Event Notification Report for April 18, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/17/2004 - 04/18/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40682
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS PETRAK
HQ OPS Officer: JAMIE HEISSERER
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS PETRAK
HQ OPS Officer: JAMIE HEISSERER
Notification Date: 04/18/2004
Notification Time: 15:31 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2004
Event Time: 12:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2004
Notification Time: 15:31 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2004
Event Time: 12:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO MAIN FEED PUMP TRIPS
"An Auxiliary Feedwater [AFW] actuation occurred with the plant in Mode 3, Main Feedwater out of service and a cooldown in progress. An AFW actuation was received when both main feed pumps tripped due to low condenser vacuum. AFW was already in service with both motor-driven pumps running and discharge valves throttled to maintain steam generator level. A surveillance to test AFW actuation on the trip of main feedwater pumps was in progress. The main feed pump trip signal was generated when condenser vacuum was broken prior to completing the test and blocking the actuation signal from the main feed pumps to AFW. Steam generator blowdown and sample valves isolated and MDAFW [Motor Driven AFW] discharge valves opened as expected. Operators took action to throttle AFW feed to the steam generators. No adverse affects on the plant occurred. The AFW actuation signal from the trip of main feed pumps has been blocked as allowed by plant conditions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"An Auxiliary Feedwater [AFW] actuation occurred with the plant in Mode 3, Main Feedwater out of service and a cooldown in progress. An AFW actuation was received when both main feed pumps tripped due to low condenser vacuum. AFW was already in service with both motor-driven pumps running and discharge valves throttled to maintain steam generator level. A surveillance to test AFW actuation on the trip of main feedwater pumps was in progress. The main feed pump trip signal was generated when condenser vacuum was broken prior to completing the test and blocking the actuation signal from the main feed pumps to AFW. Steam generator blowdown and sample valves isolated and MDAFW [Motor Driven AFW] discharge valves opened as expected. Operators took action to throttle AFW feed to the steam generators. No adverse affects on the plant occurred. The AFW actuation signal from the trip of main feed pumps has been blocked as allowed by plant conditions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40683
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVE TORREZ
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVE TORREZ
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/18/2004
Notification Time: 22:33 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2004
Event Time: 20:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2004
Notification Time: 22:33 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2004
Event Time: 20:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
COURTESY CALL INVOLVING SUSPENSION OF SECURITY PATROLS DUE TO ADVERSE WEATHER
During a tornado and severe thunder storm watch, wind gusts on site exceeded 80 mph. At 2010 CDT the shift manager directed that the security supervisor suspend guard patrols within the Owner Controlled Area and access control point for personnel safety inside the Protected Area. Patrols were restored at 2044 CDT after the wind gusts subsided. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
During a tornado and severe thunder storm watch, wind gusts on site exceeded 80 mph. At 2010 CDT the shift manager directed that the security supervisor suspend guard patrols within the Owner Controlled Area and access control point for personnel safety inside the Protected Area. Patrols were restored at 2044 CDT after the wind gusts subsided. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40684
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DAVE RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DAVE RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 04/18/2004
Notification Time: 23:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2004
Event Time: 18:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2004
Notification Time: 23:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2004
Event Time: 18:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM ISOLATION DUE TO A RISE IN REACTOR PRESSURE
"At 1830 hours on 18 April 2004, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was restoring from reactor pressure vessel leakage test.
"Reactor pressure was ~82 psi, temperature ~178 degrees, reactor level was solid with both reactor recirculation pumps running in slow speed per the leak test procedure.
" 'B' residual heat removal system was being warmed up in preparation for going in to service. Reactor water cleanup reject from the vessel was secured to maintain RPV [Reactor Pressure Vessel] pressure stable in order to provide driving head for flow through the residual heat removal discharge line to radwaste. The line is warmed up from the reactor, back through the Shutdown cooling isolation valve, to radwaste prior to placing shutdown cooling in service. When warm-up criteria are met, the operating procedure directs securing flow.
When flow was secured, this effectively isolated the solid reactor vessel, resulting in a rise in reactor pressure. Pressure peaked at ~146 psi before operators established reactor water cleanup reject flow.
"When RPV pressure reached 128 psi, the residual heat removal system isolation was automatically initiated as designed. The shutdown cooling injection valve, which was open to support piping warm-up, closed as designed. All other shutdown cooling valves were closed prior to the event per the warm-up lineup."
RPV is currently depressurized with shutdown cooling in service. All systems are functioning as expected.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * Retraction on 06/01/04 at 1512 EDT from Chris Skinner to John MacKinnon * * *
"The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #40684: On April 18, 2004, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 reported Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling System isolated due to a pressure spike while warming up the piping. The shutdown cooling injection valve, which was open to support piping warm-up, closed as designed. All other shutdown cooling valves were closed prior to the event per the warm-up lineup. Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) in response to the valid containment isolation signal.
"Subsequent analysis has concluded that, although the isolation signal was valid, it was not a general containment isolation signal (i.e., the isolation signal only involved the shutdown cooling system) and the shutdown cooling function of the Residual Heat Removal System is not listed under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) as a system that is required to be reportable. This system isolation does not meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Therefore, this notification made on April 18, 2004, is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
NRC R1DO (Ron Bellamy) notified.
"At 1830 hours on 18 April 2004, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was restoring from reactor pressure vessel leakage test.
"Reactor pressure was ~82 psi, temperature ~178 degrees, reactor level was solid with both reactor recirculation pumps running in slow speed per the leak test procedure.
" 'B' residual heat removal system was being warmed up in preparation for going in to service. Reactor water cleanup reject from the vessel was secured to maintain RPV [Reactor Pressure Vessel] pressure stable in order to provide driving head for flow through the residual heat removal discharge line to radwaste. The line is warmed up from the reactor, back through the Shutdown cooling isolation valve, to radwaste prior to placing shutdown cooling in service. When warm-up criteria are met, the operating procedure directs securing flow.
When flow was secured, this effectively isolated the solid reactor vessel, resulting in a rise in reactor pressure. Pressure peaked at ~146 psi before operators established reactor water cleanup reject flow.
"When RPV pressure reached 128 psi, the residual heat removal system isolation was automatically initiated as designed. The shutdown cooling injection valve, which was open to support piping warm-up, closed as designed. All other shutdown cooling valves were closed prior to the event per the warm-up lineup."
RPV is currently depressurized with shutdown cooling in service. All systems are functioning as expected.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * Retraction on 06/01/04 at 1512 EDT from Chris Skinner to John MacKinnon * * *
"The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #40684: On April 18, 2004, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 reported Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling System isolated due to a pressure spike while warming up the piping. The shutdown cooling injection valve, which was open to support piping warm-up, closed as designed. All other shutdown cooling valves were closed prior to the event per the warm-up lineup. Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) in response to the valid containment isolation signal.
"Subsequent analysis has concluded that, although the isolation signal was valid, it was not a general containment isolation signal (i.e., the isolation signal only involved the shutdown cooling system) and the shutdown cooling function of the Residual Heat Removal System is not listed under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) as a system that is required to be reportable. This system isolation does not meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Therefore, this notification made on April 18, 2004, is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
NRC R1DO (Ron Bellamy) notified.