Event Notification Report for February 29, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/28/2004 - 02/29/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40556
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: STEVE BANKS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: STEVE BANKS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 02/29/2004
Notification Time: 11:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/29/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/29/2004
Notification Time: 11:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/29/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/29/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
BILL BATEMAN (NRR)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
BILL BATEMAN (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
BORIC ACID RESIDUE FOUND ON PRESSURIZER HEATER SLEEVE
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional Information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On February 29, 2004, at approximately 05:21 Mountain Standard Time (MST) engineering personnel performing preplanned visual examinations of reactor coolant system (RCS) piping in accordance with procedure requirements discovered boric acid residue on the A03 pressurizer heater sleeve. The heater sleeve is an alloy 600 penetration. The visual observation was characterized as a small white buildup of boron residue around the heater sleeve as the sleeve enters the pressurizer bottom head. There does not appear to be residue running down the outside of the sleeve. There were no signs of dripping, spraying, puddles of liquid, or liquid running down the nozzle or pressurizer. The residue appeared dry.
"Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 permits no reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leakage and therefore, the discovery of leakage (presumed boric acid residue) from the pressurizer heater sleeve was a degradation of a principal safety barrier. Therefore, the ENS notification of this event is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). The control room personnel entered LCO 3.4.14 Condition B and are taking action to place the plant In Mode 5 within 36 hours. The Unit had been shutdown and was being maintained in Mode 3 while troubleshooting a turbine-generator excitation problem. At the time of discovery, the RCS was at approximately 565 degrees F and 2245 psia.
"An investigation of this event will be conducted in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program.
"No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of discovery that contributed to this condition. There were no failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable and no failures of components with multiple functions were involved. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional Information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On February 29, 2004, at approximately 05:21 Mountain Standard Time (MST) engineering personnel performing preplanned visual examinations of reactor coolant system (RCS) piping in accordance with procedure requirements discovered boric acid residue on the A03 pressurizer heater sleeve. The heater sleeve is an alloy 600 penetration. The visual observation was characterized as a small white buildup of boron residue around the heater sleeve as the sleeve enters the pressurizer bottom head. There does not appear to be residue running down the outside of the sleeve. There were no signs of dripping, spraying, puddles of liquid, or liquid running down the nozzle or pressurizer. The residue appeared dry.
"Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 permits no reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leakage and therefore, the discovery of leakage (presumed boric acid residue) from the pressurizer heater sleeve was a degradation of a principal safety barrier. Therefore, the ENS notification of this event is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). The control room personnel entered LCO 3.4.14 Condition B and are taking action to place the plant In Mode 5 within 36 hours. The Unit had been shutdown and was being maintained in Mode 3 while troubleshooting a turbine-generator excitation problem. At the time of discovery, the RCS was at approximately 565 degrees F and 2245 psia.
"An investigation of this event will be conducted in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program.
"No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of discovery that contributed to this condition. There were no failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable and no failures of components with multiple functions were involved. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40557
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/01/2004
Notification Time: 04:17 [ET]
Event Date: 02/29/2004
Event Time: 20:11 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2004
Notification Time: 04:17 [ET]
Event Date: 02/29/2004
Event Time: 20:11 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
UNIT 2 AUTOMATIC FEEDWATER ISOLATION SYSTEM (AFIS) DECLARED INOPERABLE
The licensee reported that both digital trains of the automatic feedwater isolation system were declared inoperable when one channel's input failed to zero and about the same time the second channel showed a shift in readouts which was fairly significant that they also declared it inoperable. These two channels have a shared neutral bus and it is believed that there may be a loose connection somewhere in the circuit. They are currently troubleshooting the problem. Plant will initiate a unit shutdown if the problem cannot be corrected by 0600 on 03/01/04 (12-hour LCO A/S).
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
* * * * UPDATE ON 03/23/04 @ 1348 BY RANDY TODD TO C. GOULD * * * * RETRACTION
Update- FNS 40557, dated 3-1-04, addressed an apparent loss of safety function on Oconee Unit 2. Specifically, the Automatic Feedwater Initiation System (AFIS) was considered inoperable, and therefore unable to perform its required safety functions. During that event, Operations shift personnel conservatively declared AFIS Channel 2 inoperable because it demonstrated an unexpected shift in readout concurrent with the failure of Channel 1. Subsequently Duke power concluded that Channel 2 remained capable of performing its safety function despite the shift in readout, which was in the conservative direction. Therefore, Duke Power has concluded that there was no reportable loss of safety function associated with this event and hereby retracts ENS notification 40557. Duke Power notes that, during the event, both channels were intentionally disabled for a brief period as a planned part of the repair activity. This was done to prevent the possibility of a spurious actuation during the repair. However, per guidance in NUREG 1022, removal of both trains of a safety function as part of a planned activity which results in entry into a Tech Spec action statement is not reportable. Initial Safety Significance: Operations declared TS 3.3.13 Condition B, which allowed 12 hours to come to Mode 3. Repairs were completed prior to initiation of shutdown. Corrective Action(s): A loose wiring connection was repaired.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
The licensee reported that both digital trains of the automatic feedwater isolation system were declared inoperable when one channel's input failed to zero and about the same time the second channel showed a shift in readouts which was fairly significant that they also declared it inoperable. These two channels have a shared neutral bus and it is believed that there may be a loose connection somewhere in the circuit. They are currently troubleshooting the problem. Plant will initiate a unit shutdown if the problem cannot be corrected by 0600 on 03/01/04 (12-hour LCO A/S).
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
* * * * UPDATE ON 03/23/04 @ 1348 BY RANDY TODD TO C. GOULD * * * * RETRACTION
Update- FNS 40557, dated 3-1-04, addressed an apparent loss of safety function on Oconee Unit 2. Specifically, the Automatic Feedwater Initiation System (AFIS) was considered inoperable, and therefore unable to perform its required safety functions. During that event, Operations shift personnel conservatively declared AFIS Channel 2 inoperable because it demonstrated an unexpected shift in readout concurrent with the failure of Channel 1. Subsequently Duke power concluded that Channel 2 remained capable of performing its safety function despite the shift in readout, which was in the conservative direction. Therefore, Duke Power has concluded that there was no reportable loss of safety function associated with this event and hereby retracts ENS notification 40557. Duke Power notes that, during the event, both channels were intentionally disabled for a brief period as a planned part of the repair activity. This was done to prevent the possibility of a spurious actuation during the repair. However, per guidance in NUREG 1022, removal of both trains of a safety function as part of a planned activity which results in entry into a Tech Spec action statement is not reportable. Initial Safety Significance: Operations declared TS 3.3.13 Condition B, which allowed 12 hours to come to Mode 3. Repairs were completed prior to initiation of shutdown. Corrective Action(s): A loose wiring connection was repaired.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40568
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: CITY OF HOLDREGE, NE
Region: 4
City: HOLDREGE State: NE
County:
License #: GL-0428
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: CITY OF HOLDREGE, NE
Region: 4
City: HOLDREGE State: NE
County:
License #: GL-0428
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 03/05/2004
Notification Time: 12:39 [ET]
Event Date: 02/29/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2004
Notification Time: 12:39 [ET]
Event Date: 02/29/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
GREG PICK (R4)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The City of Holdrege, NE reported that in late February 2004 during an annual inventory, it was discovered that 25 of 40 Tritium exit signs were missing. The signs were installed in stairways in the city auditorium. The signs are SafetyLite Model 2088 (2.2 Curies Tritium each as of the shipment date of March 1990). An investigation did not determine what happened to the signs and the State is closing the report.
The City of Holdrege, NE reported that in late February 2004 during an annual inventory, it was discovered that 25 of 40 Tritium exit signs were missing. The signs were installed in stairways in the city auditorium. The signs are SafetyLite Model 2088 (2.2 Curies Tritium each as of the shipment date of March 1990). An investigation did not determine what happened to the signs and the State is closing the report.