Event Notification Report for March 28, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/27/2004 - 03/28/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
40616406174061840619
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40616
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RONALD FRY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RONALD FRY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 08:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2004
Event Time: 06:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 08:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2004
Event Time: 06:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO THREE CAR ACCIDENT
"On 3/28/04 at 0637, Plant Security was notified of a three car accident at the entrance to the site involving 1) an employee leaving the site, 2) a south bound vehicle on US Route 11, and 3) an employee entering the site. There were no reported injuries. Local law enforcement (LLEA) was contacted and investigated the incident. Because of the involvement of a LLEA and potential media or general public interest in the event, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) was notified of the incident at 0812 hours.
"Based on the notification to a government agency and possible public interest, this event was determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 3/28/04 at 0637, Plant Security was notified of a three car accident at the entrance to the site involving 1) an employee leaving the site, 2) a south bound vehicle on US Route 11, and 3) an employee entering the site. There were no reported injuries. Local law enforcement (LLEA) was contacted and investigated the incident. Because of the involvement of a LLEA and potential media or general public interest in the event, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) was notified of the incident at 0812 hours.
"Based on the notification to a government agency and possible public interest, this event was determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40617
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2004
Event Time: 10:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2004
Event Time: 10:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)
RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION INOPERABLE FOR 25 MINUTES
"At approximately 1343 hours on March 27, 2004, during a routine hand - rotation check of the "C" high pressure safety injection pump (HPSI), it was discovered the pump shaft was exhibiting some binding. At the time, the "C" HPSI pump was in service as the "B" Train HPSI pump. The "C" HPSI pump was declared inoperable and Condition A of LCO 3.5.2 was entered. This LCO condition requires restoration of the inoperable safety injection train within 72 hours. At that time, the "B" HPSI pump was in service as the Train "A" HPSI pump. The "A" HPSI pump was out of service due to a previously discovered condition of minor leakage observed near two of the casing bolts. The H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, HPSI system has three safety injection pumps. The "A" HPSI pump is the normal Train "A" pump, the "C" pump is the normal Train "B" pump, and the "B" pump is capable of serving as either the Train "A" or the Train "B" pump in the place of the "A" or "C" HPSI pump. At the time of discovery of the binding in the "C" HPSI pump, the "B" HPSI pump was in service as the Train "A" HPSI pump. It was determined that the "A" pump could be restored to operable status and placed back in service to restore two Trains of HPSI. In order to do so, the "B" HPSI pump was removed from service as the Train "A" pump and placed in service as the Train "B" pump. Therefore, at 1026 hours on March 28, 2004, for approximately 25 minutes, during the process of placing the "B" HPSI pump in service on Train "B," which was necessary to allow the "A" HPSI pump to be returned to service, there was no HPSI pump automatically available to provide HPSI to the Reactor Coolant System, if an accident were to occur. Therefore, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An additional 8-hour reporting criterion associated with the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) has also been identified due to the inoperability of the HPSI system. It was known prior to the switching the "B" HPSI pump to Train "B" that this would cause inoperability of both trains of HPSI. It was also known that LCO 3.0.3 would be entered due to this circumstance. This situation was not avoidable, based on the sequence of events. The time in this condition was minimized, the operators were fully aware of plant conditions, and no other system inoperabilities were known of that would have complicated the situation. Both trains of HPSI are operable, although the "C" HPSI pump remains inoperable and out-of-service, pending investigation and repair."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
"At approximately 1343 hours on March 27, 2004, during a routine hand - rotation check of the "C" high pressure safety injection pump (HPSI), it was discovered the pump shaft was exhibiting some binding. At the time, the "C" HPSI pump was in service as the "B" Train HPSI pump. The "C" HPSI pump was declared inoperable and Condition A of LCO 3.5.2 was entered. This LCO condition requires restoration of the inoperable safety injection train within 72 hours. At that time, the "B" HPSI pump was in service as the Train "A" HPSI pump. The "A" HPSI pump was out of service due to a previously discovered condition of minor leakage observed near two of the casing bolts. The H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, HPSI system has three safety injection pumps. The "A" HPSI pump is the normal Train "A" pump, the "C" pump is the normal Train "B" pump, and the "B" pump is capable of serving as either the Train "A" or the Train "B" pump in the place of the "A" or "C" HPSI pump. At the time of discovery of the binding in the "C" HPSI pump, the "B" HPSI pump was in service as the Train "A" HPSI pump. It was determined that the "A" pump could be restored to operable status and placed back in service to restore two Trains of HPSI. In order to do so, the "B" HPSI pump was removed from service as the Train "A" pump and placed in service as the Train "B" pump. Therefore, at 1026 hours on March 28, 2004, for approximately 25 minutes, during the process of placing the "B" HPSI pump in service on Train "B," which was necessary to allow the "A" HPSI pump to be returned to service, there was no HPSI pump automatically available to provide HPSI to the Reactor Coolant System, if an accident were to occur. Therefore, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An additional 8-hour reporting criterion associated with the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) has also been identified due to the inoperability of the HPSI system. It was known prior to the switching the "B" HPSI pump to Train "B" that this would cause inoperability of both trains of HPSI. It was also known that LCO 3.0.3 would be entered due to this circumstance. This situation was not avoidable, based on the sequence of events. The time in this condition was minimized, the operators were fully aware of plant conditions, and no other system inoperabilities were known of that would have complicated the situation. Both trains of HPSI are operable, although the "C" HPSI pump remains inoperable and out-of-service, pending investigation and repair."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40618
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETER DONAHUE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETER DONAHUE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 20:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2004
Event Time: 13:03 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 20:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2004
Event Time: 13:03 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE DUE TO CLOSED FUEL OIL TRANSFER CROSS-TIE VALVE
"CNS was operating at 100% power in Mode 1 with Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) #1 inoperable due to increased levels of particulates in the EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank and supply piping. EDG #2 was determined to be operable with compensatory measures in place, including maintaining the two diesel fuel oil storage tanks tied together. With the crosstie valves open and the storage tank levels equalized, evaluation has shown that flow rates between the #2 EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tanks is low enough during EDG #2 operation to preclude excessive contamination of the EDG #2 Fuel Oil Storage Tank.
"At 13:03 hours CST one of the two valves that cross-tie the two Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks together was found in the closed position, which was in conflict with the Operability Evaluation such that EDG #2 was determined to be inoperable. The valve was opened immediately and EDG #2 was declared operable. The cause of the event is under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"CNS was operating at 100% power in Mode 1 with Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) #1 inoperable due to increased levels of particulates in the EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank and supply piping. EDG #2 was determined to be operable with compensatory measures in place, including maintaining the two diesel fuel oil storage tanks tied together. With the crosstie valves open and the storage tank levels equalized, evaluation has shown that flow rates between the #2 EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tanks is low enough during EDG #2 operation to preclude excessive contamination of the EDG #2 Fuel Oil Storage Tank.
"At 13:03 hours CST one of the two valves that cross-tie the two Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks together was found in the closed position, which was in conflict with the Operability Evaluation such that EDG #2 was determined to be inoperable. The valve was opened immediately and EDG #2 was declared operable. The cause of the event is under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40619
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 21:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2004
Event Time: 13:49 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 21:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2004
Event Time: 13:49 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION AT SAN OFRE 2 AND 3 DUE TO INADVERTENT WEAPON DISCHARGE
"At about 1349 (PST) on March 28, 2004, while a Security Offer was receiving his weapon in the armory, the weapon accidentally discharged as it was being holstered. The discharge grazed the officer's leg and the officer was treated for the resulting abrasion. At about 1425 PST, Southern California Edison notified the FBI (SONGS LLEA). SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"At about 1349 (PST) on March 28, 2004, while a Security Offer was receiving his weapon in the armory, the weapon accidentally discharged as it was being holstered. The discharge grazed the officer's leg and the officer was treated for the resulting abrasion. At about 1425 PST, Southern California Edison notified the FBI (SONGS LLEA). SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.