Event Notification Report for May 22, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/21/2004 - 05/22/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40771
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES SHELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES SHELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/22/2004
Notification Time: 22:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2004
Event Time: 21:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2004
Notification Time: 22:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2004
Event Time: 21:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
JAY HENSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO UNDERGROUND LEAK
"There is sufficient reason to believe that the buried auxiliary feedwater piping associated with Unit 2 is degraded and leaking and thus as a conservative measure it is declared inoperable. This operability determination is based on not having a reasonable assurance that the auxiliary feedwater piping can continue to perform its intended function under all design basis events including seismic events. Approximate leakrate is 8 gpm. Makeup is sufficient at this time to maintain desired level in the affected tank. Further efforts to determine the exact leak location are ongoing. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for the 8-hour notification of a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems or structures that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
Emergency Condensate Storage Tank level was decreasing and water has been detected coming from a conduit in the Safeguard Building. Licensee is in Tech Spec 3.0.1 (30 hours to get below 350 degrees F and 450 psig).
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
See EN #'s 40770, 40769 & 40768 for Surry Unit 2 related problems.
"There is sufficient reason to believe that the buried auxiliary feedwater piping associated with Unit 2 is degraded and leaking and thus as a conservative measure it is declared inoperable. This operability determination is based on not having a reasonable assurance that the auxiliary feedwater piping can continue to perform its intended function under all design basis events including seismic events. Approximate leakrate is 8 gpm. Makeup is sufficient at this time to maintain desired level in the affected tank. Further efforts to determine the exact leak location are ongoing. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for the 8-hour notification of a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems or structures that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
Emergency Condensate Storage Tank level was decreasing and water has been detected coming from a conduit in the Safeguard Building. Licensee is in Tech Spec 3.0.1 (30 hours to get below 350 degrees F and 450 psig).
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
See EN #'s 40770, 40769 & 40768 for Surry Unit 2 related problems.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40847
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DANNY WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DANNY WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/30/2004
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2004
Event Time: 04:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2004
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2004
Event Time: 04:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF DIVISION 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DUE TO LOSS OF A RPS BUS
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"On May 22, 2004, at approximately 4:29 am EDT, while the plant was operating at 100% power, the normal power supply to the Division 1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus was lost. This caused the actuation of the Division 1 primary containment isolation logic circuit. This was an event that resulted in the actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. However, as this event meets the definition of an invalid actuation (i.e., not a response to an actual plant parameter exceeding a trip setpoint), this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) in lieu of a Licensee Event Report.
"Operators implemented the applicable response procedures, and shifted Division 1 RPS to its alternate power supply. The containment isolation signal was reset, and systems were restored to normal alignment. Reactor power was not affected by this event.
"All safety related equipment controlled by the affected circuits responded to the loss of Division 1 RPS as required, with one exception. The Division 1 control building emergency filtration train should have automatically initiated, but did not. Subsequent troubleshooting discovered a failed relay in its control circuitry. This defect would not have prevented the Division 2 control building emergency filtration train from performing its safety function.
"It was determined that a relay coil in the control circuitry for the Division 1 RPS motor-generator set failed. This caused the main output contactor on the MG set to open, interrupting power to the bus. Repairs were completed on June 3, 2004, and the Division 1 RPS bus was then shifted back to its normal power supply."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this notification.
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"On May 22, 2004, at approximately 4:29 am EDT, while the plant was operating at 100% power, the normal power supply to the Division 1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus was lost. This caused the actuation of the Division 1 primary containment isolation logic circuit. This was an event that resulted in the actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. However, as this event meets the definition of an invalid actuation (i.e., not a response to an actual plant parameter exceeding a trip setpoint), this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) in lieu of a Licensee Event Report.
"Operators implemented the applicable response procedures, and shifted Division 1 RPS to its alternate power supply. The containment isolation signal was reset, and systems were restored to normal alignment. Reactor power was not affected by this event.
"All safety related equipment controlled by the affected circuits responded to the loss of Division 1 RPS as required, with one exception. The Division 1 control building emergency filtration train should have automatically initiated, but did not. Subsequent troubleshooting discovered a failed relay in its control circuitry. This defect would not have prevented the Division 2 control building emergency filtration train from performing its safety function.
"It was determined that a relay coil in the control circuitry for the Division 1 RPS motor-generator set failed. This caused the main output contactor on the MG set to open, interrupting power to the bus. Repairs were completed on June 3, 2004, and the Division 1 RPS bus was then shifted back to its normal power supply."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this notification.