Event Notification Report for April 23, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/22/2004 - 04/23/2004
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40700
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: STEVE SKAGGS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: STEVE SKAGGS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/24/2004
Notification Time: 04:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2004
Event Time: 08:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2004
Notification Time: 04:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2004
Event Time: 08:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
CRITICALITY CONTROL 24-HOUR (BULLETIN 91-01) REPORT
The following information was obtained from the regulatee via facsimile:
"At 0845, on 04-23-04, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a violation of Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls associated with storage of waste drums in the C-335 building. Two Spacing Exempt waste drums were identified to have been characterized utilizing erroneous results from the Q2 drum monitor in violation of Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) 091. The characterization is based on it being unlikely that the drum monitor will give an erroneous result. The purpose of the requirements is to ensure the mass in an NCS Spacing Exempt waste drum is below the [DELETED] 235U limit.
"The waste drums have been independently sampled and demonstrated to be below the [DELETED] 235U limit.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
While the [DELETED] 235U limit was not exceeded for these two drums, both legs of double contingency were lost and the potential exists for waste drums to be non-conservatively characterized using the Q2 drum monitor.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S)) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to occur, two or more waste drums containing above the [DELETED] 235U limit would have to be accumulated to exceed a critical mass with no spacing and be moderated.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on mass.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
Each drum contains less than [DELETED] 235U at an enrichment of less than 1.5 wt% 235U.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency relies on it being unlikely for the Q2 drum monitor to provide an erroneous result. The drum monitor measurement gave a non-conservative erroneous result, which was used to characterize the drum. Therefore, the unlikely statement was violated. However, the drums were subsequently sampled with the result being below the [DELETED] 235U limit for each drum. Therefore, the parameter was maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency relies on it being independently unlikely for the Q2 drum monitor to provide an erroneous result. The independent drum monitor measurement gave a non-conservative erroneous result, which was independently used to characterize the drum. Therefore, the independent unlikely statement was violated. However, the drums were subsequently independently sampled with the independent result being below the [DELETED] 235U limit for each drum. Therefore, the parameter was maintained.
"Although the parameter was maintained, double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
1. Characterize waste drums (PF-04-7258 and PF-03-5051) using the independent sample results. Completed 04/23/04.
2. Complete the 'extent of condition' examination prior to making a determination for removal of the ropes and postings."
The Q2 drum monitor requires a density of material input to properly characterize drum material. Sodium fluoride (NaF) density was used instead of uranyl fluoride (UO2F2) which resulted in a non-conservative characterization. The drum contained both materials.
Plant personnel have imposed spacing requirements on all other drums in the immediate area that have questionable characterizations until they can be properly analyzed.
To prevent re-occurrence, plant management has issued orders and mandates to verify drum contents utilizing two different and distinct sampling methods (i.e. monitoring and laboratory sampling).
The following information was obtained from the regulatee via facsimile:
"At 0845, on 04-23-04, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a violation of Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls associated with storage of waste drums in the C-335 building. Two Spacing Exempt waste drums were identified to have been characterized utilizing erroneous results from the Q2 drum monitor in violation of Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) 091. The characterization is based on it being unlikely that the drum monitor will give an erroneous result. The purpose of the requirements is to ensure the mass in an NCS Spacing Exempt waste drum is below the [DELETED] 235U limit.
"The waste drums have been independently sampled and demonstrated to be below the [DELETED] 235U limit.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
While the [DELETED] 235U limit was not exceeded for these two drums, both legs of double contingency were lost and the potential exists for waste drums to be non-conservatively characterized using the Q2 drum monitor.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S)) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to occur, two or more waste drums containing above the [DELETED] 235U limit would have to be accumulated to exceed a critical mass with no spacing and be moderated.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on mass.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
Each drum contains less than [DELETED] 235U at an enrichment of less than 1.5 wt% 235U.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency relies on it being unlikely for the Q2 drum monitor to provide an erroneous result. The drum monitor measurement gave a non-conservative erroneous result, which was used to characterize the drum. Therefore, the unlikely statement was violated. However, the drums were subsequently sampled with the result being below the [DELETED] 235U limit for each drum. Therefore, the parameter was maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency relies on it being independently unlikely for the Q2 drum monitor to provide an erroneous result. The independent drum monitor measurement gave a non-conservative erroneous result, which was independently used to characterize the drum. Therefore, the independent unlikely statement was violated. However, the drums were subsequently independently sampled with the independent result being below the [DELETED] 235U limit for each drum. Therefore, the parameter was maintained.
"Although the parameter was maintained, double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
1. Characterize waste drums (PF-04-7258 and PF-03-5051) using the independent sample results. Completed 04/23/04.
2. Complete the 'extent of condition' examination prior to making a determination for removal of the ropes and postings."
The Q2 drum monitor requires a density of material input to properly characterize drum material. Sodium fluoride (NaF) density was used instead of uranyl fluoride (UO2F2) which resulted in a non-conservative characterization. The drum contained both materials.
Plant personnel have imposed spacing requirements on all other drums in the immediate area that have questionable characterizations until they can be properly analyzed.
To prevent re-occurrence, plant management has issued orders and mandates to verify drum contents utilizing two different and distinct sampling methods (i.e. monitoring and laboratory sampling).
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40805
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 06/10/2004
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2004
Event Time: 05:53 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2004
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2004
Event Time: 05:53 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
MARK LESSER (R2)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFfUSSION PLANT - RESPONSE BULLETIN 91-01 24 - HOUR REPORT
"At 1550 on 6-09-04, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a failure of a Safety Related Item (SRI) relied upon in Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) 052 'Enrichment Cascade During Normal Operations at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.' At 0553 hours on 4-23-04, when responding to alarms on Cell 6 in Building C-310, the second bank of motors could not be shut down using the manual motor trip system. Operators opened the Transformer Secondary Breaker (TSB) as an alternate means to shut down the motors. The manual motor trip system is credited to mitigate/minimize the consequences or extent of a Hot Metal Reaction (HMR).
"PGDP Problem Report No, ATRC-04-2299; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-17; Event Worksheet [NRC Event Number]: # 40805, Responsible Division: Operations.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Minimal. There are multiple methods capable of shutting down equipment suspected of undergoing a HMR. The compressor motors were shut down using one of these methods. The shutdown was accomplished within 2 minutes.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIOS) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to occur, the equipment would have had to be involved In the initiating event of a HMR. There were no indications of a HMR. Additionally, the HMR event would need to have occurred with a significant inventory of UF6 present. The event was in the purge cascade having UF6 concentrations in the ppm range. Therefore, there is no credible pathway to criticality for this incident.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):
This scenario is singly contingent based on moderation control.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
The event was in the purge cascade having UF6 concentrations in the ppm range at an enrichment of less than [DELETED] wt % 235U.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
This scenario is singly contingent based on moderation control. The scenario indicates that it is unlikely for a significant HMR to occur resulting in a cooler/cascade breach with subsequent sprinkler activation based on historical operations. The manual motor trip system is credited to mitigate/minimize the consequences or extent of a HMR. The credited trip failed to perform its intended function. Although the credited trip failed, alternative methods were used to shutdown the cell, thereby satisfying the intent of the administrative portion of the control. Also, no HMR, cell breach, or sprinkler activation occurred. Although the SRI failed, the moderation parameter was maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The cell was shut down using alternate means within 2 minutes. The manual motor trip system was declared inoperable at 0700 on 4-23-04 and repaired.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"At 1550 on 6-09-04, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a failure of a Safety Related Item (SRI) relied upon in Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) 052 'Enrichment Cascade During Normal Operations at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.' At 0553 hours on 4-23-04, when responding to alarms on Cell 6 in Building C-310, the second bank of motors could not be shut down using the manual motor trip system. Operators opened the Transformer Secondary Breaker (TSB) as an alternate means to shut down the motors. The manual motor trip system is credited to mitigate/minimize the consequences or extent of a Hot Metal Reaction (HMR).
"PGDP Problem Report No, ATRC-04-2299; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-17; Event Worksheet [NRC Event Number]: # 40805, Responsible Division: Operations.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Minimal. There are multiple methods capable of shutting down equipment suspected of undergoing a HMR. The compressor motors were shut down using one of these methods. The shutdown was accomplished within 2 minutes.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIOS) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to occur, the equipment would have had to be involved In the initiating event of a HMR. There were no indications of a HMR. Additionally, the HMR event would need to have occurred with a significant inventory of UF6 present. The event was in the purge cascade having UF6 concentrations in the ppm range. Therefore, there is no credible pathway to criticality for this incident.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):
This scenario is singly contingent based on moderation control.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
The event was in the purge cascade having UF6 concentrations in the ppm range at an enrichment of less than [DELETED] wt % 235U.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
This scenario is singly contingent based on moderation control. The scenario indicates that it is unlikely for a significant HMR to occur resulting in a cooler/cascade breach with subsequent sprinkler activation based on historical operations. The manual motor trip system is credited to mitigate/minimize the consequences or extent of a HMR. The credited trip failed to perform its intended function. Although the credited trip failed, alternative methods were used to shutdown the cell, thereby satisfying the intent of the administrative portion of the control. Also, no HMR, cell breach, or sprinkler activation occurred. Although the SRI failed, the moderation parameter was maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The cell was shut down using alternate means within 2 minutes. The manual motor trip system was declared inoperable at 0700 on 4-23-04 and repaired.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."