Event Notification Report for July 08, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/07/2004 - 07/08/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
40858408604085740903
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40858
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS VAUGHN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS VAUGHN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/09/2004
Notification Time: 02:21 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2004
Event Time: 22:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/09/2004
Notification Time: 02:21 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2004
Event Time: 22:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/09/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A TURBINE GENERATOR LOAD REJECTION SIGNAL
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 7/08/2004 at approximately 2232 hours CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 2 scrammed due to a Turbine Generator Load Reject Signal. All systems responded as required to the scram signal. No ECCS initiations occurred as a result of this event. Reactor Water Level lowered to the Low Level setpoint which generated a redundant SCRAM signal and initiated the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) function for PCIS groups 2 (Primary Containment), 3 (RWCU) [Reactor Water Clean Up], 6 (Secondary Containment), and 8 (TIP system) [Transverse Incore Probe]. As expected, Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) opened due to the high reactor pressure (maximum value observed was 1137 psig) as a result of the Main Turbine / Generator Trip. Reactor Water level was restored to normal via the Reactor Feedwater system and all PCIS isolations have been reset. The cause of the Load Reject Signal is still under investigation at this time.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical' and also under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B)'. This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)."
All control rods inserted during the scram. All Main Steam Relief Valves have properly reset. Decay heat is being removed from the reactor via main turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Pressure is being maintained at normal operating pressure. The electrical grid is stable. Unit 3 was not affected by the scram on Unit 2.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 7/08/2004 at approximately 2232 hours CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 2 scrammed due to a Turbine Generator Load Reject Signal. All systems responded as required to the scram signal. No ECCS initiations occurred as a result of this event. Reactor Water Level lowered to the Low Level setpoint which generated a redundant SCRAM signal and initiated the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) function for PCIS groups 2 (Primary Containment), 3 (RWCU) [Reactor Water Clean Up], 6 (Secondary Containment), and 8 (TIP system) [Transverse Incore Probe]. As expected, Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) opened due to the high reactor pressure (maximum value observed was 1137 psig) as a result of the Main Turbine / Generator Trip. Reactor Water level was restored to normal via the Reactor Feedwater system and all PCIS isolations have been reset. The cause of the Load Reject Signal is still under investigation at this time.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical' and also under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B)'. This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)."
All control rods inserted during the scram. All Main Steam Relief Valves have properly reset. Decay heat is being removed from the reactor via main turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Pressure is being maintained at normal operating pressure. The electrical grid is stable. Unit 3 was not affected by the scram on Unit 2.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40860
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/09/2004
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2004
Event Time: 15:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/09/2004
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2004
Event Time: 15:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/09/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 LOSS OF CRITICALITY CONTROL
"At 1550, on 07-08-04 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that three centrifugal compressor impellers were received as part of a shipment from Portsmouth GDP. The existence of the impellers was not recognized as being part of this shipment and, as a result, applicable NCS [Nuclear Criticality Safety] controls were not implemented. NCSA GEN-20 requires receipt of documented NDA [Non Destructive Analysis] inspections of equipment prior to receipt (unloading) in the shipping/receiving area and completion of a second NDA prior to removing the equipment from the shipping/receiving area to a location within the plant. The purpose of this control is to ensure that equipment containing greater than a safe mass will not be received from offsite.
"The three centrifugal compressor impellers have subsequently been characterized as a group, by NDA, to be less than the safe mass assuming 100 wt.% 235U.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: NDA measurements have been completed and the results indicate less than a safe mass of uranium.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): In order for a criticality to be possible, greater than a critical mass of uranium would have to be present in the equipment in a configuration favorable for a criticality.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on mass.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The group of equipment contains less than the safe mass assuming 100 wt.% 235U.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEMS) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency relies on the review of characterization results prior to receipt (unloading) at PGDP. Characterization results were not reviewed prior to receipt. The three centrifugal compressor impellers have subsequently been characterized as a group, by NDA, to be less than the safe mass assuming 100 wt.% 235U. Although, the NCS controls were violated, the parameter was maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency relies on an independent NDA measurement prior to release from the shipping/receiving area. NDA characterization did not occur prior to release from the shipping/receiving area. The three centrifugal compressor impellers have subsequently been characterized as a group, by NDA, to be less than the safe mass assuming 100 wt% 235U. Although, the NCS controls were violated, the parameter was maintained.
"Although the parameter was maintained, double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED :
"1. Post equipment according to CP2-MA-MT1034. Completed 07/09/04
"The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-04-2682, PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-18; Event Worksheet #40860 Responsible Division: Maintenance"
"At 1550, on 07-08-04 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that three centrifugal compressor impellers were received as part of a shipment from Portsmouth GDP. The existence of the impellers was not recognized as being part of this shipment and, as a result, applicable NCS [Nuclear Criticality Safety] controls were not implemented. NCSA GEN-20 requires receipt of documented NDA [Non Destructive Analysis] inspections of equipment prior to receipt (unloading) in the shipping/receiving area and completion of a second NDA prior to removing the equipment from the shipping/receiving area to a location within the plant. The purpose of this control is to ensure that equipment containing greater than a safe mass will not be received from offsite.
"The three centrifugal compressor impellers have subsequently been characterized as a group, by NDA, to be less than the safe mass assuming 100 wt.% 235U.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: NDA measurements have been completed and the results indicate less than a safe mass of uranium.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): In order for a criticality to be possible, greater than a critical mass of uranium would have to be present in the equipment in a configuration favorable for a criticality.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on mass.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The group of equipment contains less than the safe mass assuming 100 wt.% 235U.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEMS) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency relies on the review of characterization results prior to receipt (unloading) at PGDP. Characterization results were not reviewed prior to receipt. The three centrifugal compressor impellers have subsequently been characterized as a group, by NDA, to be less than the safe mass assuming 100 wt.% 235U. Although, the NCS controls were violated, the parameter was maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency relies on an independent NDA measurement prior to release from the shipping/receiving area. NDA characterization did not occur prior to release from the shipping/receiving area. The three centrifugal compressor impellers have subsequently been characterized as a group, by NDA, to be less than the safe mass assuming 100 wt% 235U. Although, the NCS controls were violated, the parameter was maintained.
"Although the parameter was maintained, double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED :
"1. Post equipment according to CP2-MA-MT1034. Completed 07/09/04
"The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-04-2682, PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-18; Event Worksheet #40860 Responsible Division: Maintenance"
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40857
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: TERRACON CONSULTANTS, INC
Region: 1
City: Memphis State: TN
County:
License #: R-19215
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBRA SHULTS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: TERRACON CONSULTANTS, INC
Region: 1
City: Memphis State: TN
County:
License #: R-19215
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBRA SHULTS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/08/2004
Notification Time: 15:42 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2004
Notification Time: 15:42 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
JIM WHITNEY (TAS)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
JIM WHITNEY (TAS)
TENNESSEE AGREEMENT STATE REPORT: STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"Terracon Consultants reported a Troxler moisture density gauge, Model 3430 SN 26411, containing 8 milliCuries of Cesium-137 and 40 milliCuries of Americium-241;Beryllium was stolen from the locked cab of a pickup truck parked at a hotel in Memphis, TN. The door of the truck was damaged and the locked container removed. State Department of Radiological Health (DRH) inspectors are onsite investigating at this time."
Tennessee DRH notified US NRC Region 1, Memphis Police Department, Mississippi Division of Radiological Health, Arkansas Radiation Control, FBI, and Tennessee Emergency Management Agency. A press release was also issued by the Tennessee DRH.
"Terracon Consultants reported a Troxler moisture density gauge, Model 3430 SN 26411, containing 8 milliCuries of Cesium-137 and 40 milliCuries of Americium-241;Beryllium was stolen from the locked cab of a pickup truck parked at a hotel in Memphis, TN. The door of the truck was damaged and the locked container removed. State Department of Radiological Health (DRH) inspectors are onsite investigating at this time."
Tennessee DRH notified US NRC Region 1, Memphis Police Department, Mississippi Division of Radiological Health, Arkansas Radiation Control, FBI, and Tennessee Emergency Management Agency. A press release was also issued by the Tennessee DRH.
Hospital
Event Number: 40903
Rep Org: MADIGAN ARMY MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: MADIGAN ARMY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: TACOMA State: WA
County:
License #: 46-02645-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID RYNDERS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: MADIGAN ARMY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: TACOMA State: WA
County:
License #: 46-02645-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID RYNDERS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/28/2004
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2004
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3047(a) - EMBRYO/FETUS DOSE > 50 mSv
10 CFR Section:
35.3047(a) - EMBRYO/FETUS DOSE > 50 mSv
Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
MEDICAL EVENT INVOLVING UNINTENDED DOSE TO EMBRYO/FETUS
A female patient undergoing treatment for Graves disease received 26.6 millicuries I-131. The patient received counseling and a pregnancy test on 7/8/04 (negative results) prior to treatment. Subsequent to treatment the Hospital was informed by her husband that a home pregnancy test showed positive. The Hospital contacted the patient and scheduled a second pregnancy test on 7/23/04. The test results confirmed the pregnancy on 7/24/04. The prescribing physician has been informed. The preliminary assessment performed by the Hospital concluded that this medical event would most likely result in either a spontaneous abortion or have no impact on fetus development, i.e., at this stage in the pregnancy (zygote) the thyroid has not developed.
A female patient undergoing treatment for Graves disease received 26.6 millicuries I-131. The patient received counseling and a pregnancy test on 7/8/04 (negative results) prior to treatment. Subsequent to treatment the Hospital was informed by her husband that a home pregnancy test showed positive. The Hospital contacted the patient and scheduled a second pregnancy test on 7/23/04. The test results confirmed the pregnancy on 7/24/04. The prescribing physician has been informed. The preliminary assessment performed by the Hospital concluded that this medical event would most likely result in either a spontaneous abortion or have no impact on fetus development, i.e., at this stage in the pregnancy (zygote) the thyroid has not developed.