Event Notification Report for August 02, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/01/2004 - 08/02/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40915
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: M. STRUBMULLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: M. STRUBMULLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/03/2004
Notification Time: 01:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2004
Event Time: 15:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2004
Notification Time: 01:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2004
Event Time: 15:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FUEL LEAK- OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.
"Salem Unit 1 experienced an underground fuel leak that required notification to the state of N.J. (NJDEP). Fuel oil was observed in a storm drain, there was not a release to the Delaware river and the storm drain system has been isolated and pumped out. The source of the leak is under investigation. There were no injuries as a result of the spill and no equipment has been declared inoperable. The bulk fuel oil storage tank has been isolated as a potential leak source." Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified.
The Bulk fuel oil storage tank makes up to Salem Unit 1 & 2 diesel storage tanks which are at full capacity. Licensee is making a contingency plan that they will not be able to use the bulk fuel oil tank and they plan to have fuel oil tank trucks come onsite Tuesday.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"Salem Unit 1 experienced an underground fuel leak that required notification to the state of N.J. (NJDEP). Fuel oil was observed in a storm drain, there was not a release to the Delaware river and the storm drain system has been isolated and pumped out. The source of the leak is under investigation. There were no injuries as a result of the spill and no equipment has been declared inoperable. The bulk fuel oil storage tank has been isolated as a potential leak source." Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified.
The Bulk fuel oil storage tank makes up to Salem Unit 1 & 2 diesel storage tanks which are at full capacity. Licensee is making a contingency plan that they will not be able to use the bulk fuel oil tank and they plan to have fuel oil tank trucks come onsite Tuesday.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41148
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: RAYTHEON COMPANY
Region: 4
City: EL SEGUNDO State: CA
County:
License #: 1053-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATHLEEN KAUFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: RAYTHEON COMPANY
Region: 4
City: EL SEGUNDO State: CA
County:
License #: 1053-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATHLEEN KAUFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 10/26/2004
Notification Time: 19:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2004
Event Time: 17:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2004
Notification Time: 19:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2004
Event Time: 17:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILS TO FUNCTION
Summary report of fax provided by State of California
On August 2, 2004 at 5:00 pm PDT, a licensee employee was irradiating electrical parts using the Low Dose 142-MA Self Contained, Shielded Panoramic Irradiator. This device uses a Cobalt- 60 (Co-60) source with an activity of 2 Curies. The licensee employee was able to bypass the interlock to the chamber while the chamber was irradiating. The employee was wearing a film badge and holding his ring badge in his hand (not on finger) while working with the chamber. The film badge was first used on August 2, 2004. The ring and film badges were collected and immediately shipped for analysis.
The source of radiation within the chamber is a sealed Co-60 (2 Curies) source and is exposed by raising and lowering the source rod. Raising the rod activates the door interlock and exposes the source within the chamber. The licensee intended to place a product into the chamber and failed to notice that the source rod was up, and pulled open the door while the interlock was activated. The safety interlock failed and was unsuccessful in keeping the doors locked. The door was immediately closed (exposure time approximately 3 seconds)
On August 4, 2004, the licensee contacted a Health Physics consultant and performed a calculation to estimate the possible exposure level. They used the Gamma Constant for Co-60, the exposure time, distance, and activities that were involved.
During the afternoon of August 4, 2004, J. L. Shepherd inspected the equipment and determined that the interlock was defective and advised that they install an alternate interlock that is sturdier. They returned on August 5, 2004 and installed the new interlock.
Wear on the interlock arm caused the ultimate failure on August 4, 2004, and was most probably caused by repeated attempts by the operators of the irradiator to forcibly open the cavity lids while the source was in the "Irradiate" position. The replacement arm has been redesigned and strengthened to avoid the recurrence of a problem of this nature in the future.
California preliminary exposure estimate to the operator's hands is less than 200 millirem while licensee calculation showed exposure received to be approximately 2-3 millirem.
Incident remains open until receipt of documentation of monitoring device exposure and copies of the physicist's calculations.
Summary report of fax provided by State of California
On August 2, 2004 at 5:00 pm PDT, a licensee employee was irradiating electrical parts using the Low Dose 142-MA Self Contained, Shielded Panoramic Irradiator. This device uses a Cobalt- 60 (Co-60) source with an activity of 2 Curies. The licensee employee was able to bypass the interlock to the chamber while the chamber was irradiating. The employee was wearing a film badge and holding his ring badge in his hand (not on finger) while working with the chamber. The film badge was first used on August 2, 2004. The ring and film badges were collected and immediately shipped for analysis.
The source of radiation within the chamber is a sealed Co-60 (2 Curies) source and is exposed by raising and lowering the source rod. Raising the rod activates the door interlock and exposes the source within the chamber. The licensee intended to place a product into the chamber and failed to notice that the source rod was up, and pulled open the door while the interlock was activated. The safety interlock failed and was unsuccessful in keeping the doors locked. The door was immediately closed (exposure time approximately 3 seconds)
On August 4, 2004, the licensee contacted a Health Physics consultant and performed a calculation to estimate the possible exposure level. They used the Gamma Constant for Co-60, the exposure time, distance, and activities that were involved.
During the afternoon of August 4, 2004, J. L. Shepherd inspected the equipment and determined that the interlock was defective and advised that they install an alternate interlock that is sturdier. They returned on August 5, 2004 and installed the new interlock.
Wear on the interlock arm caused the ultimate failure on August 4, 2004, and was most probably caused by repeated attempts by the operators of the irradiator to forcibly open the cavity lids while the source was in the "Irradiate" position. The replacement arm has been redesigned and strengthened to avoid the recurrence of a problem of this nature in the future.
California preliminary exposure estimate to the operator's hands is less than 200 millirem while licensee calculation showed exposure received to be approximately 2-3 millirem.
Incident remains open until receipt of documentation of monitoring device exposure and copies of the physicist's calculations.