Event Notification Report for April 04, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/03/2004 - 04/04/2004
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40641
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 04/05/2004
Notification Time: 01:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2004
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2004
Notification Time: 01:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2004
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 LOSS OF CRITICALITY CONTROL NOTIFICATION
"At 1430, on 04-04-04 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a violation of Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) control in the C-333 process building. While preparing for start up of the C-333 #1 High Speed Purge and Evacuation (P & E) pump, operations discovered that the delta pressure (DP) alarm instrument line to the RCW supply was unattached and the isolation valve was closed. With the RCW instrument line not attached, both DP alarms for this pump were not functional and therefore not able to perform their safety function, violating a safety related item (SRI) in NCSE 039. The SRI requires that both DP alarms be functional while the P & E is isolated from the cascade. The purpose of the SRI Is to alert the operator to take actions within a 28-hour timeframe to prevent wet R-114 from leaking into the process gas system. The DP alarms had been nonfunctional for more than 28 hours when discovered. Both DP alarms were put back in service and the R-114 sampled and found dry within 4 hours of discovery, therefore, re-establishing double contingency.
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"PGDP Problem Report No, ATR-04-1342; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-09; Event Worksheet #40641 Responsible Division: Operations
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: While the R-114 was demonstrated to be dry, both DP alarms relied on for double contingency were disabled without the knowledge of the operators.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: In order for a criticality to occur, an unsafe mass uranium deposit would have to be present in the process gas system, an R-114 leak to the process gas system would have to occur, the R-114 would have to contain an unacceptable amount of moisture ( i.e., greater than 10 kg of water) and moderate the deposit.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, G5OMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on moderation.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: No known mass of licensed material exists in the #1 High Speed Purge and Evacuation pump.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is based on the DP switch alarming to alert the operator to take action to either verify the R-114 is dry or to isolate the RCW and remove the R-114 from the system in order to prevent water from leaking into the process gas system. This DP alarm was not maintained as functional. The DP alarm was put back in service and the R-114 was sampled and found to be dry. The SRI was not maintained and the control was violated but the process condition was maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency is based on the independent DP switch alarming to alert the operator to take action to either verify the R-114 is dry or to isolate the RCW and remove the R-114 from the system in order to prevent water from leaking into the process gas system. The independent DP alarm was not maintained as functional. The independent DP alarm was put back in service and the R-114 was sampled and found to be dry. The SRI was not maintained and the control was violated but the process condition was maintained. This re-established double contingency.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Both DP switches were returned to service and the R-114 was sampled and found to be dry on 04-04-04 at 1655."
* * * UPDATE 4/29/04 AT 1025 BEASLEY TO GOTT * * *
"Subsequent assay sample analysis of the Purge and Evacuation pump system indicates the system is non-fissile."
The PGDP notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified NMSS (Torres) and R2DO (Ernstes)
"At 1430, on 04-04-04 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a violation of Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) control in the C-333 process building. While preparing for start up of the C-333 #1 High Speed Purge and Evacuation (P & E) pump, operations discovered that the delta pressure (DP) alarm instrument line to the RCW supply was unattached and the isolation valve was closed. With the RCW instrument line not attached, both DP alarms for this pump were not functional and therefore not able to perform their safety function, violating a safety related item (SRI) in NCSE 039. The SRI requires that both DP alarms be functional while the P & E is isolated from the cascade. The purpose of the SRI Is to alert the operator to take actions within a 28-hour timeframe to prevent wet R-114 from leaking into the process gas system. The DP alarms had been nonfunctional for more than 28 hours when discovered. Both DP alarms were put back in service and the R-114 sampled and found dry within 4 hours of discovery, therefore, re-establishing double contingency.
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"PGDP Problem Report No, ATR-04-1342; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-09; Event Worksheet #40641 Responsible Division: Operations
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: While the R-114 was demonstrated to be dry, both DP alarms relied on for double contingency were disabled without the knowledge of the operators.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: In order for a criticality to occur, an unsafe mass uranium deposit would have to be present in the process gas system, an R-114 leak to the process gas system would have to occur, the R-114 would have to contain an unacceptable amount of moisture ( i.e., greater than 10 kg of water) and moderate the deposit.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, G5OMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on moderation.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: No known mass of licensed material exists in the #1 High Speed Purge and Evacuation pump.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is based on the DP switch alarming to alert the operator to take action to either verify the R-114 is dry or to isolate the RCW and remove the R-114 from the system in order to prevent water from leaking into the process gas system. This DP alarm was not maintained as functional. The DP alarm was put back in service and the R-114 was sampled and found to be dry. The SRI was not maintained and the control was violated but the process condition was maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency is based on the independent DP switch alarming to alert the operator to take action to either verify the R-114 is dry or to isolate the RCW and remove the R-114 from the system in order to prevent water from leaking into the process gas system. The independent DP alarm was not maintained as functional. The independent DP alarm was put back in service and the R-114 was sampled and found to be dry. The SRI was not maintained and the control was violated but the process condition was maintained. This re-established double contingency.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Both DP switches were returned to service and the R-114 was sampled and found to be dry on 04-04-04 at 1655."
* * * UPDATE 4/29/04 AT 1025 BEASLEY TO GOTT * * *
"Subsequent assay sample analysis of the Purge and Evacuation pump system indicates the system is non-fissile."
The PGDP notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified NMSS (Torres) and R2DO (Ernstes)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40766
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON ROLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON ROLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/21/2004
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2004
Event Time: 14:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2004
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2004
Event Time: 14:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60 -DAY REPORT: INVALID ACTUATION OF THE "E" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
On 04/04/04 at 14:57 hours, the "E" Emergency Diesel Generator unexpectedly started in the emergency mode of operation during performance of Unit 1 LOCA/LOOP surveillance testing. The diesel generator started in response to a false loss of offsite power signal that occurred after an electrical test jumper was incorrectly installed in panel 1A201. While the procedure directed installation of the jumper across the field side of states links T5-10 and T5-12, the jumper was instead installed across the panel side of the links. When link T5-10 was opened per procedural direction, a false LOOP signal was sent to the "E" diesel generator start circuit. The "E" emergency diesel generator successfully started and properly responded to the complete train actuation signal. The diesel was shutdown following the incident. No other plant equipment was affected by this jumper use error. At the time of this event, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 and Unit 2 was in Mode 1. Both Units continued in Modes 5 and 1, respectively. Surveillance testing was successfully completed on 04/05/04.
The consequences of this event were limited to the unplanned start of the "E" emergency diesel generator. The diesel generator started and functioned in accordance with its design. This event comprises an invalid actuation of an emergency AC electrical power system and is therefore being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a 60- day telephone notification per the provision of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1).
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the 60- day report notification by the licensee.
On 04/04/04 at 14:57 hours, the "E" Emergency Diesel Generator unexpectedly started in the emergency mode of operation during performance of Unit 1 LOCA/LOOP surveillance testing. The diesel generator started in response to a false loss of offsite power signal that occurred after an electrical test jumper was incorrectly installed in panel 1A201. While the procedure directed installation of the jumper across the field side of states links T5-10 and T5-12, the jumper was instead installed across the panel side of the links. When link T5-10 was opened per procedural direction, a false LOOP signal was sent to the "E" diesel generator start circuit. The "E" emergency diesel generator successfully started and properly responded to the complete train actuation signal. The diesel was shutdown following the incident. No other plant equipment was affected by this jumper use error. At the time of this event, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 and Unit 2 was in Mode 1. Both Units continued in Modes 5 and 1, respectively. Surveillance testing was successfully completed on 04/05/04.
The consequences of this event were limited to the unplanned start of the "E" emergency diesel generator. The diesel generator started and functioned in accordance with its design. This event comprises an invalid actuation of an emergency AC electrical power system and is therefore being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a 60- day telephone notification per the provision of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1).
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the 60- day report notification by the licensee.