Event Notification Report for April 25, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/24/2004 - 04/25/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
40819
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40819
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE FOSS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE FOSS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 06/15/2004
Notification Time: 09:14 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2004
Event Time: 01:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2004
Notification Time: 09:14 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2004
Event Time: 01:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day optional report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of specified systems, specifically the Units 2 and 3 Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS).
"On 4/25/04, at approximately 0105 hours, the 343SU startup source tripped resulting in a fast transfer of expected 4 kV emergency busses to the alternate offsite power source. The fast transfer resulted in a half PCIS Group II isolation on both Units 2 and 3 as expected. The half isolation of PCIS Group II resulted in outboard isolation valves closing on Unit 2 and inboard isolation valves closing on Unit 3. The isolations involved various PCIS Group II process lines such as Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU), Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) / Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD) and Containment Instrument Nitrogen. The Units 2 and 3 PCIS isolations were reset by approximately 0130 hours in accordance with procedures. All required isolation valves operated as designed.
"The offsite source (343SU) was lost as a result of a ground fault. Subsequent investigation determined that a raccoon had climbed a takeoff tower where the startup source transitions from an aerial line to underground cabling. The associated equipment was located in a small fenced area near the plant. The offsite source was inspected, tested and returned to an operable condition by approximately 2220 hours on 4/25/04. This issue has been entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CR 216811) for evaluation and implementation of further corrective actions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This 60-day optional report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of specified systems, specifically the Units 2 and 3 Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS).
"On 4/25/04, at approximately 0105 hours, the 343SU startup source tripped resulting in a fast transfer of expected 4 kV emergency busses to the alternate offsite power source. The fast transfer resulted in a half PCIS Group II isolation on both Units 2 and 3 as expected. The half isolation of PCIS Group II resulted in outboard isolation valves closing on Unit 2 and inboard isolation valves closing on Unit 3. The isolations involved various PCIS Group II process lines such as Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU), Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) / Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD) and Containment Instrument Nitrogen. The Units 2 and 3 PCIS isolations were reset by approximately 0130 hours in accordance with procedures. All required isolation valves operated as designed.
"The offsite source (343SU) was lost as a result of a ground fault. Subsequent investigation determined that a raccoon had climbed a takeoff tower where the startup source transitions from an aerial line to underground cabling. The associated equipment was located in a small fenced area near the plant. The offsite source was inspected, tested and returned to an operable condition by approximately 2220 hours on 4/25/04. This issue has been entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CR 216811) for evaluation and implementation of further corrective actions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.