Event Notification Report for March 19, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/18/2004 - 03/19/2004
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40599
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RON CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 2 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RON CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 03/19/2004
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2004
Event Time: 09:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2004
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2004
Event Time: 09:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATION AT PORTSMOUTH GDP
"On 03/19/04 at 0910 hours, Autoclave #5 in the X-343 Facility experienced a Steam Shutdown due to high condensate level alarms (A) and (B) actuating. The autoclave was in an applicable TSR mode (Mode II, Heating) at the time of the alarm actuations. The autoclave was placed in Mode VII (Shutdown) and declared INOPERABLE by the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS). An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the actuations. No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of this incident. This event is being reported in accordance with UE2-RA-RE1030, Appendix D. J. 2. Safety System Actuations."
"On 03/19/04 at 0910 hours, Autoclave #5 in the X-343 Facility experienced a Steam Shutdown due to high condensate level alarms (A) and (B) actuating. The autoclave was in an applicable TSR mode (Mode II, Heating) at the time of the alarm actuations. The autoclave was placed in Mode VII (Shutdown) and declared INOPERABLE by the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS). An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the actuations. No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of this incident. This event is being reported in accordance with UE2-RA-RE1030, Appendix D. J. 2. Safety System Actuations."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40600
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN SEMETER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN SEMETER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 03/19/2004
Notification Time: 21:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2004
Event Time: 14:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2004
Notification Time: 21:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2004
Event Time: 14:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 15 | Power Operation | 15 | Power Operation |
HPCI SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE AT LIMERICK 1 DUE TO A BROKEN HAND SWITCH
"On 3/19/04 at 14:08 PM EST, the Unit-1. HPCI system was declared inoperable due to a hand-switch failure, which prevented main control room operation of the HV-055-1F0O1 HPCI steam admission valve. The system had just successfully completed its functional surveillance test and the switch broke resulting in the operators using an, alternate means to shutdown the HPCI system. The steam admission valve is not a PCIV. The valve was open all the time; the system was shutdown using an alternate procedure. The system is now blocked for hand-switch replacement. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) for failure of a single train accident mitigation system."
The NRC Resident inspector was notified. Operators entered the unit into a 14 day LCO for declaring HPCI system inoperable.
*****RETRACTED ON 4/14/04 AT 12:56 FROM GAMBLE TO LAURA*****
"This is a retraction of the event notification made on 3/19/04 at 21:00 hours. This event (#40600) was initially reported as a safety system functional failure under the requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to a handswitch failure that prevented operation of the HV-055-1F001 HPCI steam admission valve from the main control room. The handswitch failed while attempting to close the steam admission valve during system shutdown at the conclusion of surveillance testing. The operator then closed the outboard steam line isolation valve to complete the system shutdown.
"HPCI is automatically initiated by low reactor level or high drywell pressure signals. Manual HPCI initiation for inventory makeup is performed by depressing the initiation pushbutton. Both automatic initiation and manual initiation using the pushbutton open the steam admission valve. The failed handswitch did not adversely affect the initiation of the HPCI system in the inventory makeup mode. The manual startup of the system in the test mode of operation is unavailable when the handswitch is failed. The test mode can be used to remove decay heat following an isolation of the main steam lines but it is not a credited safety function.
"The steam admission valve handswitch would not be used to shutdown the system when an automatic initiation signal is present; the outboard steam line isolation valve would be closed to secure the system. This is the method that was used to secure the system during the surveillance test. The handswitch is mainly used to startup and secure the system during surveillance testing. The system was removed from service as part of a planned evolution to conduct surveillance testing in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's Technical Specifications. The system was secured for the purpose of concluding the surveillance test and replacing the handswitch. The failed handswitch did not adversely affect the systems capability of performing its safety function. A condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of the HPCI safety function."
Notified R1DO (B. MCDERMOTT).
"On 3/19/04 at 14:08 PM EST, the Unit-1. HPCI system was declared inoperable due to a hand-switch failure, which prevented main control room operation of the HV-055-1F0O1 HPCI steam admission valve. The system had just successfully completed its functional surveillance test and the switch broke resulting in the operators using an, alternate means to shutdown the HPCI system. The steam admission valve is not a PCIV. The valve was open all the time; the system was shutdown using an alternate procedure. The system is now blocked for hand-switch replacement. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) for failure of a single train accident mitigation system."
The NRC Resident inspector was notified. Operators entered the unit into a 14 day LCO for declaring HPCI system inoperable.
*****RETRACTED ON 4/14/04 AT 12:56 FROM GAMBLE TO LAURA*****
"This is a retraction of the event notification made on 3/19/04 at 21:00 hours. This event (#40600) was initially reported as a safety system functional failure under the requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to a handswitch failure that prevented operation of the HV-055-1F001 HPCI steam admission valve from the main control room. The handswitch failed while attempting to close the steam admission valve during system shutdown at the conclusion of surveillance testing. The operator then closed the outboard steam line isolation valve to complete the system shutdown.
"HPCI is automatically initiated by low reactor level or high drywell pressure signals. Manual HPCI initiation for inventory makeup is performed by depressing the initiation pushbutton. Both automatic initiation and manual initiation using the pushbutton open the steam admission valve. The failed handswitch did not adversely affect the initiation of the HPCI system in the inventory makeup mode. The manual startup of the system in the test mode of operation is unavailable when the handswitch is failed. The test mode can be used to remove decay heat following an isolation of the main steam lines but it is not a credited safety function.
"The steam admission valve handswitch would not be used to shutdown the system when an automatic initiation signal is present; the outboard steam line isolation valve would be closed to secure the system. This is the method that was used to secure the system during the surveillance test. The handswitch is mainly used to startup and secure the system during surveillance testing. The system was removed from service as part of a planned evolution to conduct surveillance testing in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's Technical Specifications. The system was secured for the purpose of concluding the surveillance test and replacing the handswitch. The failed handswitch did not adversely affect the systems capability of performing its safety function. A condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of the HPCI safety function."
Notified R1DO (B. MCDERMOTT).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40708
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: UCLA MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: TORRANCE State: CA
County:
License #: 0369-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATHLEEN KAUFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: UCLA MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: TORRANCE State: CA
County:
License #: 0369-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATHLEEN KAUFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 04/27/2004
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2004
Event Time: 11:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2004
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2004
Event Time: 11:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
A STATE OF CALIFORNIA LICENSEE HAS LOST A CESIUM 137 SEED
The licensee reported that at approximately 1130 am, the physicist was involved in removal of cesium 137 seeds from an implant. The seeds were counted and accounted for in the patient's room after removal. They were then brought to the radiation oncology hot lab for placement into the safe. While removing them from the "Heyman Carrier" the physicist encountered some difficulty with one of the seeds which resulted in its being "flung" behind the counter in the hot lab and "lost." The Radiation Safety Office was notified and an initial search for the seed (activity 10 mg Ra equivalent - 25 millicuries) did not locate it.
The same afternoon the RSO presumably located the seed lodged in the crack of the counter. Because of its location the counter was required to be taken apart. The State was informed by RSO on April 26, 2004 that final retrieval will be made in approximately two weeks when they receive their new counter table and safe so that the remaining seeds can be removed and present counter cut to retrieve the lost seed.
The licensee reported that at approximately 1130 am, the physicist was involved in removal of cesium 137 seeds from an implant. The seeds were counted and accounted for in the patient's room after removal. They were then brought to the radiation oncology hot lab for placement into the safe. While removing them from the "Heyman Carrier" the physicist encountered some difficulty with one of the seeds which resulted in its being "flung" behind the counter in the hot lab and "lost." The Radiation Safety Office was notified and an initial search for the seed (activity 10 mg Ra equivalent - 25 millicuries) did not locate it.
The same afternoon the RSO presumably located the seed lodged in the crack of the counter. Because of its location the counter was required to be taken apart. The State was informed by RSO on April 26, 2004 that final retrieval will be made in approximately two weeks when they receive their new counter table and safe so that the remaining seeds can be removed and present counter cut to retrieve the lost seed.