Event Notification Report for July 29, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/28/2004 - 07/29/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
40917409054090640908
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40917
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: PRIVATE RESIDENT
Region: 4
City: BROOMFIELD State: CO
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHIL EGIDI
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Licensee: PRIVATE RESIDENT
Region: 4
City: BROOMFIELD State: CO
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHIL EGIDI
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 08/03/2004
Notification Time: 14:19 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2004
Notification Time: 14:19 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
COLORADO AGREEMENT STATE NOTIFICATION OF URANIUM OXIDE FOUND IN PRIVATE RESIDENCE
"The Colorado Agreement State program was notified by a private resident who was cleaning out his late father's basement of the existence of an unknown yellow solid material that he believed was yellowcake. Staff members of Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment have confirmed that the material is 19 lbs of uranium oxide (yellowcake) in a private residence. The deceased owner of the home worked in the uranium industry many years ago. The material is containerized and the State is assisting the widow to make arrangements for sending it to a uranium mill."
"The Colorado Agreement State program was notified by a private resident who was cleaning out his late father's basement of the existence of an unknown yellow solid material that he believed was yellowcake. Staff members of Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment have confirmed that the material is 19 lbs of uranium oxide (yellowcake) in a private residence. The deceased owner of the home worked in the uranium industry many years ago. The material is containerized and the State is assisting the widow to make arrangements for sending it to a uranium mill."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40905
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEN CHISM
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEN CHISM
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 07/29/2004
Notification Time: 12:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/2004
Event Time: 09:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2004
Notification Time: 12:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/2004
Event Time: 09:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 88 | Power Operation | 46 | Power Operation |
PLANT ENTERED LCO ACTION STATEMENT DUE TO MALFUNCTION OF A SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-TO-DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER.
On July 29, 2004, at approximately 0351 hours, testing of Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell vacuum breakers commenced in accordance with Periodic Test 0PT02.3.1, "Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker Operability Test." At 0357 hours, it was determined that vacuum breaker 2-CAC-X18D had an open indication. Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.6, "Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers," Condition B was entered for one suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker (2-CAC-X18D) not indicating closed. Required Action B.1 of TS LCO 3.6.1.6 provides 4 hours to verify the vacuum breaker closed. Attempts to confirm the vacuum breaker closed were unsuccessful and at 0757 hours, TS LCO 3.6.1.6 Condition C was entered. Required Action C.1 is to be in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) in 12 hours and Required Action C.2 is to be in Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) in 36 hours. Initiation of the plant shutdown required by TS LCO 3.6.1.6 commenced at 0942 hours.
This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) as the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's TS.
INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION
The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. The actual position of the vacuum breaker cannot be confirmed, however if one vacuum breaker was not closed, communication between the drywell and suppression chamber air space could occur, and as a result, there is a potential, for primary containment overpressurization due to this bypass leakage if a loss of coolant accident were to occur. The plant is currently proceeding to hot shutdown with all Emergency Core Cooling systems operable.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Determine the required corrective actions after entry into the drywell following shutdown. The safety significance of the event will be reviewed when the actual condition of the vacuum breaker is known.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 07/29/04 @ 1654 FROM KEN CHISM TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * *
On July 29, 2004, at 1517 hours, a manual scram was inserted to shut down the Unit 2 reactor from approximately 23 percent of rated thermal power. The reactor shutdown was implemented to meet the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.6 Required Action C.1 to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours. All control rods fully inserted into the core and no ECCS actuation occurred or relief valves lifted. Following the scram, an expected reactor vessel coolant level shrink occurred causing coolant level to decrease below the Low Level 1 setpoint. This coolant level decrease resulted in a Primary Containment Isolation Valve isolation signal to Group 2 (Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Traversing In-core Probe, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling System), and Group 8 (RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction and RHR Inboard Injection) isolation valves. The isolation signal closed all of the valves that were open at the time of the expected initiation.
The plant is currently in mode 3 and proceeding with a normal cooldown to Mode 4.
The NRC Resident Inspection was informed.
Notified Reg 2 RDO (Tom Decker).
On July 29, 2004, at approximately 0351 hours, testing of Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell vacuum breakers commenced in accordance with Periodic Test 0PT02.3.1, "Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker Operability Test." At 0357 hours, it was determined that vacuum breaker 2-CAC-X18D had an open indication. Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.6, "Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers," Condition B was entered for one suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker (2-CAC-X18D) not indicating closed. Required Action B.1 of TS LCO 3.6.1.6 provides 4 hours to verify the vacuum breaker closed. Attempts to confirm the vacuum breaker closed were unsuccessful and at 0757 hours, TS LCO 3.6.1.6 Condition C was entered. Required Action C.1 is to be in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) in 12 hours and Required Action C.2 is to be in Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) in 36 hours. Initiation of the plant shutdown required by TS LCO 3.6.1.6 commenced at 0942 hours.
This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) as the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's TS.
INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION
The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. The actual position of the vacuum breaker cannot be confirmed, however if one vacuum breaker was not closed, communication between the drywell and suppression chamber air space could occur, and as a result, there is a potential, for primary containment overpressurization due to this bypass leakage if a loss of coolant accident were to occur. The plant is currently proceeding to hot shutdown with all Emergency Core Cooling systems operable.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Determine the required corrective actions after entry into the drywell following shutdown. The safety significance of the event will be reviewed when the actual condition of the vacuum breaker is known.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 07/29/04 @ 1654 FROM KEN CHISM TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * *
On July 29, 2004, at 1517 hours, a manual scram was inserted to shut down the Unit 2 reactor from approximately 23 percent of rated thermal power. The reactor shutdown was implemented to meet the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.6 Required Action C.1 to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours. All control rods fully inserted into the core and no ECCS actuation occurred or relief valves lifted. Following the scram, an expected reactor vessel coolant level shrink occurred causing coolant level to decrease below the Low Level 1 setpoint. This coolant level decrease resulted in a Primary Containment Isolation Valve isolation signal to Group 2 (Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Traversing In-core Probe, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling System), and Group 8 (RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction and RHR Inboard Injection) isolation valves. The isolation signal closed all of the valves that were open at the time of the expected initiation.
The plant is currently in mode 3 and proceeding with a normal cooldown to Mode 4.
The NRC Resident Inspection was informed.
Notified Reg 2 RDO (Tom Decker).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40906
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/29/2004
Notification Time: 12:51 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/2004
Event Time: 11:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2004
Notification Time: 12:51 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/2004
Event Time: 11:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
SUZANNE BLACK (NRR)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
SUZANNE BLACK (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT ON THE OWNER CONTROLLED AREA
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"(Time 1103 hrs.[EDT]) A lawn mowing company was working outside the protected area when a mower rolled over on the individual doing the mowing. The mowing evolution was near a pond. The mower went over the edge of the pond, landing in the water. The individual operating the mower was trapped under the mower in the water. Several employees from the Davis Besse training center saw the mower in the water and pulled the individual from the water. The victim was not breathing at that time.
"CPR was performed and Life Flight called. Helicopter on site at 1123 [hrs.] and transported victim to St. Vincent Hospital. Helicopter lifted off from the site at 1138 [hrs.]. The victim was breathing on her own at that time but still unconscious."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"(Time 1103 hrs.[EDT]) A lawn mowing company was working outside the protected area when a mower rolled over on the individual doing the mowing. The mowing evolution was near a pond. The mower went over the edge of the pond, landing in the water. The individual operating the mower was trapped under the mower in the water. Several employees from the Davis Besse training center saw the mower in the water and pulled the individual from the water. The victim was not breathing at that time.
"CPR was performed and Life Flight called. Helicopter on site at 1123 [hrs.] and transported victim to St. Vincent Hospital. Helicopter lifted off from the site at 1138 [hrs.]. The victim was breathing on her own at that time but still unconscious."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40908
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RAGER ORZELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RAGER ORZELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 07/29/2004
Notification Time: 15:46 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/2004
Event Time: 12:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2004
Notification Time: 15:46 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/2004
Event Time: 12:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO RAW SEWAGE DISCHARGE TO LAKE ONTARIO
A report was received in the Unit 2 Control Room by Site personnel that raw sewage appeared to be seeping from a manhole inside the protected area. The Fire Department and Environmental Department were dispatched to the area. It was reported back to the Unit 2 Control Room that raw sewage was seeping from the manhole and filling nearby ditch and flowing to a storm sewer.
Due to the leakage, Nine Mile Point entered their HAZMAT response procedure. Initial investigation for the sewage release found the sewage lift station pumps' control switch in the "OFF" position preventing the pumps from operating. The lift station pumps were restarted and the discharge from the manhole stopped. Lift station pumps continue to function properly and cleanup efforts are underway. Investigation is underway on why the lift station pump control switches were in the off position. Based upon initial calculations, it was determined approximately 3000 gallons of raw sewage was released from manhole to a nearby storm sewer which discharges to Lake Ontario.
Nine Mile Point has notified the Oswego County Department of Health and New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. No hazards exist to offsite personnel and no wildlife has been adversely affected.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Local and State agencies.
* * * UPDATE AT 1700 EDT ON 8/27/04 FROM CHRIS SKINNER TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"Subsequent investigation has determined that approximately 400 gallons of raw sewage was released into the storm drainage ditch. There was no active flow in the storm drainage ditch at the time of the event. Samples indicate that the raw sewage did not reach the lake. The event was reclassified as a State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Upset with minor impact to the environment. Therefore, the event notification from July 29, 2004 is retracted."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cobey).
A report was received in the Unit 2 Control Room by Site personnel that raw sewage appeared to be seeping from a manhole inside the protected area. The Fire Department and Environmental Department were dispatched to the area. It was reported back to the Unit 2 Control Room that raw sewage was seeping from the manhole and filling nearby ditch and flowing to a storm sewer.
Due to the leakage, Nine Mile Point entered their HAZMAT response procedure. Initial investigation for the sewage release found the sewage lift station pumps' control switch in the "OFF" position preventing the pumps from operating. The lift station pumps were restarted and the discharge from the manhole stopped. Lift station pumps continue to function properly and cleanup efforts are underway. Investigation is underway on why the lift station pump control switches were in the off position. Based upon initial calculations, it was determined approximately 3000 gallons of raw sewage was released from manhole to a nearby storm sewer which discharges to Lake Ontario.
Nine Mile Point has notified the Oswego County Department of Health and New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. No hazards exist to offsite personnel and no wildlife has been adversely affected.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Local and State agencies.
* * * UPDATE AT 1700 EDT ON 8/27/04 FROM CHRIS SKINNER TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"Subsequent investigation has determined that approximately 400 gallons of raw sewage was released into the storm drainage ditch. There was no active flow in the storm drainage ditch at the time of the event. Samples indicate that the raw sewage did not reach the lake. The event was reclassified as a State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Upset with minor impact to the environment. Therefore, the event notification from July 29, 2004 is retracted."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cobey).