Event Notification Report for April 01, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/31/2004 - 04/01/2004
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40633
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: ALLEN MABRY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: ALLEN MABRY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 04/02/2004
Notification Time: 10:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2004
Notification Time: 10:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
LINDA PSYK (NMSS)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
LINDA PSYK (NMSS)
OUTDOOR AREA CRITICALITY WARNING SYSTEM HORN INOPERATIVE
"At approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 1, 2004 it was discovered a Criticality Warning System (CWS) horn had been rendered inoperative in an unoccupied remote outdoor area due to maintenance conducted on the system on March 31, 2004. Maintenance was conducted on the system to remove a tree that had fallen across the communication line to Data Acquisition Module (DAM) #25 which provides coverage for the outdoor process lagoon area. During maintenance activities to remove the tree, a temporary system was installed and the permanently installed system horn was disconnected. Following completion of the maintenance, the restoration effort failed to reinstall a local horn relay.
"Throughout the maintenance, the DAM remained operable and indications of normal conditions were available. With the exception of the local horn at the remote outdoor area, all other system functions remained operable.
"Upon discovery of the local horn being disabled, the horn relay was promptly restored and tested, confirming restoration of full system operability. This condition is reported pursuant to 10CFR70.50(B)(2) as an event in which equipment designed to mitigate the effects of an incident are disabled or fails to function as designed. Incident investigation and evaluation of additional corrective actions are continuing."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Low safety significance - The potential for a criticality event in this area is highly unlikely because of the very low uranium concentration, low material density, and high levels of non-uranium materials. This is consistent with the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) for the area.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: There is no known process upset that would change the highly unlikely potential for a criticality in this area.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION ETC.): Density and Mass (concentration)
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST BASE CRITICAL MASS): N/A. Affected area is final wastewater process lagoon. Uranium concentration in the affected area is approximately [deleted] parts per million (PPM)
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEMS AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: N/A
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: System was restored to normal operation at 1300 on 4/1/04 and subsequently tested. Investigation of event and evaluation of additional corrective actions pending."
The licensee will notified the local County, the State of North Carolina, and NRC Region II.
"At approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 1, 2004 it was discovered a Criticality Warning System (CWS) horn had been rendered inoperative in an unoccupied remote outdoor area due to maintenance conducted on the system on March 31, 2004. Maintenance was conducted on the system to remove a tree that had fallen across the communication line to Data Acquisition Module (DAM) #25 which provides coverage for the outdoor process lagoon area. During maintenance activities to remove the tree, a temporary system was installed and the permanently installed system horn was disconnected. Following completion of the maintenance, the restoration effort failed to reinstall a local horn relay.
"Throughout the maintenance, the DAM remained operable and indications of normal conditions were available. With the exception of the local horn at the remote outdoor area, all other system functions remained operable.
"Upon discovery of the local horn being disabled, the horn relay was promptly restored and tested, confirming restoration of full system operability. This condition is reported pursuant to 10CFR70.50(B)(2) as an event in which equipment designed to mitigate the effects of an incident are disabled or fails to function as designed. Incident investigation and evaluation of additional corrective actions are continuing."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Low safety significance - The potential for a criticality event in this area is highly unlikely because of the very low uranium concentration, low material density, and high levels of non-uranium materials. This is consistent with the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) for the area.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: There is no known process upset that would change the highly unlikely potential for a criticality in this area.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION ETC.): Density and Mass (concentration)
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST BASE CRITICAL MASS): N/A. Affected area is final wastewater process lagoon. Uranium concentration in the affected area is approximately [deleted] parts per million (PPM)
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEMS AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: N/A
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: System was restored to normal operation at 1300 on 4/1/04 and subsequently tested. Investigation of event and evaluation of additional corrective actions pending."
The licensee will notified the local County, the State of North Carolina, and NRC Region II.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40718
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN FREGEAU
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN FREGEAU
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 04/30/2004
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2004
Event Time: 03:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2004
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2004
Event Time: 03:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID AUTOMATIC START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DURING SURVEILLANCE TEST
"The purpose of this report is provide a telephone notification under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) in lieu of submitting a written LER for an invalid actuation from other than the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical.
"On April 1, 2004 at 0306, during a refueling outage the Division I Diesel Generator auto-started during the performance of a bus under-voltage surveillance test. The diesel generator successfully started with the Divisional Switchgear remaining energized from off-site power. The diesel was secured following verification of the start to be a result of an invalid signal.
"Prior to the engine start, the diesel was removed from service to support planned maintenance activities. In conjunction with these activities surveillance testing was being performed which required the diesel generator to be unavailable. When the maintenance activities were completed the diesel was restored to available. The relay and control testing was recommenced without realizing the impact that restoring the tag out would have on the testing. The diesel started successfully, however it did not energize the switchgear, as the switchgear remained energized from its normal power supply."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The purpose of this report is provide a telephone notification under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) in lieu of submitting a written LER for an invalid actuation from other than the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical.
"On April 1, 2004 at 0306, during a refueling outage the Division I Diesel Generator auto-started during the performance of a bus under-voltage surveillance test. The diesel generator successfully started with the Divisional Switchgear remaining energized from off-site power. The diesel was secured following verification of the start to be a result of an invalid signal.
"Prior to the engine start, the diesel was removed from service to support planned maintenance activities. In conjunction with these activities surveillance testing was being performed which required the diesel generator to be unavailable. When the maintenance activities were completed the diesel was restored to available. The relay and control testing was recommenced without realizing the impact that restoring the tag out would have on the testing. The diesel started successfully, however it did not energize the switchgear, as the switchgear remained energized from its normal power supply."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.