Event Notification Report for June 08, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/07/2004 - 06/08/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
40797407994080040801
Hospital
Event Number: 40797
Rep Org: WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL
Licensee: WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: ROYAL OAK State: MI
County:
License #: 21-01333-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERYL SCHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: ROYAL OAK State: MI
County:
License #: 21-01333-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERYL SCHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 06/08/2004
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 06/08/2004
Event Time: 14:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2004
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 06/08/2004
Event Time: 14:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
MEDICAL EVENT AT THE WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL IN ROYAL OAK, MI
On Tuesday, June 8, 2004 at 2:25 p.m., a patient was scheduled for an I-131 thyroid uptake with an oral dose between 5 and 20 microcurie. Instead, the patient was administered 915 microcurie (34 MBq), which resulted in an absorbed dose of 2675 rad to the thyroid (assuming a 55% radioactive iodine uptake) and 81 rad effective dose equivalent.
Each Month the Radiopharmacy prepares an oral solution of sodium iodide I-131 for uptake doses which are pipetted into individual patient dose vials. The sodium iodide I-131 uptake solution for June contained 12 microcurie per milliliter (ml) in a total volume of 300 ml. The Radiopharmacy technologist prepared the uptake dose by pipetting one ml of solution into the patient vial, which, should have yielded a dose of approximately 12 microcurie. The pipette that the Radiopharmacy technologist used to prepare this dose had been used earlier in the day to prepare therapeutic doses of I-131, and was labeled as the therapy pipette. The Radiopharmacy technologist did not realize that she had picked up the pipette labeled for therapy and assumed it was the pipette used for preparing the uptake doses. Usually the uptake pipette is stored in a shielded vial in the far right corner of the fume hood, but in this case, the therapy pipette was located in the far right corner. The Radiopharmacy technologist assayed the dose in the dose calibrator and noted that the reading was too high for an uptake dose. This caused the staff to question which pipette was used, and they confirmed that the therapy pipette was used. The Radiopharmacy staff discarded the dose in accordance with radioactive waste procedures, and proceeded to draw another uptake dose with the pipette labeled for uptakes. One milliliter was drawn and assayed in the dose calibrator and read 0.915 mCi/ml. The Radiopharmacy technologist accepted the dose thinking that it was really 9.15 microcurie instead of 0.915 millicurie. The computer program is set up to accept I-131 uptake doses on the basis of correct volume and since the volume was within the acceptable range of 1 ml, the computer printed a label for the dose and it was dispensed. The nuclear medicine technologist followed the procedure for confirming the dose prior to administration by checking the patient name, ID number, the I-131 uptake procedure and circling the dose. She looked at the dose printed on the label and thought that the dose was 9.15 uCi instead of the what was printed on the label (0.915 mCi), and administered the dose to the patient.
The Radiopharmacy technologist became concerned about using the wrong pipette and contacted the Radiopharmacist, who then discovered the error. The therapy pipette contained residual millicurie amounts of therapeutic I-131 solution which contaminated the I-131 uptake dose.
B. Why the Event Occurred
The root cause was determined to be the lack of an adequate double check of the I-131 uptake dose prior to administration. A pipette contaminated with 2 millicurie I-131 was inadvertently used to prepare the uptake dose. The Radiopharmacy computer was programmed to detect volume errors, but not activity errors, so it accepted the dose and printed the label. The Radiopharmacy technologist did not detect the error when she assayed the dose for this second redraw, because she assumed that the activity displayed 9.15 uCi, rather than the actual activity displayed, which was 0.915 mCi. The nuclear medicine technologist who double checked the dose mistook the 0.9 mCi for 9 uCi on the dose label and administered the dose. She had been working in an imaging room, but was needed to cover the thyroid uptake room near the end of the work shift. This may have contributed to the error made when confirming the dose.
C. The Effect on the Patient
The absorbed dose to the thyroid was 2675 rad (assuming a 55% radioactive iodine uptake) and the effective dose equivalent was 81 rad. The patient is expected to return to William Beaumont Hospital tomorrow (6/9/04) for treatment with I-131 for hyperthyroidism. The additional dose given for the uptake is a fraction of the dose that will be administered for therapy. The patient is not expected to have any adverse effects.
D. What improvements are Needed to Prevent Recurrence
A complete investigation was conducted to determine the root cause of the medical event. A new pipette will be used for each I-131 uptake patient dose, which will prevent the cross contamination. The computer will be re-programmed to accept uptake dose activity (ie., 5 - 20 microcurie) rather than volume. The computer will not print a label for the uptake dose unless the activity is within the predefined range. The radiopharmacy staff have been trained not to over-ride the failsafe mechanisms of the computer. The nuclear medicine technologist will be retrained in the dose verification process prior to a dose administration. Both the Radiopharmacy technologist and the nuclear medicine technologist will review the dose units (i.e., microcurie, millicurie, MBq) and pass a test.
E. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence
1. A new pipette will be used for each I-131 uptake patient dose, which will prevent the cross contamination.
2. The computer will be re-programmed to accept uptake dose activity (i.e., 5 - 20 microcurie) rather than volume. The computer will not print a label for the uptake dose unless the activity is within the predefined range.
3. The nuclear medicine technologist will be retrained in the dose verification process prior to a dose administration.
4. Both the Radiopharmacy technologist and the nuclear medicine technologist will review the dose units (i.e., microcurie, millicurie, MBq) and pass a test.
On Tuesday, June 8, 2004 at 2:25 p.m., a patient was scheduled for an I-131 thyroid uptake with an oral dose between 5 and 20 microcurie. Instead, the patient was administered 915 microcurie (34 MBq), which resulted in an absorbed dose of 2675 rad to the thyroid (assuming a 55% radioactive iodine uptake) and 81 rad effective dose equivalent.
Each Month the Radiopharmacy prepares an oral solution of sodium iodide I-131 for uptake doses which are pipetted into individual patient dose vials. The sodium iodide I-131 uptake solution for June contained 12 microcurie per milliliter (ml) in a total volume of 300 ml. The Radiopharmacy technologist prepared the uptake dose by pipetting one ml of solution into the patient vial, which, should have yielded a dose of approximately 12 microcurie. The pipette that the Radiopharmacy technologist used to prepare this dose had been used earlier in the day to prepare therapeutic doses of I-131, and was labeled as the therapy pipette. The Radiopharmacy technologist did not realize that she had picked up the pipette labeled for therapy and assumed it was the pipette used for preparing the uptake doses. Usually the uptake pipette is stored in a shielded vial in the far right corner of the fume hood, but in this case, the therapy pipette was located in the far right corner. The Radiopharmacy technologist assayed the dose in the dose calibrator and noted that the reading was too high for an uptake dose. This caused the staff to question which pipette was used, and they confirmed that the therapy pipette was used. The Radiopharmacy staff discarded the dose in accordance with radioactive waste procedures, and proceeded to draw another uptake dose with the pipette labeled for uptakes. One milliliter was drawn and assayed in the dose calibrator and read 0.915 mCi/ml. The Radiopharmacy technologist accepted the dose thinking that it was really 9.15 microcurie instead of 0.915 millicurie. The computer program is set up to accept I-131 uptake doses on the basis of correct volume and since the volume was within the acceptable range of 1 ml, the computer printed a label for the dose and it was dispensed. The nuclear medicine technologist followed the procedure for confirming the dose prior to administration by checking the patient name, ID number, the I-131 uptake procedure and circling the dose. She looked at the dose printed on the label and thought that the dose was 9.15 uCi instead of the what was printed on the label (0.915 mCi), and administered the dose to the patient.
The Radiopharmacy technologist became concerned about using the wrong pipette and contacted the Radiopharmacist, who then discovered the error. The therapy pipette contained residual millicurie amounts of therapeutic I-131 solution which contaminated the I-131 uptake dose.
B. Why the Event Occurred
The root cause was determined to be the lack of an adequate double check of the I-131 uptake dose prior to administration. A pipette contaminated with 2 millicurie I-131 was inadvertently used to prepare the uptake dose. The Radiopharmacy computer was programmed to detect volume errors, but not activity errors, so it accepted the dose and printed the label. The Radiopharmacy technologist did not detect the error when she assayed the dose for this second redraw, because she assumed that the activity displayed 9.15 uCi, rather than the actual activity displayed, which was 0.915 mCi. The nuclear medicine technologist who double checked the dose mistook the 0.9 mCi for 9 uCi on the dose label and administered the dose. She had been working in an imaging room, but was needed to cover the thyroid uptake room near the end of the work shift. This may have contributed to the error made when confirming the dose.
C. The Effect on the Patient
The absorbed dose to the thyroid was 2675 rad (assuming a 55% radioactive iodine uptake) and the effective dose equivalent was 81 rad. The patient is expected to return to William Beaumont Hospital tomorrow (6/9/04) for treatment with I-131 for hyperthyroidism. The additional dose given for the uptake is a fraction of the dose that will be administered for therapy. The patient is not expected to have any adverse effects.
D. What improvements are Needed to Prevent Recurrence
A complete investigation was conducted to determine the root cause of the medical event. A new pipette will be used for each I-131 uptake patient dose, which will prevent the cross contamination. The computer will be re-programmed to accept uptake dose activity (ie., 5 - 20 microcurie) rather than volume. The computer will not print a label for the uptake dose unless the activity is within the predefined range. The radiopharmacy staff have been trained not to over-ride the failsafe mechanisms of the computer. The nuclear medicine technologist will be retrained in the dose verification process prior to a dose administration. Both the Radiopharmacy technologist and the nuclear medicine technologist will review the dose units (i.e., microcurie, millicurie, MBq) and pass a test.
E. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence
1. A new pipette will be used for each I-131 uptake patient dose, which will prevent the cross contamination.
2. The computer will be re-programmed to accept uptake dose activity (i.e., 5 - 20 microcurie) rather than volume. The computer will not print a label for the uptake dose unless the activity is within the predefined range.
3. The nuclear medicine technologist will be retrained in the dose verification process prior to a dose administration.
4. Both the Radiopharmacy technologist and the nuclear medicine technologist will review the dose units (i.e., microcurie, millicurie, MBq) and pass a test.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40799
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MATERIALS TESTING OF ARKANSAS
Region: 4
City: CONWAY State: AR
County:
License #: ARK859BP03-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JARED THOMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: MATERIALS TESTING OF ARKANSAS
Region: 4
City: CONWAY State: AR
County:
License #: ARK859BP03-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JARED THOMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 06/09/2004
Notification Time: 11:54 [ET]
Event Date: 06/08/2004
Event Time: 19:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/2004
Notification Time: 11:54 [ET]
Event Date: 06/08/2004
Event Time: 19:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CHARLES MILLER (NMSS)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CHARLES MILLER (NMSS)
ARKANSAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING AND THEN FOUND MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was provided via email:
"At 7:00 p.m., June 8, 2004, Materials Testing of Arkansas, Inc., Arkansas Radioactive Materials License Number ARK-859-BP-03-02, notified the Arkansas Department of Health, of a missing Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc., Model 3430 moisture density gauge, serial number 26636, containing 44 millicuries of Americium-241: Berylium, and 9 millicuries of Cesium-137. The licensee stated that the gauge had fallen out of the truck during transport from a job site in Conway, Arkansas.
"The Conway Police Department, Faulkner County Sheriff's Office, Arkansas State Police and the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management were notified.
"At 7:00 a.m., June 9, 2004, Materials Testing of Arkansas, Inc. reported the gauge had been recovered and was being returned to the storage location. The gauge was recovered by another Arkansas Radioactive Material Licensee who secured the gauge overnight. The gauge does not appear to have been tampered with or damaged.
"The Department is investigating the incident and will provide follow-up information upon receipt of the licensee's formal notification report."
The following information was provided via email:
"At 7:00 p.m., June 8, 2004, Materials Testing of Arkansas, Inc., Arkansas Radioactive Materials License Number ARK-859-BP-03-02, notified the Arkansas Department of Health, of a missing Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc., Model 3430 moisture density gauge, serial number 26636, containing 44 millicuries of Americium-241: Berylium, and 9 millicuries of Cesium-137. The licensee stated that the gauge had fallen out of the truck during transport from a job site in Conway, Arkansas.
"The Conway Police Department, Faulkner County Sheriff's Office, Arkansas State Police and the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management were notified.
"At 7:00 a.m., June 9, 2004, Materials Testing of Arkansas, Inc. reported the gauge had been recovered and was being returned to the storage location. The gauge was recovered by another Arkansas Radioactive Material Licensee who secured the gauge overnight. The gauge does not appear to have been tampered with or damaged.
"The Department is investigating the incident and will provide follow-up information upon receipt of the licensee's formal notification report."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40800
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: GEOTECH
Region: 1
City: Rayham State: MA
County:
License #: UNKNOWN
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: GEOTECH
Region: 1
City: Rayham State: MA
County:
License #: UNKNOWN
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 06/09/2004
Notification Time: 14:43 [ET]
Event Date: 06/08/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/2004
Notification Time: 14:43 [ET]
Event Date: 06/08/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
LINDA PSYK-GERSEY (NMSS)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
LINDA PSYK-GERSEY (NMSS)
MASSACHUSETTS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
On the afternoon of 06/08/04, a Troxler moisture density gauge (model/serial number not yet known) was run over by a pickup truck at a construction site in Rayham, MA. The source rod was detached but not bent. The area was cordoned off and the licensee RSO was notified. The RSO arrived, positioned the source rod back into the gauge, secured the gauge and performed a radiological survey with negative results. The results of a source leak test are pending.
On the afternoon of 06/08/04, a Troxler moisture density gauge (model/serial number not yet known) was run over by a pickup truck at a construction site in Rayham, MA. The source rod was detached but not bent. The area was cordoned off and the licensee RSO was notified. The RSO arrived, positioned the source rod back into the gauge, secured the gauge and performed a radiological survey with negative results. The results of a source leak test are pending.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 40801
Rep Org: SCI ENGINEERING
Licensee: SCI ENGINEERING
Region: 3
City: SAINT CHARLES State: MO
County:
License #: 24-20039-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM GUERDAN
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Licensee: SCI ENGINEERING
Region: 3
City: SAINT CHARLES State: MO
County:
License #: 24-20039-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM GUERDAN
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/09/2004
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 06/08/2004
Event Time: 14:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/2004
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 06/08/2004
Event Time: 14:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
An equipment operator backed up a vehicle (Bobcat) over a moisture density gauge at a construction project site located near the intersection of White Gate and West Clay streets in Saint Charles, Missouri. The density gauge was damaged but the gauge probe (rod) containing the source was inserted into the ground during the accident. The licensee followed emergency procedures and contacted their contractor to perform radiation surveys of the area. Initial measurements indicate that the sources are not leaking. Further leak tests will be performed on the damaged gauge. The licensee is planning on packaging and shipping the damaged density gauge to the manufacturer. The moisture density gauge is manufactured by Humboldt, series 5001 containing 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241:Be.
An equipment operator backed up a vehicle (Bobcat) over a moisture density gauge at a construction project site located near the intersection of White Gate and West Clay streets in Saint Charles, Missouri. The density gauge was damaged but the gauge probe (rod) containing the source was inserted into the ground during the accident. The licensee followed emergency procedures and contacted their contractor to perform radiation surveys of the area. Initial measurements indicate that the sources are not leaking. Further leak tests will be performed on the damaged gauge. The licensee is planning on packaging and shipping the damaged density gauge to the manufacturer. The moisture density gauge is manufactured by Humboldt, series 5001 containing 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241:Be.