Event Notification Report for May 07, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/06/2004 - 05/07/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
40740407344073240854
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40740
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: CTI CONSULTANTS INC
Region: 1
City: State: MD
County: MONTGOMERY
License #: MD-31-241-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB NELSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: CTI CONSULTANTS INC
Region: 1
City: State: MD
County: MONTGOMERY
License #: MD-31-241-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB NELSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/10/2004
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2004
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2004
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2004
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
TROXLER GAUGE RUN OVER BY BULLDOZER AT CONSTRUCTION SITE
A Troxler gauge model 3430 containing 10 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries AmBe-241 was run over by a bulldozer at a construction site in Montgomery County, MD. The device was completely destroyed, but the sources were not broken or leaking. The device was shipped to NE Technical Service in Westminster, MD and will be disposed of at a nuclear waste site in California..
A Troxler gauge model 3430 containing 10 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries AmBe-241 was run over by a bulldozer at a construction site in Montgomery County, MD. The device was completely destroyed, but the sources were not broken or leaking. The device was shipped to NE Technical Service in Westminster, MD and will be disposed of at a nuclear waste site in California..
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40734
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ART LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ART LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 05/07/2004
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2004
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2004
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2004
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JAMES LYONS (NRR)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JAMES LYONS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITY DUE TO INABILITY TO ACTIVATE SIRENS
The following information was obtained by the licensee via facsimile:
"During the May 7, 2004 monthly siren test, it was determined that the Ottawa County Sheriff dispatcher did not have the capability to activate the EPZ [Emergency Preparedness Zone] Sirens. Follow-up investigation determined that a time difference between the control station in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the sheriff's dispatch control station caused the sheriff's control station to be unable to activate the sirens. This condition was corrected within minutes of discovery, however it appears that the Sheriff's dispatcher had lost capability to activate the sirens when the EOF computer clock was reset due to daylight savings time (reset manually on April 5, 2004).
"All 54 sirens were successfully tested using the vendors control station. The ability to [activate] the sirens from the Sheriff's control station was restored. The EOF control station retained the ability to activate the sirens throughout this time period.
"Because the sirens could not be sounded from a 24-hour manned station, in accordance with station procedures, this event represents a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capability. Therefore, this event is reportable within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The Ottawa County Sheriff's Office was notified of this event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was obtained by the licensee via facsimile:
"During the May 7, 2004 monthly siren test, it was determined that the Ottawa County Sheriff dispatcher did not have the capability to activate the EPZ [Emergency Preparedness Zone] Sirens. Follow-up investigation determined that a time difference between the control station in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the sheriff's dispatch control station caused the sheriff's control station to be unable to activate the sirens. This condition was corrected within minutes of discovery, however it appears that the Sheriff's dispatcher had lost capability to activate the sirens when the EOF computer clock was reset due to daylight savings time (reset manually on April 5, 2004).
"All 54 sirens were successfully tested using the vendors control station. The ability to [activate] the sirens from the Sheriff's control station was restored. The EOF control station retained the ability to activate the sirens throughout this time period.
"Because the sirens could not be sounded from a 24-hour manned station, in accordance with station procedures, this event represents a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capability. Therefore, this event is reportable within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The Ottawa County Sheriff's Office was notified of this event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40732
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: NEW ORLEANS CANCER INSTITUTE MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: New Orleans State: LA
County:
License #: LA-10853-LO1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: NEW ORLEANS CANCER INSTITUTE MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: New Orleans State: LA
County:
License #: LA-10853-LO1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/07/2004
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2004
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT
The following information was obtained from the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality via facsimile:
"There was a Medical Event reported on April 7, 2004 concerning an incident that occurred on March 31-April 1, 2004. In the process of constructing a computer generated treatment plan for prostate Brachytherapy, a default switch that changes the source position calculation orientation from 'Connector End' to 'Catheter tip' was not adjusted to the correct orientation (Catheter/Needle tip). This led to the sources stopping short of the target and the total prescribed dose was not delivered. The facility was using a Nucletron Micro Selectron with a 7.315 [Curie] source of Ir-192. There was a total of three fractions for the treatment. One on March 31, 2004 and two on April 1, 2004. The total dose that was delivered was 1800 centigray to the wrong location. The misadministration is being compensated by external beam therapy. [There] are two causes for this event. The design of the default switch automatically selects an orientation that is not used at this facility and cannot be adjusted to default to the correct position. The other cause is operator error in not assuring that the orientation had been changed to read correctly. The patient is self-[referred] from Guatemala. The patient was informed immediately of the misadministration and received further external beam treatment. According to the Radiation Oncologist, no detrimental effects are expected. Actions taken to prevent further recurrence will be the addition of a visible check and documentation that the treatment plan was done with the source positions calculated from the tip end of the catheter or needle. This will be added to the pretreatment checklist which is performed and signed by the Radiation Oncologist, the Physicist, and the Dosimetrist. This checklist will be performed prior to initial treatment and at plan changes and is part of the patient's permanent record. There will also be a written notification to Nucletron regarding the potential danger of misadministration due to inability to change the default on the orientation 'switch'. The design should be that if the connector end is selected, the [planner] should be warned that this will change the source placement."
The following information was obtained from the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality via facsimile:
"There was a Medical Event reported on April 7, 2004 concerning an incident that occurred on March 31-April 1, 2004. In the process of constructing a computer generated treatment plan for prostate Brachytherapy, a default switch that changes the source position calculation orientation from 'Connector End' to 'Catheter tip' was not adjusted to the correct orientation (Catheter/Needle tip). This led to the sources stopping short of the target and the total prescribed dose was not delivered. The facility was using a Nucletron Micro Selectron with a 7.315 [Curie] source of Ir-192. There was a total of three fractions for the treatment. One on March 31, 2004 and two on April 1, 2004. The total dose that was delivered was 1800 centigray to the wrong location. The misadministration is being compensated by external beam therapy. [There] are two causes for this event. The design of the default switch automatically selects an orientation that is not used at this facility and cannot be adjusted to default to the correct position. The other cause is operator error in not assuring that the orientation had been changed to read correctly. The patient is self-[referred] from Guatemala. The patient was informed immediately of the misadministration and received further external beam treatment. According to the Radiation Oncologist, no detrimental effects are expected. Actions taken to prevent further recurrence will be the addition of a visible check and documentation that the treatment plan was done with the source positions calculated from the tip end of the catheter or needle. This will be added to the pretreatment checklist which is performed and signed by the Radiation Oncologist, the Physicist, and the Dosimetrist. This checklist will be performed prior to initial treatment and at plan changes and is part of the patient's permanent record. There will also be a written notification to Nucletron regarding the potential danger of misadministration due to inability to change the default on the orientation 'switch'. The design should be that if the connector end is selected, the [planner] should be warned that this will change the source placement."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40854
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Region: 4
City: AUSTIN State: TX
County:
License #: L-00485-000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Region: 4
City: AUSTIN State: TX
County:
License #: L-00485-000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 07/07/2004
Notification Time: 13:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2004
Notification Time: 13:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JEFFERY CLARK (R4)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
JEFFERY CLARK (R4)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE
"On May 6, 2004, a leak test sample from a Hewlett Packard 5890 Gas Chromatograph, with ECD Model # 19233, was leak tested for source Serial No. L6180 [Nickel - 63, current activity 13.48 milliCuries]. The initial leak test resulted in removable activity of approximately 9250 disintegrations per minute (dpm) or 0.0042 microCuries, near leak test limits. A second test was repeated on May 7, 2004, which resulted in 194,000 dpm or 0.087 microCuries of removable activity on the vent tube, which was well above the leak test limit. Minor removable contamination (approximately 100 counts per minute (cpm)) was detected on the interior of the case, the inlet tube sample (approximately 100 cpm), and the vent tube cap (approximately 1750 cpm). The source was confiscated by the University's radiation safety staff to a secure location at the Radiation Safety Office. The last leak test was conducted on December 17, 2003, with results indicating no contamination. The source will be returned to the manufacture or disposed of as radioactive waste. The direct cause of the loss of the source's integrity is not known. The written report was received by this agency May 17, 2004, but was not delivered to Incident Investigation until July 7, 2004. No violations have been cited. This incident was closed July 7,2004."
TX Incident number I-8138
"On May 6, 2004, a leak test sample from a Hewlett Packard 5890 Gas Chromatograph, with ECD Model # 19233, was leak tested for source Serial No. L6180 [Nickel - 63, current activity 13.48 milliCuries]. The initial leak test resulted in removable activity of approximately 9250 disintegrations per minute (dpm) or 0.0042 microCuries, near leak test limits. A second test was repeated on May 7, 2004, which resulted in 194,000 dpm or 0.087 microCuries of removable activity on the vent tube, which was well above the leak test limit. Minor removable contamination (approximately 100 counts per minute (cpm)) was detected on the interior of the case, the inlet tube sample (approximately 100 cpm), and the vent tube cap (approximately 1750 cpm). The source was confiscated by the University's radiation safety staff to a secure location at the Radiation Safety Office. The last leak test was conducted on December 17, 2003, with results indicating no contamination. The source will be returned to the manufacture or disposed of as radioactive waste. The direct cause of the loss of the source's integrity is not known. The written report was received by this agency May 17, 2004, but was not delivered to Incident Investigation until July 7, 2004. No violations have been cited. This incident was closed July 7,2004."
TX Incident number I-8138