Event Notification Report for July 16, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/15/2004 - 07/16/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40876
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RITA BRADDICK
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RITA BRADDICK
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 07/16/2004
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2004
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2004
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2004
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
GLENN MEYER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN/LOSS OF SINGLE SAFETY FUNCTION
"A Unit shutdown was initiated at 1100 [ET 07/16/04] to comply with Technical Specifications. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable at 1000 on 7/16/04 due to an inability to demonstrate that it is capable of meeting its design flow and pressure requirements identified during an extent of condition review being conducted in conjunction with an ongoing Safety System Design Inspection. Concurrently, the `D' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was inoperable due to an in-progress surveillance. This rendered the `D' Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem and `B' Core Spray subsystem inoperable resulting in entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 requiring within 1 hour initiating action to place the unit in at least startup within the next 6 hours, hot shutdown within the following 6 hours and cold shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours.
"Power ascension was in progress with reactor power at 95%. Power ascension was suspended. Preparations for power reduction were initiated. Actions were taken to restore the `D' EDG to an operable, standby alignment, which was complete at 1145 rendering `D' LPCI subsystem and `B' Core Spray subsystem operable. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. No power reduction was conducted.
"The HPCI system remains inoperable constituting a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The investigation is ongoing including a determination of the need for any physical modifications that may be required.
"Prior to the event, the `C' Station Service Water pump, `D' Filtration Recirculation, Ventilation System recirculation fan, and `B' Primary Containment Instrument gas compressor were out of service for scheduled maintenance. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this event.
"The NRC Resident inspector was notified of this event."
"A Unit shutdown was initiated at 1100 [ET 07/16/04] to comply with Technical Specifications. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable at 1000 on 7/16/04 due to an inability to demonstrate that it is capable of meeting its design flow and pressure requirements identified during an extent of condition review being conducted in conjunction with an ongoing Safety System Design Inspection. Concurrently, the `D' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was inoperable due to an in-progress surveillance. This rendered the `D' Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem and `B' Core Spray subsystem inoperable resulting in entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 requiring within 1 hour initiating action to place the unit in at least startup within the next 6 hours, hot shutdown within the following 6 hours and cold shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours.
"Power ascension was in progress with reactor power at 95%. Power ascension was suspended. Preparations for power reduction were initiated. Actions were taken to restore the `D' EDG to an operable, standby alignment, which was complete at 1145 rendering `D' LPCI subsystem and `B' Core Spray subsystem operable. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. No power reduction was conducted.
"The HPCI system remains inoperable constituting a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The investigation is ongoing including a determination of the need for any physical modifications that may be required.
"Prior to the event, the `C' Station Service Water pump, `D' Filtration Recirculation, Ventilation System recirculation fan, and `B' Primary Containment Instrument gas compressor were out of service for scheduled maintenance. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this event.
"The NRC Resident inspector was notified of this event."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40877
Facility: HUMBOLDT BAY
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] GE-1
NRC Notified By: DAVID SOKOLSKY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] GE-1
NRC Notified By: DAVID SOKOLSKY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 07/16/2004
Notification Time: 14:04 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2004
Notification Time: 14:04 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
PRESS RELEASE WILL BE ISSUED AT 1300 PDT ON 7/16/04 ON THE MATERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY DISCREPANCY INVOLVING A PORTION OF A SPENT FUEL ROD USED AT HUMBOLT BAY POWER PLANT UNIT 3.
This is a non-emergency Event Notification made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) to inform the NRC that a press release will be issued shortly informing the public of a nuclear material accountability discrepancy involving a portion of a spent fuel rod used at Pacific Gas and Electric's (PG&E) Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) Unit 3. HBPP Unit 3 has been shut down since 1976 and in SAFSTOR since 1988. In the process of reviewing records and verifying the contents of the spent fuel pool (SFP) in preparation for loading materials into dry cask storage, PG&E has identified a discrepancy in plant records that calls into question the location of three segments of a portion of a single spent fuel rod removed from assembly A-49 in 1968. Meeting records produced in 1968 indicate that the segments have been stored in the SFP since 1968. However, 1969 plant shipping records indicate that the entire A-49 assembly was included as part of a larger shipment of several spent fuel assemblies sent for offsite reprocessing in 1969. The 1969 shipping records make no mention that one rod had been removed from the A-49 assembly that was shipped. A more detailed review of records and a complete search of the SFP is underway to establish and verify the location of the three fuel rod segments.
Since 2003, PG&E plant personnel have been conducting a complete review of plant records and cataloging the contents of the SFP in preparation for the planned decommissioning of the plant, including the transfer of spent fuel into an onsite Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation. On June 23, 2004, plant personnel found Onsite Review Committee (OSRC) meeting minutes dated October 2, 1968, that described cutting one fuel rod from fuel assembly A-49 into three 18 inch segments that were placed into a small container (1 -1 /2 inch, schedule 40 pipe) in preparation for shipment to the Battelle Memorial Institute in Columbus, Ohio, for analysis. The meeting minutes further state that the shipment to Battelle was subsequently cancelled and the small container with the three 18-inch fuel rod segments was returned to the SFP, with the specific location in the SFP unidentified. The minutes also state that the remnants of the 84 inch long fuel rod from which the three 18-inch segments were cut were placed in the central storage container within the SFP.
On June 25, 2004, after further research, PG&E found shipping records indicating that on August 6, 1969, the entire A-49 fuel assembly was shipped to Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. (NFS) in West Valley, New York, for reprocessing. No mention was made in the shipping record that a rod had been removed from the A-49 fuel assembly. This contradicts the OSRC meeting minutes that indicate one fuel rod from A-49 remains in the SFP. Further review of records did not resolve the discrepancy, so on June 28, 2004, PG&E verbally notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV office of the potential discrepancy in records and the uncertainty regarding the specific location of the fuel rod removed from A-49.
On July 7, 2004, PG&E began a physical search of the central storage container in the SFP for the remnant portions of the A-49 rod, as well as the three 18-inch segments. On July 9-11, 2004, PG&E identified what appears to be the remnant portions of the A-49 rod in the central storage container in the SFP as specified in the 1968 OSRC meeting minutes. However, the three 18-inch segments were not found in the central storage container. PG&E is continuing with a thorough search of the remaining storage containers in the SFP as well as other possible areas in the SFP where the three fuel rod segments may be located. The search is a painstaking process performed under tight procedural guidance that could take at least several weeks to complete. NRC inspectors have been onsite during the week of July 12 and are fully aware of the status of these inspections. In addition, PG&E is continuing its review of plant records as well as interviewing plant personnel who were onsite during the 1968-1969 period to find further evidence that may expedite location of the three fuel rod segments.
This notification also satisfies the 30-day notification requirement of 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii). If ongoing searches fail to confirm the location of the material, a subsequent written report will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b).
This is a non-emergency Event Notification made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) to inform the NRC that a press release will be issued shortly informing the public of a nuclear material accountability discrepancy involving a portion of a spent fuel rod used at Pacific Gas and Electric's (PG&E) Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) Unit 3. HBPP Unit 3 has been shut down since 1976 and in SAFSTOR since 1988. In the process of reviewing records and verifying the contents of the spent fuel pool (SFP) in preparation for loading materials into dry cask storage, PG&E has identified a discrepancy in plant records that calls into question the location of three segments of a portion of a single spent fuel rod removed from assembly A-49 in 1968. Meeting records produced in 1968 indicate that the segments have been stored in the SFP since 1968. However, 1969 plant shipping records indicate that the entire A-49 assembly was included as part of a larger shipment of several spent fuel assemblies sent for offsite reprocessing in 1969. The 1969 shipping records make no mention that one rod had been removed from the A-49 assembly that was shipped. A more detailed review of records and a complete search of the SFP is underway to establish and verify the location of the three fuel rod segments.
Since 2003, PG&E plant personnel have been conducting a complete review of plant records and cataloging the contents of the SFP in preparation for the planned decommissioning of the plant, including the transfer of spent fuel into an onsite Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation. On June 23, 2004, plant personnel found Onsite Review Committee (OSRC) meeting minutes dated October 2, 1968, that described cutting one fuel rod from fuel assembly A-49 into three 18 inch segments that were placed into a small container (1 -1 /2 inch, schedule 40 pipe) in preparation for shipment to the Battelle Memorial Institute in Columbus, Ohio, for analysis. The meeting minutes further state that the shipment to Battelle was subsequently cancelled and the small container with the three 18-inch fuel rod segments was returned to the SFP, with the specific location in the SFP unidentified. The minutes also state that the remnants of the 84 inch long fuel rod from which the three 18-inch segments were cut were placed in the central storage container within the SFP.
On June 25, 2004, after further research, PG&E found shipping records indicating that on August 6, 1969, the entire A-49 fuel assembly was shipped to Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. (NFS) in West Valley, New York, for reprocessing. No mention was made in the shipping record that a rod had been removed from the A-49 fuel assembly. This contradicts the OSRC meeting minutes that indicate one fuel rod from A-49 remains in the SFP. Further review of records did not resolve the discrepancy, so on June 28, 2004, PG&E verbally notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV office of the potential discrepancy in records and the uncertainty regarding the specific location of the fuel rod removed from A-49.
On July 7, 2004, PG&E began a physical search of the central storage container in the SFP for the remnant portions of the A-49 rod, as well as the three 18-inch segments. On July 9-11, 2004, PG&E identified what appears to be the remnant portions of the A-49 rod in the central storage container in the SFP as specified in the 1968 OSRC meeting minutes. However, the three 18-inch segments were not found in the central storage container. PG&E is continuing with a thorough search of the remaining storage containers in the SFP as well as other possible areas in the SFP where the three fuel rod segments may be located. The search is a painstaking process performed under tight procedural guidance that could take at least several weeks to complete. NRC inspectors have been onsite during the week of July 12 and are fully aware of the status of these inspections. In addition, PG&E is continuing its review of plant records as well as interviewing plant personnel who were onsite during the 1968-1969 period to find further evidence that may expedite location of the three fuel rod segments.
This notification also satisfies the 30-day notification requirement of 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii). If ongoing searches fail to confirm the location of the material, a subsequent written report will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40878
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By:
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By:
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 07/16/2004
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2004
Event Time: 13:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2004
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2004
Event Time: 13:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
THE PLANT LOST PUBLIC PROMPT NOTIFICATION CAPABILITY
"At approximately 1345 CST on 7/16/04, Cooper Nuclear Station was informed by Emergency Preparedness officials of Nemaha County that the radio transmission tower that provides signals to activate tone alert radios within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) was not functioning. Tone alert radio is relied on by approximately 650 households in the EPZ, who are not in audible range of sirens for notification of an emergency at CNS. Based on a total EPZ population currently estimated at 4600 persons (who are alerted principally by sirens and the tone alert radio), this is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification system capability, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Investigations are ongoing. The cause appears to be an inadvertently severed telecommunications cable to the tower. There does not appear to be any evidence of sabotage. It is expected that repairs will be completed by 1800 CST on 7/16/04. During the interim, compensatory measures have been verified to be in place via state and local emergency planning officials for backup route alerting for personnel within the 10-mile EPZ."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with State and Local agencies
* * * * UPDATE FROM A. OHRABLO TO M. RIPLEY 2257 ET 07/16/04 * * * *
"At 2035 CST the Cooper Control Room was informed that the radio transmission tower has been repaired and tested satisfactorily. The cause was inadvertent severing of the telecommunications cable during digging. The NRC Resident will be informed."
Notified R4DO (D. Powers)
"At approximately 1345 CST on 7/16/04, Cooper Nuclear Station was informed by Emergency Preparedness officials of Nemaha County that the radio transmission tower that provides signals to activate tone alert radios within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) was not functioning. Tone alert radio is relied on by approximately 650 households in the EPZ, who are not in audible range of sirens for notification of an emergency at CNS. Based on a total EPZ population currently estimated at 4600 persons (who are alerted principally by sirens and the tone alert radio), this is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification system capability, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Investigations are ongoing. The cause appears to be an inadvertently severed telecommunications cable to the tower. There does not appear to be any evidence of sabotage. It is expected that repairs will be completed by 1800 CST on 7/16/04. During the interim, compensatory measures have been verified to be in place via state and local emergency planning officials for backup route alerting for personnel within the 10-mile EPZ."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with State and Local agencies
* * * * UPDATE FROM A. OHRABLO TO M. RIPLEY 2257 ET 07/16/04 * * * *
"At 2035 CST the Cooper Control Room was informed that the radio transmission tower has been repaired and tested satisfactorily. The cause was inadvertent severing of the telecommunications cable during digging. The NRC Resident will be informed."
Notified R4DO (D. Powers)