required level is 35.4 feet. Alternate indication including the local level indicator and the absence of a low RWST level alarm indicated adequate RWST level. A one hour Tech Spec AOT [Allowed Outage Time] was entered at 2324 EDT on 8/04/2004. Indicated level was restored to 35.4 feet at 0013 EDT on 08/05/04 and the AOT exited.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR.50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as the indicated level of 35.3 feet could potentially constitute an event or condition which at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems required to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
Indicated level was restored to 35.4 feet by adding water to the RWST. Licensee is investigating the initial calibration on the level indicator.
Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BRIAN ROKES TO W. GOTT AT 1658 EDT ON 8/5/04 * * *
Indian Point Unit 3 is withdrawing the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on August 5, 2004, at 0658 hours (EN Log No. 40925). The notification on August 5, reported an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function [10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)]. After calibration of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level indication (LT-920), on August 4, 2004, the Control Room As-Left level instrument indicated 35.3 feet in the RWST. The Technical Specification (SR 3.5.4.2) required level is 35.4 feet. Alternate level indication including a local level indicator and the absence of a low RWST level alarm provided indication of adequate RWST level. The one-hour Allowed Outage Time (AOT) of TS 3.5.4.C was entered at 2324 hours, on August 4, 2004. Water was added to the RWST and indicated RWST level in the Control Room was restored to 35.4 feet at 0013 hours, on August 5, 2004, and the TS AOT exited.
Subsequently, a calibration check of the level instrument was performed on August 5, 2004, and the instrument failed the calibration. The instrument was declared inoperable and the 7-day AOT of TS 3.5.4.13 was entered at 1231 hours. The notification is being retracted based on the engineering conclusion that the out of spec level indication was due to a failed level instrument. The RWST level was within spec as indicated by alternate level Indication including a local level indicator and absence of a low level alarm. These alternate level indication instruments are operable and within calibration. Therefore, Operations concluded the condition did not represent a RWST level below minimum TS level and the safety function of systems required to mitigate the consequences of an accident was met.
Notified R1DO (Shanbaky) and NRR (Imbro).