Event Notification Report for April 05, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/04/2004 - 04/05/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
406474064840642406434064540646
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40647
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GARY R. BRINSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GARY R. BRINSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/05/2004
Notification Time: 20:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 19:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2004
Notification Time: 20:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 19:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BRIEF LOSS OF NOAA WEATHER RADIO CAPABILITY
"Site experienced a momentary loss of the NOAA Weather Radio System from 1916 to 1918 EST. During the time that this system was out of service, a major loss of offsite communication capability is considered. Site emergency planning personnel were notified and will investigate this momentary loss. The system is in service and functioning properly."
The licensee notified both state/local agencies and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1700 ON 4/9/04 RUSSELL TO GOTT * * *
"After further investigation, a determination has been made that there was no major loss of offsite notification capability of the Hatch Prompt Notification System (NOAA Weather Radio System). The momentary losses reported were caused by testing of the primary audio feed line utilizing a tone generator while investigating the loss of this feed. The secondary audio feed from Jacksonville NWS remained operable during the time of testing."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Decker)
"Site experienced a momentary loss of the NOAA Weather Radio System from 1916 to 1918 EST. During the time that this system was out of service, a major loss of offsite communication capability is considered. Site emergency planning personnel were notified and will investigate this momentary loss. The system is in service and functioning properly."
The licensee notified both state/local agencies and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1700 ON 4/9/04 RUSSELL TO GOTT * * *
"After further investigation, a determination has been made that there was no major loss of offsite notification capability of the Hatch Prompt Notification System (NOAA Weather Radio System). The momentary losses reported were caused by testing of the primary audio feed line utilizing a tone generator while investigating the loss of this feed. The secondary audio feed from Jacksonville NWS remained operable during the time of testing."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Decker)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40648
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 04/06/2004
Notification Time: 02:17 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 20:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2004
Notification Time: 02:17 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 20:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
OFFSITE ELECTRICAL POWER SOURCES AND 1E 4KV DISTRIBUTION BUSES INOPERABLE
"On 04/05/04 at 2030 hours, Engineering personnel informed Operations personnel of an issue affecting the ability of the offsite power sources to provide adequate 1E bus voltage consistent with the design basis. Operating procedures currently contain non-conservative values for minimum voltage on 1E 4 kV buses. In addition, the transformer auto load tap changer (LTC) is currently set to regulate at approximately 4200 VAC, a value that is below the required 1E 4 kV bus lower voltage design limit. Adequate voltage from the offsite power sources is required IAW General Design Criteria 17 to ensure that vital buses remain connected to their preferred power source and adequate terminal voltage exists at the load end device during accident conditions. The ability of the Emergency Diesel Generators to perform their design function is not affected by this condition. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function because it affects the ability of both offsite power sources to provide adequate voltage to all 1E buses to properly mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Both offsite electrical power sources and all four 4 kV distribution buses have been declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification Actions have been entered. The current voltage readings for all 1E 4 kV buses are between 4204 and 4263 VAC. The plant will remain in Operational Condition 4 until this condition is corrected. Engineering and Operations personnel are evaluating this condition to determine required corrective actions. All other plant systems are available to support Operational Condition change and reactor startup."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local township.
"On 04/05/04 at 2030 hours, Engineering personnel informed Operations personnel of an issue affecting the ability of the offsite power sources to provide adequate 1E bus voltage consistent with the design basis. Operating procedures currently contain non-conservative values for minimum voltage on 1E 4 kV buses. In addition, the transformer auto load tap changer (LTC) is currently set to regulate at approximately 4200 VAC, a value that is below the required 1E 4 kV bus lower voltage design limit. Adequate voltage from the offsite power sources is required IAW General Design Criteria 17 to ensure that vital buses remain connected to their preferred power source and adequate terminal voltage exists at the load end device during accident conditions. The ability of the Emergency Diesel Generators to perform their design function is not affected by this condition. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function because it affects the ability of both offsite power sources to provide adequate voltage to all 1E buses to properly mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Both offsite electrical power sources and all four 4 kV distribution buses have been declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification Actions have been entered. The current voltage readings for all 1E 4 kV buses are between 4204 and 4263 VAC. The plant will remain in Operational Condition 4 until this condition is corrected. Engineering and Operations personnel are evaluating this condition to determine required corrective actions. All other plant systems are available to support Operational Condition change and reactor startup."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local township.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40642
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM HUFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM HUFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 04/05/2004
Notification Time: 04:02 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 01:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2004
Notification Time: 04:02 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 01:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
KENNETH JENISON (R1)
KENNETH JENISON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION FOR EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"At 0030 [ET] during setup for Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP Surveillance testing, the controlling procedure required making the Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C ESS buses inoperable. The specification has a 1 hour time limit for restoration, or the associated Diesel Generators must be declared inoperable. Due to delays during the setup of equipment the time requirements were not met, and the associated Diesel Generators were declared inoperable at 0130. The Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three operable Diesel Generators to safely shutdown. Therefore, this condition is reportable for Unit 2 under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Unit 1 is in Mode 5 and therefore not impacted. The Loss of Power instruments were restored, and the Diesel Generators declared operable at 0223."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * * RETRACTION FROM R. FRY TO M. RIPLEY 1419 ET ON 05/27/04 * * * *
"The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #40642 AND #40646: On April 5, 2004, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported three events to the NRC associated with Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP surveillance testing. In each case, the safety function of two (out of 4) emergency diesel generators was brought into question during the testing. In two of these events, the E (substituting for A) and C diesel generators were administratively declared inoperable per Technical Specifications. This was necessary because Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C buses, rendered inoperable in support of the test procedure, was not restored within 1 hour. In the third event, the E (for A) and C emergency diesel generators were, again, declared inoperable when two ESW pump start timers failed to meet acceptance criteria thus bringing the proper start sequencing of emergency loads into question. Because the Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three diesel generators to safely shutdown an operating unit, the potential compromise of the diesel generator safety function was a concern for Unit 2 in each instance. (NOTE: Unit 1 was in Refueling Mode 5 and was, therefore, not impacted by these events.) Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 2.
"Subsequent engineering analysis has concluded that, although the declaration of diesel generator inoperability was correct and in accordance with Technical Specifications, fulfillment of these administrative actions did not result in an actual loss of safety function during any of the above described events. Details of the analysis show that the diesel generators were available to supply emergency power to the ESS buses and/or that sufficient redundant equipment was available to fulfill the safety function needs of Unit 2. These analysis conclusions provide the basis for retraction of the ENS reports made on April 5, 2004."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (R. Conte)
"At 0030 [ET] during setup for Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP Surveillance testing, the controlling procedure required making the Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C ESS buses inoperable. The specification has a 1 hour time limit for restoration, or the associated Diesel Generators must be declared inoperable. Due to delays during the setup of equipment the time requirements were not met, and the associated Diesel Generators were declared inoperable at 0130. The Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three operable Diesel Generators to safely shutdown. Therefore, this condition is reportable for Unit 2 under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Unit 1 is in Mode 5 and therefore not impacted. The Loss of Power instruments were restored, and the Diesel Generators declared operable at 0223."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * * RETRACTION FROM R. FRY TO M. RIPLEY 1419 ET ON 05/27/04 * * * *
"The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #40642 AND #40646: On April 5, 2004, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported three events to the NRC associated with Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP surveillance testing. In each case, the safety function of two (out of 4) emergency diesel generators was brought into question during the testing. In two of these events, the E (substituting for A) and C diesel generators were administratively declared inoperable per Technical Specifications. This was necessary because Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C buses, rendered inoperable in support of the test procedure, was not restored within 1 hour. In the third event, the E (for A) and C emergency diesel generators were, again, declared inoperable when two ESW pump start timers failed to meet acceptance criteria thus bringing the proper start sequencing of emergency loads into question. Because the Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three diesel generators to safely shutdown an operating unit, the potential compromise of the diesel generator safety function was a concern for Unit 2 in each instance. (NOTE: Unit 1 was in Refueling Mode 5 and was, therefore, not impacted by these events.) Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 2.
"Subsequent engineering analysis has concluded that, although the declaration of diesel generator inoperability was correct and in accordance with Technical Specifications, fulfillment of these administrative actions did not result in an actual loss of safety function during any of the above described events. Details of the analysis show that the diesel generators were available to supply emergency power to the ESS buses and/or that sufficient redundant equipment was available to fulfill the safety function needs of Unit 2. These analysis conclusions provide the basis for retraction of the ENS reports made on April 5, 2004."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (R. Conte)
Hospital
Event Number: 40643
Rep Org: ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL
Licensee: ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: INDIANPOLIS State: IN
County:
License #: 13-00133-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED WROBLEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: INDIANPOLIS State: IN
County:
License #: 13-00133-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED WROBLEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/05/2004
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 11:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2004
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 11:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
MEDICAL EVENT INVOLVING FRACTIONATED DOSE DELIVERY HIGHER THAN PRESCRIBED
A patient was prescribed five (5) fractional treatments of 500 centigray each to the surface using a 6.7 curie Ir-192 brachytherapy source. On 3/15, 3/22 and 3/29/04 the patient received 500 centigray/fraction at a depth of 5 mm. This resulted in a delivered dose of 818 centigray/fraction at the surface. The error was discovered prior to delivering the fourth (4th) fraction and is attributed to a miscalculation. The prescribing physician has been informed and concluded that there would be no adverse effects to the patient. The licensee is implementing additional reviews to preclude this type of event from reoccurring.
A patient was prescribed five (5) fractional treatments of 500 centigray each to the surface using a 6.7 curie Ir-192 brachytherapy source. On 3/15, 3/22 and 3/29/04 the patient received 500 centigray/fraction at a depth of 5 mm. This resulted in a delivered dose of 818 centigray/fraction at the surface. The error was discovered prior to delivering the fourth (4th) fraction and is attributed to a miscalculation. The prescribing physician has been informed and concluded that there would be no adverse effects to the patient. The licensee is implementing additional reviews to preclude this type of event from reoccurring.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40645
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: LAMPKIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Region: 1
City: VICKSBURG State: MS
County:
License #: MS-964-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Mark Langston, MS DRH
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: LAMPKIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Region: 1
City: VICKSBURG State: MS
County:
License #: MS-964-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Mark Langston, MS DRH
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 04/05/2004
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 13:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2004
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 13:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
DONNA-MARIE PEREZ (TAS)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
DONNA-MARIE PEREZ (TAS)
MS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
At 1641 EDT on 04/05/04, a MS Division of Radiological Health representative reported that at 1330 CDT on 04/05/04, a representative of Lampkin Construction Company, Vicksburg, MS, reported that between 1700 CDT on 04/02/04 and 0800 CDT on 04/05/04 a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge, locked in its transport case was stolen from a storage building at their office in Vicksburg, MS. A window had been broken and a door was forced open at the storage building. The Troxler Gauge, Model #3430, Serial #22349 contains an 8 milliCurie Cs-137 source and a 40 milliCurie Am-241-Be source. The licensee notified the MS Emergency Management Agency and the Warren County Sheriff. The licensee is planning to issue a press release.
* * * UPDATE VIA EMAIL FROM B. J. SMITH, MS DIVISION OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH ON 5/28/04 AT 0956 EDT TAKEN BY CROUCH * * *
The following information was received via e-mail:
"Troxler gauge recovered by Warren County Sheriff's department on 5-26-04 at approximately 3:30 PM. Gauge was located on the Mississippi River after water level had receded. Gauge was picked up by Division of Radiological
Health and returned to our office for leak test. No damage was observed to the gauge however it was apparent it had been under water. The gauge was determined to be free of contamination. Licensee Lampkin Construction RSO
was coming to pick up gauge at DRH office this morning. Licensee will be required to send gauge for repair and leak tests and furnish DRH with copy of results. This incident is closed as of 5-28-04."
* * * UPDATE VIA EMAIL FROM B. J. SMITH, MS DIVISION OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH ON 5/28/04 AT 1225 EDT TAKEN BY RIPLEY * * *
The following information was received via e-mail:
The location of the gauge recovery was clarified to be near a road close to Delta, Louisiana. The balance of the information remains the same.
Notified R1DO (Conte), NMSS (Torres), and TAS (Hahn).
At 1641 EDT on 04/05/04, a MS Division of Radiological Health representative reported that at 1330 CDT on 04/05/04, a representative of Lampkin Construction Company, Vicksburg, MS, reported that between 1700 CDT on 04/02/04 and 0800 CDT on 04/05/04 a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge, locked in its transport case was stolen from a storage building at their office in Vicksburg, MS. A window had been broken and a door was forced open at the storage building. The Troxler Gauge, Model #3430, Serial #22349 contains an 8 milliCurie Cs-137 source and a 40 milliCurie Am-241-Be source. The licensee notified the MS Emergency Management Agency and the Warren County Sheriff. The licensee is planning to issue a press release.
* * * UPDATE VIA EMAIL FROM B. J. SMITH, MS DIVISION OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH ON 5/28/04 AT 0956 EDT TAKEN BY CROUCH * * *
The following information was received via e-mail:
"Troxler gauge recovered by Warren County Sheriff's department on 5-26-04 at approximately 3:30 PM. Gauge was located on the Mississippi River after water level had receded. Gauge was picked up by Division of Radiological
Health and returned to our office for leak test. No damage was observed to the gauge however it was apparent it had been under water. The gauge was determined to be free of contamination. Licensee Lampkin Construction RSO
was coming to pick up gauge at DRH office this morning. Licensee will be required to send gauge for repair and leak tests and furnish DRH with copy of results. This incident is closed as of 5-28-04."
* * * UPDATE VIA EMAIL FROM B. J. SMITH, MS DIVISION OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH ON 5/28/04 AT 1225 EDT TAKEN BY RIPLEY * * *
The following information was received via e-mail:
The location of the gauge recovery was clarified to be near a road close to Delta, Louisiana. The balance of the information remains the same.
Notified R1DO (Conte), NMSS (Torres), and TAS (Hahn).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40646
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RONALD FRY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RONALD FRY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/05/2004
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 11:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2004
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 11:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION FOR EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"At 1040 hrs during setup for Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP Surveillance testing, the controlling procedure required making the Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C ESS buses inoperable. The specification has a 1 hour time limit for restoration, or the associated Diesel Generators must be declared inoperable. Due to delays during the setup of equipment the time requirements were not met, and the 'E' (Substituting for 'A') and 'C' Diesel Generators were declared inoperable at 1140 hrs. The Loss of Power instruments were restored, and the Diesel Generators declared operable at 1206 hrs. Unit 1 is in Mode 5 requiring only 2 diesel generators operable, therefore not impacted by the Loss of Power instrumentation inoperability.
"Also during the surveillance, two pump start timers failed to meet the required acceptance criteria. The 'A' ESW Pump timer actuated at 47.86 seconds (criteria; 36 sec. to 44 sec) and the 'C' ESW Pump timer actuated at 50.38 seconds (criteria: 39.6 sec. to 48.4 sec). With failure of the timers, proper loading on the Diesel Generators is not assured, and they were declared inoperable until the associated pump control breakers were opened. The 'E' Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1448 hrs, when the data analysis identified that the 'A' ESW pump timer did not meet acceptance criteria. The 'E' Diesel Generator was returned to operable at 1453 hrs when the DC Knife switches for the 'A' ESW pump were open. The 'C' Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1524 hrs, when the data analysis identified that the 'C' ESW pump timer did not meet acceptance criteria. The 'C' Diesel Generator was restored to operable at 1706 hrs after supported systems were realigned to prevent further loss of safety function and the DC Knife switches for the 'C' ESW pump were open.
"The Susquehanna safety analysis requires three operable Diesel Generators to safely shutdown the plant. Therefore with only two operable Diesel Generators, the condition requires an 8 hr ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)and (vi)."
All times referenced above are EDT. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM R. FRY TO M. RIPLEY 1419 ET ON 05/27/04 * * * *
"The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #40642 AND #40646: On April 5, 2004, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported three events to the NRC associated with Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP surveillance testing. In each case, the safety function of two (out of 4) emergency diesel generators was brought into question during the testing. In two of these events, the E (substituting for A) and C diesel generators were administratively declared inoperable per Technical Specifications. This was necessary because Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C buses, rendered inoperable in support of the test procedure, was not restored within 1 hour. In the third event, the E (for A) and C emergency diesel generators were, again, declared inoperable when two ESW pump start timers failed to meet acceptance criteria thus bringing the proper start sequencing of emergency loads into question. Because the Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three diesel generators to safely shutdown an operating unit, the potential compromise of the diesel generator safety function was a concern for Unit 2 in each instance. (NOTE: Unit 1 was in Refueling Mode 5 and was, therefore, not impacted by these events.) Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 2.
"Subsequent engineering analysis has concluded that, although the declaration of diesel generator inoperability was correct and in accordance with Technical Specifications, fulfillment of these administrative actions did not result in an actual loss of safety function during any of the above described events. Details of the analysis show that the diesel generators were available to supply emergency power to the ESS buses and/or that sufficient redundant equipment was available to fulfill the safety function needs of Unit 2. These analysis conclusions provide the basis for retraction of the ENS reports made on April 5, 2004."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (R. Conte)
"At 1040 hrs during setup for Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP Surveillance testing, the controlling procedure required making the Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C ESS buses inoperable. The specification has a 1 hour time limit for restoration, or the associated Diesel Generators must be declared inoperable. Due to delays during the setup of equipment the time requirements were not met, and the 'E' (Substituting for 'A') and 'C' Diesel Generators were declared inoperable at 1140 hrs. The Loss of Power instruments were restored, and the Diesel Generators declared operable at 1206 hrs. Unit 1 is in Mode 5 requiring only 2 diesel generators operable, therefore not impacted by the Loss of Power instrumentation inoperability.
"Also during the surveillance, two pump start timers failed to meet the required acceptance criteria. The 'A' ESW Pump timer actuated at 47.86 seconds (criteria; 36 sec. to 44 sec) and the 'C' ESW Pump timer actuated at 50.38 seconds (criteria: 39.6 sec. to 48.4 sec). With failure of the timers, proper loading on the Diesel Generators is not assured, and they were declared inoperable until the associated pump control breakers were opened. The 'E' Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1448 hrs, when the data analysis identified that the 'A' ESW pump timer did not meet acceptance criteria. The 'E' Diesel Generator was returned to operable at 1453 hrs when the DC Knife switches for the 'A' ESW pump were open. The 'C' Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1524 hrs, when the data analysis identified that the 'C' ESW pump timer did not meet acceptance criteria. The 'C' Diesel Generator was restored to operable at 1706 hrs after supported systems were realigned to prevent further loss of safety function and the DC Knife switches for the 'C' ESW pump were open.
"The Susquehanna safety analysis requires three operable Diesel Generators to safely shutdown the plant. Therefore with only two operable Diesel Generators, the condition requires an 8 hr ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)and (vi)."
All times referenced above are EDT. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM R. FRY TO M. RIPLEY 1419 ET ON 05/27/04 * * * *
"The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #40642 AND #40646: On April 5, 2004, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported three events to the NRC associated with Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP surveillance testing. In each case, the safety function of two (out of 4) emergency diesel generators was brought into question during the testing. In two of these events, the E (substituting for A) and C diesel generators were administratively declared inoperable per Technical Specifications. This was necessary because Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C buses, rendered inoperable in support of the test procedure, was not restored within 1 hour. In the third event, the E (for A) and C emergency diesel generators were, again, declared inoperable when two ESW pump start timers failed to meet acceptance criteria thus bringing the proper start sequencing of emergency loads into question. Because the Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three diesel generators to safely shutdown an operating unit, the potential compromise of the diesel generator safety function was a concern for Unit 2 in each instance. (NOTE: Unit 1 was in Refueling Mode 5 and was, therefore, not impacted by these events.) Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 2.
"Subsequent engineering analysis has concluded that, although the declaration of diesel generator inoperability was correct and in accordance with Technical Specifications, fulfillment of these administrative actions did not result in an actual loss of safety function during any of the above described events. Details of the analysis show that the diesel generators were available to supply emergency power to the ESS buses and/or that sufficient redundant equipment was available to fulfill the safety function needs of Unit 2. These analysis conclusions provide the basis for retraction of the ENS reports made on April 5, 2004."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (R. Conte)