Event Notification Report for May 08, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/07/2004 - 05/08/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40735
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BRILEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BRILEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/08/2004
Notification Time: 07:07 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2004
Event Time: 04:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2004
Notification Time: 07:07 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2004
Event Time: 04:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR STARTUP CANCELLED DUE TO ERRATIC SOURCE RANGE MONITOR
While performing a unit start-up, SRM 24 was declared inoperable due to erratic indications. SRM 22 was already inoperable which resulted in falling below the Technical Specification 3.3.1.2 mode 2 requirement of 3 operable SRMs.
The cause of the erratic indications on SRM 24 is unknown at this time. All control rods were fully inserted at 0527 CDT.
The license plans to go to a cold shutdown condition to investigate the erratic source range monitor.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
While performing a unit start-up, SRM 24 was declared inoperable due to erratic indications. SRM 22 was already inoperable which resulted in falling below the Technical Specification 3.3.1.2 mode 2 requirement of 3 operable SRMs.
The cause of the erratic indications on SRM 24 is unknown at this time. All control rods were fully inserted at 0527 CDT.
The license plans to go to a cold shutdown condition to investigate the erratic source range monitor.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40736
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ART LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ART LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/08/2004
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2004
Event Time: 13:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2004
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2004
Event Time: 13:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JAMES LYONS (NRR)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JAMES LYONS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY SIRENS
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 0912 [EDT] the Salem Township sirens, zone 14, sounded for 3 minutes. All ten sirens in zone 14 sounded. The reason for the siren sounding was unknown at that time. The Sheriff Dispatcher notified Emergency Preparedness of the sirens sounding. Emergency Preparedness called the vendor, Transco, to investigate the siren sounding. Transco went to the 500 [foot] siren tower and polled the siren system and found that the Zone 14 sirens had been activated by a signal from the Sheriff Dispatch office at 0912 [hrs.]. Transco then went to the Sheriff Dispatch office to look at the system and found no problems. At 1158 [hrs.], on 5/8/04, a quiet test, e.g. low noise level test, was conducted for siren 91, next to the Sheriff's office, to ensure the siren system was operating properly.
"Discussions with the Sheriff Dispatchers indicated that they were not in the vicinity of the siren console and did not have the siren screen called up. Therefore, it was not possible for the Sheriff Dispatchers to inadvertently activate the sirens. The only other activity in the siren console area was an exterminator working. Therefore, at this time, the most likely cause of the sirens sounding is the exterminator inadvertently activating the Zone 14 sirens.
"The Prompt Notification System (sirens) were verified capable of performing [their] intended function (operable), at no time was Emergency Notification capability impaired, it was also validated, that once activated by the inadvertent action, the system responded as expected. This spurious activation does not appear in any way to be related to Event #40734 regarding the test failure on May 7, 2004."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 0912 [EDT] the Salem Township sirens, zone 14, sounded for 3 minutes. All ten sirens in zone 14 sounded. The reason for the siren sounding was unknown at that time. The Sheriff Dispatcher notified Emergency Preparedness of the sirens sounding. Emergency Preparedness called the vendor, Transco, to investigate the siren sounding. Transco went to the 500 [foot] siren tower and polled the siren system and found that the Zone 14 sirens had been activated by a signal from the Sheriff Dispatch office at 0912 [hrs.]. Transco then went to the Sheriff Dispatch office to look at the system and found no problems. At 1158 [hrs.], on 5/8/04, a quiet test, e.g. low noise level test, was conducted for siren 91, next to the Sheriff's office, to ensure the siren system was operating properly.
"Discussions with the Sheriff Dispatchers indicated that they were not in the vicinity of the siren console and did not have the siren screen called up. Therefore, it was not possible for the Sheriff Dispatchers to inadvertently activate the sirens. The only other activity in the siren console area was an exterminator working. Therefore, at this time, the most likely cause of the sirens sounding is the exterminator inadvertently activating the Zone 14 sirens.
"The Prompt Notification System (sirens) were verified capable of performing [their] intended function (operable), at no time was Emergency Notification capability impaired, it was also validated, that once activated by the inadvertent action, the system responded as expected. This spurious activation does not appear in any way to be related to Event #40734 regarding the test failure on May 7, 2004."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40737
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN GUNN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN GUNN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/09/2004
Notification Time: 02:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2004
Event Time: 20:39 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2004
Notification Time: 02:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2004
Event Time: 20:39 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING PHYSICS TESTING DUE TO CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY SLIPPING 6 INCHES.
On May 8, 2004, at approximately 20:39 Mountain Standard Time (MST) Palo Verde Unit 1 operations manually tripped the reactor when a Control Element Assembly (CEA) slipped approximately 6 inches (CEA # 89) while conducting physics testing (at 10E-02 percent power) following Unit 1's eleventh refueling outage. Unit 1 was at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to the trip. All CEAs inserted fully into the reactor core (Initial Conditions: Regulating groups 1, 2 & 5 were fully withdrawn, regulating group 3 was fully inserted, regulating group 4 was being inserted when CEA # 89 slipped approximately 6 inches. Shutdown groups were fully withdrawn). This was an uncomplicated reactor trip. No emergency classification was required per the Emergency Plan. No automatic ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Safety related buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. No LCOs (Limiting Conditions of Operations) have been entered as a result of this event. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event.
Unit 1 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
The Senior Resident Inspector was informed of the Unit 1 reactor trip.
On May 8, 2004, at approximately 20:39 Mountain Standard Time (MST) Palo Verde Unit 1 operations manually tripped the reactor when a Control Element Assembly (CEA) slipped approximately 6 inches (CEA # 89) while conducting physics testing (at 10E-02 percent power) following Unit 1's eleventh refueling outage. Unit 1 was at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to the trip. All CEAs inserted fully into the reactor core (Initial Conditions: Regulating groups 1, 2 & 5 were fully withdrawn, regulating group 3 was fully inserted, regulating group 4 was being inserted when CEA # 89 slipped approximately 6 inches. Shutdown groups were fully withdrawn). This was an uncomplicated reactor trip. No emergency classification was required per the Emergency Plan. No automatic ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Safety related buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. No LCOs (Limiting Conditions of Operations) have been entered as a result of this event. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event.
Unit 1 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
The Senior Resident Inspector was informed of the Unit 1 reactor trip.