Event Notification Report for April 03, 2004

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ON STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GUAGE

"The Radiation Safety Officer (R.S.O.), was returning to his office in a company pick-up truck Ford F250, without company markings, when he stopped at a McCoy's hardware store for a can of spray paint. He had a nuclear gauge, Troxler Model 3411B, Serial No. 10000, with two sealed radioactive sources: Cs137, Serial No. 40-7475, 8 millicuries; and Am-241/Be, Serial No. 46-1383, 40 millicuries, chained in the rear of the truck. When he returned to the truck he noticed that the gauge and case were missing from the truck bed. He states that the gauge, case and chain and lock are all missing. He reported the incident to the Hays County Sheriff's Department. A police report has been filed. A report was submitted to this Agency [Texas Department of Health] after normal duty hours by facsimile. A call to the Agency on August 4, 2004, confirmed receipt of the facsimile and reported the serial numbers of the radioactive sources.

"Event Location: Hardware store between Dripping Springs and Oak Hill (Austin) TX."

Texas Incident No. I-8147

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"During plant startup from the Brunswick Unit 1 Refueling Outage, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable due to pump data not meeting the acceptable value of OPT-09.2, HPCI System Operability Test. With pump flow established at the reference value of 4550 gallons per minute, the actual turbine speed was 2530 rpm, outside the acceptable range of 2485-2515 rpm.

"Initial Safety Significance Evaluation: Minimal since the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), the Low Pressure Coolant Injection System (LPCI), and the Core Spray System are Operable. In addition the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) is Operable.

"Corrective Actions: Engineering to evaluate the test results and determine corrective actions."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION TAKEN ON 5/6/04 @ 1534 EDT BY CROUCH FROM ELBERFELD * * *

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:

"The purpose of this call is to retract the notification (Event Number 40636) made by the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No, 1, Docket No. 50-325 / License No. DPR-71, on April 3, 2004, at 0549 hours.

"On April 2, 2004, at 2324 hours, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable for scheduled testing performed in accordance with 0PT-09.2, 'HPCI System Operability Test.' 0PT-09.2 includes, in part, Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.1.7, to verify that, with reactor pressure < 1045 and > 945 psig, the HPCI pump unit could develop a flow rate > 4250 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure. The testing also includes in part, In-service Test (IST) program requirements for HPCI pump performance (to test for pump degradation). During this testing, water is circulated from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) through the HPCI pump and back to the CST through a 'Bypass to CST' valve. Motive force for the pump is provided by reactor steam being routed through the HPCI turbine into the suppression pool. Due to the heat energy being deposited in the suppression pool, time for HPCI turbine/pump testing is limited.

"When tested, the HPCI pump passed the TS SR 3.5.1.7 pump pressure and flow rate test requirements. However, when HPCI turbine speed was set to the IST-required value of 2,500 rpm, as indicated by the control room indicator 1-E41-C002-4 (the preferred indication), the IST required system flow of 4,550 gpm could not be attained. Turbine speed was then adjusted, using a portable speed indicator, to attain 4,550 gpm system flow. The portable speed indicator read 2530 rpm, high, outside the acceptable range of 2,485 to 2,515 rpm. The unsatisfactory test indicated potential pump degradation. The IST program requires the equipment to be declared inoperable until unsatisfactory test results are evaluated. On April 3, 2004, at 0436 hours, the HPCI system was declared inoperable due to the unsatisfactory test. At 0549 hours, the NRC was notified (Event Number 40636) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"During the testing with the portable speed indicator, it was noted that the control room indicator 1-E41-C002-4 was reading high (i.e., 1-E41-C002-4 was reading 2,600 rpm compared to 2,500 rpm on the portable speed indicator). Turbine speed indicator 1-E41-C002-4 was adjusted back to within required accuracy in accordance with Work Order 306977.

"After the initial test, a thorough review of pump data, instrument calibration data, and IST program guidance was conducted. It was determined that there was no indication of pump degradation and no indication of a flow indicator problem. Having corrected a speed indicator problem, sections of 0PT-09.2 were performed on April 5, 2004, to test for pump degradation using the preferred speed indicator 1-E41-C002-4. Test results were satisfactory and demonstrated that the pump performance met the IST program requirements. The HPCI system was declared operable on April 5, 2004, at approximately 0521 hours. Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Action Request (AR) 123551.

"NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, Section 3.2.7 (page 56) lists types of events or conditions that are generally not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v) criteria. The list of not-reportable conditions includes:

"- Removal of a system or part of a system from service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function)

"On April 2, 2004, the HPCI system was removed from service for testing in accordance with an approved procedure 0PT-09.2. The system was declared inoperable due to the test results discussed above, and since the HPCI system is a single train safety system, an ENS notification was made. However, no condition was discovered that could have prevented the HPCI system from performing its functions.

"Carolina Power & Light Company, doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., has determined that this event does not meet the 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73 reporting criteria and the notification for Event Number 40636 is retracted. The resident inspector has been notified."

NOTIFICATION TO VIRGINIA DEQ CONCERNING A CHEMICAL SPILL

"Notification made to State Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) for a chemical spill of Calgon H-901-g going into onsite waters."

Approximately 500 gallons of chemicals containing Bromine used to treat service water spilled onsite. A portion of the spill entered the drainage system and was released offsite. The licensee attributes the spill to a mechanical failure on their brominator system and is in the process of cleaning up the material onsite.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE MISSING WITH EMPLOYEE

Dressler Consulting reported to the Kansas Department of Health and Environment that a trusted employee failed to show up at his worksite at 634 Prospect, Kansas City, MO this morning. Dressler Consulting is located in Shawnee Mission, KS. The employee had in his possession a Humboldt Moisture Density Gauge, Model 5000, Serial Number 2655 which had a 10 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries Am-241source. Dressler Consulting also notified the local law enforcement, Raytown Police Department, and the MO Department of Health. The gauge is normally restrained with a 2000# tow strap and locks in the employee's truck. The employee was told to store the gauge inside his home overnight. A Dressler Consulting representative attempted to contact the employee on telephone and went to his apartment in Raytown, MO with negative results. The employee last contacted Dressler Consulting at 1700 CST on 4/2/04 when he finished a job at 6700 Agnes, Kansas City, MO.

* * * UPDATE FROM DRESSLER TO GOTT AT 1527 EST ON 4/3/04 * * *

Dressler Consulting reported that the driver was contacted by his sister on his personal cell phone. His truck is broken down between Saint Louis and Kansas City, MO. The gauge is not in the truck. The driver will be contacted again to determine the location of the gauge.

Notified NMSS (Moore) and R4DO (Powers)

*****UPDATE FROM DRESSLER TO LAURA AT 0930 EST ON 4/5/04*****

Dressler Consulting reported that the gauge was found in the employees apartment and is no longer considered missing. The protocol for handling and storing gauges will be reviewed by the licensee.

Notified NMSS (L. Psyk) and R4DO (B. Spitzberg).

VALID ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DURING MAINTENANCE

"This is an 8-hour notification being made to report that a valid ESF Auxiliary Feed actuation occurred. Salem Unit 1 is in mode 5 with RHR providing shutdown cooling. '11' Aux Feed Pump was in service to fill '13' and '14' steam generators for wet lay-up conditions. Actual levels were low in both '13' and '14' steam generators but jumpers were installed on steam generator narrow range level channel III and IV to prevent an ESF actuation. On 4/03/04 at 1050 AM, a breaker effecting reactor protection system channel III was cleared and tagged as part of preparations to remove 1C 4KV vital bus from service. The actual low level in '13' and '14' steam generators along with the power loss to channel III caused 2 out of 3 logic to be satisfied and initiated an AFW actuation. '11' Auxiliary Feed Pump remained running. '12' Auxiliary Feed Pump auto started. '13' Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was removed from service prior to the actuation and did not start. The '13' and '14' steam generators continued to fill. '11' and '12" Auxiliary Feed Valves (11AF21 and 12AF21) were closed and no level rise was observed. The breaker was restored and reactor protection system channel III was placed back in service. All auto start signals cleared after power was restored and the '12' Aux Feed Pump was stopped at 1101. There were no unusual or unexpected plant response from the actuation. All safety systems and equipment performed as expected. Entry into mode 6 is expected this afternoon and progress of the refueling outage is expected to continue. There were no personnel injured."

The licensee will inform the Lower Alloways Creek Township (LAC) and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * RETRACTION ON 05/05/04 AT 1252 EDT FROM S. SAUER TO A. COSTA * * *

"On April 3, 2004 at 1410 PSEG made an 8 hour notification to report a valid ESF actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (Event Number 40639). At the time of the report 11 Auxiliary feedwater pump was in service to fill the 13 and 14 steam generators for wet lay-up. The levels on those generators were low (as previous plant condition had demanded) and the jumpers had been installed in the level detectors to prevent the automatic start of the auxiliary feedwater pumps. 12 auxiliary feedwater pump was out of service. The steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump was tagged out of service. Core heat removal was being provided by the Residual Heat Removal System. On April 3, with the steam generator level being carried below the low level setpoint, in accordance with procedures, as a result of other activities associated with the refueling outage the installed jumpers were removed causing the auto start of the 12 pump.

"Subsequent investigation Into this event and further review of NUREG 1022 has determined that the condition described above is not reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv) or 50.73(a)(2)(iv). As stated In NUREG 1022 the intent of reporting under this paragraph is '..to report actuations of systems that mitigate the consequences of significant events .. The Staff does not consider this to include single component actuation because single components of complex systems, by themselves usually do not mitigate the consequences of significant events.' Furthermore valid signals are defined as ' those signals that are Initiated in response to actual plant conditions .. Satisfying the requirements for initiation of a safety function of the system.' (emphasis added on safety function).

"In this particular event the required Safety Function to maintain the core cooled and decay heat removal was being accomplished by the Residual Heat Removal System and it remained unaffected throughout this event. The plant was in a condition where the steam generators in conjunction with the Auxiliary Feedwater System were not part of the ultimate heat sink or a principal means to remove decay heat. The Auxiliary Feedwater System was only functional and available to provide a means to place the steam generators in wet lay-up in support of outage activities. The 11 pump was already in service providing for this non-safety related function. Thus the auto start of the 12 pump was not as a result of a valid signal for a significant event that required initiation of a mitigating function; e.g. an ESF actuation.

Therefore this event was not reportable under 10CFR50.72 or 50.73, as per the guidance provided in NUREG 1022."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO(Della Greca).

STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

A truck containing a CPN moisture density gauge was stolen from an employee's home in Puerto Rico. The truck and gauge were stolen between 0200 - 0300 EST on 04/03/04. The truck was recovered without the gauge. A report was filed with the police, and the local media was informed. A reward for the gauge's return has been offered. The gauge contains 10 millicuries Cs-137 and 50 millicuries Am-241. The gauge's serial number is MD10606200.