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Event Notification Report for May 26, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/25/2004 - 05/26/2004

EVENT NUMBERS
407774089542362

Power Reactor
Event Number: 40777
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 05/26/2004
Notification Time: 17:55 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2004
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
OFF SITE NOTIFICATION

"This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an item of public interest and an event for which other government agencies have been notified.

"At 1600 on 5/26/2004, the operations Shift Manager was notified by the Security Shift Supervisor that an individual [truck driver] had been arraigned by a LLEA [Local Law Enforcement Agency] judge for prohibited items (drug paraphernalia) which were discovered during a routine entrance search of personnel and vehicles. The items were discovered outside the protected area [and] were determined to not pose a threat or attempted threat. The LLEA was called and responded to the site access area and removed the individual to the local barracks, where he was subsequently arraigned on a misdemeanor. The individual's name has been removed from the Susquehanna LLC visitors list.

"The Manager of Nuclear Security briefed NRC Region #1 Inspector, Dana Caran, concerning the incident."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 40895
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STAN GAMBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 07/23/2004
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2004
Event Time: 16:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
60 DAY INVALID AUTOMATIC ACTUATION REPORT: CONTAINMENT ISOALTION VALVES IN MORE THAN ONE SYSTEM

"On May 26, 2004 at 16:22 hours and inadvertent primary containment isolation signal was initiated following restoration from a surveillance test on the 2A Reactor Enclosure ventilation exhaust duct radiation monitor. The isolation was due to a fuse failure that caused isolation signals on Group 6A, 6B, 6C, and 7A primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs). The Unit 2 reactor enclosure ventilation isolated. The 2A standby gas treatment system (SGTS) and 2A reactor enclosure recirculation system (RERS) trains initiated. The instrument gas compressor suction valve and the 2A instrument gas header supply valve closed. The containment nitrogen inerting valve and the 2A instrument gas header supply valve closed. The containment nitrogen inerting block valve closed. The containment atmospheric sample valves received an isolation signal but were in a closed position prior to the event. All system functioned as designed during the event.

"The laboratory analysis of the fuse determined that the most probable cause of the event was an age related degradation of the fuse that reduced its current carrying capacity. The fuse was operating under steady state conditions for approximately 30 seconds prior to the failure. A fuse replacement plan was in progress prior to the event due to prior age related failures of this type of fuse. The fuse replacement plan will be evaluated to ensure the current schedule is adequate.

"Component data:
Type: Fuse
Manufacturer: Bussmann
Model number: MIN-5"

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 42362
Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: NOT DISCLOSED BY STATE LAW
Region: 1
City:   State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: R. DANERSEAU (via fax)
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/22/2006
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING AN INTRAVASCULAR BRACHYTHERAPY EVENT

The following information was received via facsimile:

"NY-06-005

"Intravascular Brachytherapy event. (NYS DOH Internal Tracking No. 223)

"New York law prohibits the release of any identities in cases of medical events. Therefore the facility name, etc., is not contained in this report.

"RSO of the hospital called to report that on May 26, 2004, during the introduction of Novoste Sr-90 (3.5 French catheter with the 40mm source train) it was noted, on fluoroscopy that the sources did not advance into the intended target tissue site in the right coronary artery. The licensee used a survey meter to confirm the source train was not in its intended position (rough check). The measurement served to confirm that the source train advanced partially and became stuck in the patient's abdomen. Emergency procedures were followed and all sources were removed within 30 seconds from the 63 [year old] female patient. The catheter assembly containing all sources was placed into a Lucite shield (bailout box). Confirmation of the stuck sources in the transfer case was obtained through fluoroscopy and indicated that the sources were trapped 13 cm from the distal end of the guide catheter. The patient was informed of the event and was subsequently treated with a stent.

"This is reportable under 10 NYCRR 16.25(a)(3)&7 (part of the body other than intended and total dose deviation greater than 10 %). The hospital will send the catheter back to Novoste for an evaluation and will submit a written report following Novoste written analysis.

"The incident reports from the facility, as well as from Novoste, were provided to DOH. Novoste provided guidance to avoid a recurrence."