Event Notification Report for March 08, 2004

LOSS OF LICENSED MATERIAL

The Department of Veterans Affairs reported the following via facsimile:

"I am calling to report a loss of licensed material. The loss occurred at a medical broad-scope permittee authorized under the master materials license issued to the Department of Veterans Affairs, NRC License 03-23853-01VA. The permittee is VA Boston Healthcare System, Boston, Massachusetts.

"The loss was reported to the permittee Radiation Safety Officer on March 8, 2004.

"The basis for reporting the loss is under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(i) in that a waste vendor reported that a drum from the permittee triggered a radiation detector at a landfill. The activity involved although unknown at this time could potentially be greater than the reporting limit.

"Specifically, the vendor (New York Environmental Services) indicated that a survey meter reading on contact with the drum was 4.8 millirem per hour. The drum is being returned to the permittee for radionuclide evaluation.

"The Department of Veterans Affairs will evaluate the circumstances related to the loss and submit a written report to NRC, Region III, within 30 days."

* * * RETRACTION ON 3/31/04 AT 1406 EST FROM J. WISSING TO A. COSTA * * *

The following retraction was faxed to the NRC Operations Center on 3/31/04. Categorization of this information as a retraction was reviewed and approved by K. O'Brien, NRC Region 3.

"The licensed material was recovered and returned to the VA Boston Healthcare System for evaluation on March 11, 2004. The medical center RSO evaluated the drum contents for radionuclidic identity and activity. The National Health Physics Program (NHPP) performed an inspection at the Medical Center on March 18, 2004. The NHPP inspection included a review of the Medical Center RSO's analysis of the recovered. Licensed material.

"Analysis of the recovered drum indicated a total activity of less than 100 [microcuries] of I-125, (less than 1000 times Appendix C, 10 CFR 20) reportable quantity specified by 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(i). Since the material was recovered and is in the possession of permittee, a 30-day report specified by 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(ii) is not required."

Notified NMSS EO (C. Miller), R1DO (K. Jenison),

HPCI SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILURE OF TORUS SUCTION VALVE TO FULLY OPEN

"U2 HPCI was declared inoperable to fulfill its safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"U2 HPCI torus suction valve MO-2-23-058 failed to fully open, during performance of ST-O-023-301-2 'HPCI Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test.' The valve stopped in a mid-position. HPCI flow path from Condensate Storage Tank remains available for HPCI injection. Investigation into cause is continuing."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED AT 1509 ET ON 4/20/04 BY D. FOSS TO J. ROTTON * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 3/8/04 at 1130 hours (EN# 40576). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when unexpected conditions were found during performance of routine surveillance testing of HPCI. Specifically, it was noted that a motor-operated Suppression Pool suction valve for HPCI (MO-58) did not complete its stroke in the open direction during testing. The HPCI system was not operating at the time of the discovery.

"Since the initial report, Engineering has determined that HPCI was capable of performing its safety function. The evaluation has determined that the MO-58 valve was operable for continued operations. The MO-58 stopped in the mid-stroke position due to motor operator torque switch operation. During design events, the torque switch is bypassed and would not have interrupted valve operation. The torque switch is only in the valve logic for remote manual valve operations (e.g. testing). The torque switch was adjusted and HPCI was returned to service on 3/10/04 by approximately 1500 hours [ET].

"During adjustments to the HPCI MO-58 motor operator, the suction source from the Suppression Pool was isolated in accordance with Technical Specifications since MO-58 is considered as a Primary Containment Isolation Valve. This occurred on 3/8/04 by approximately 1340 hours. This action was performed in accordance with station procedures and is considered planned maintenance. Throughout the time period of repairs to the MO-58, HPCI was available for operations with its suction source from the normally aligned Condensate Storage Tank.

"The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction."

Notified R1 DO (D. Silk).