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Event Notification Report for January 28, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/27/2004 - 01/28/2004

EVENT NUMBERS
4048540486404874048840543

Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40485
Facility: BWX TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 2     State: VA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: DAVID SPANGLER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/28/2004
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2004
Event Time: 08:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(2) - EXTERNAL RAD LEVELS > LIMITS
Person (Organization):
GEORGE KUZO (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
Event Text
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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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THE LICENSEE RECEIVED A PACKAGE CONTAINING Cs-137 WHICH EXCEEDED EXTERNAL RADIATION LIMITS

BWXT received two type A packages packed inside a larger package from Baker Hughes in Houston, TX on 1/27/04. When they opened the larger package, they discovered that one of the type A packages containing a single 2.5 curie Cs-137 source exceeded the limits (200 mr/hr) for external radiation. The package was measuring 375 mr/hr, however the surface smears were within limits and the package was intact. The seal numbers on the package and manifest matched. The licensee notified both Baker Hughes and the transport company, Emery Worldwide, of the problem.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY H. Crouch * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 40486
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/29/2004
Notification Time: 00:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2004
Event Time: 20:33 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DUE TO FIRE BRIGADE ACTIVATION

"At 2018 hrs, the Control Room was notified of smoke coming from the Unit 2 Vital UPS room. The Field Unit Supervisor (FUS) was dispatched to the room to investigate. At 2026 hrs, the Fire Brigade was activated. When the FUS arrived at the Vital UPS Panel he reported that there was smoke coming from the panel. He opened the panel and observed smoke coming from the transformer in the panel. He did not observe any flames at any time while dealing with the event. At 2029 hrs, Security was notified and subsequently notified the State Police at 2033 hrs. At 2033 hrs, the transformer was deenergized and the smoke began to dissipate. Entry into the Emergency Plan was evaluated and it was determined that no entry conditions exists at this time.

"Due to the notification of the Local Law Enforcement Agency, this event constitutes an Offsite Notification and therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) requiring a 4 hr ENS notification."

When the transformer was deenergized, all loads were automatically transferred to the alternate power supply. The loss of this transformer did not affect any safety related equipment and does not require entry into any TS LCO Action Statements.

The licensee notified state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. No press release is planned.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 40487
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DAVE RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/29/2004
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2004
Event Time: 15:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 97 Power Operation 97 Power Operation
Event Text
24-HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT DUE TO INOPERABLE DIVISION II CONTROL ROOM SPECIAL FILTER TRAIN

"While attempting to perform the Control Room Special Filter Train Functional Test for Division ll, the required train flow test conditions could not be established. Investigation revealed that the inlet backdraft damper 2HVC*DMPV93 was latched closed and would not open automatically on a Special Filter Train start.

"The damper was found latched closed due to an improperly set spring-loaded 'stop.' As a result, the Division II Control Room Special Filter Train was declared inoperable as of 1530 on 1/28/04. Technical Specification 3.7.2, Condition A was entered which allows 7 days to restore the Division II Control Room Special Filter Train to an operable status.

"A review of plant computer data and monthly surveillance tests for the Division II Special Filter Train determined that the backdraft damper has been latched closed since October 2003. As a result, the Division Il Control Room Special Filter exceeded Technical Specification 3.7.2 action to restore Control Room Special Filter Train Subsystem to operable within 7 days. This is reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 'Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications,' and Section 2.F of the Nine Mile Point Operating License. Per Nine Mile Point Operating license, initial notification that the facility is not operated in accordance with the Technical Specifications shall be made within 24 hours to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System, with written follow up within 30 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(b), (c), and (e).

"A repair plan is being prepared with work to commence today (1/29). Following repairs, surveillance testing will be performed to confirm proper operation of the damper.

"An inspection of the redundant Division I Control Room Special Filter Train damper and review of monthly surveillance tests demonstrated that the latching mechanism does not interfere with the ability of the damper to open as designed. Therefore, operability of the Division I Control Room Special Filter Train has been confirmed."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 40488
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: J.K. DISPLAY INC.
Region: 3
City: MILWAUKEE   State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL CALEB
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/29/2004
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
Event Text
MISSING NDR, INC. STATIC ELIMINATOR GUN DEVICE.

On January 28, 2004 a letter was received by Wisconsin's Radioactive Materials Program, dated January 26, 2004 from state licensee J.K. Display, Inc., 8300 W. Parkland Court, Milwaukee, WI 53223. The letter informed the department that the company could not locate one of the two NDR, Inc., P-2021 Nuclecel-Ionizer air gun devices that it had in its possession..

The missing/loss P-2021 device, serial # A2CL456 was leased from NDR, November 2002 with an activity of 10.0 mCi of Po-210. The static eliminator gun was last used in July of 2003 because it was broken and unusable. Apparently, the connections between the air-hose and device leaked, reducing the gun's ability to produce ionized air. The device was placed in the shop on a shelf for return to NDR, Inc. at termination of the lease.

Polonium-210 has a half-life of 138 days, therefore, if the assay date of November 2003 is accurate, the source has gone through approximately three (3) half-lives. The Po-210 source at this point should have an activity of approximately 1.275 mCi.

The licensee has done an exhaustive search of the shop and offices for the device, but it cannot be located. The most likely possibility, according to the company, is an employee threw out the device.

Corrective actions taken by the company are to instruct their six employees to identify the device(s) and their location at all times and to isolate and store unused device(s) in a secure location.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 40543
Rep Org: NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ALTRU HEALTH SYSTEM
Region: 4
City: GRAND FORKS   State: ND
County:
License #: 33-01599-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM KILLINGBECK
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 02/24/2004
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2004
Event Time: 12:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF MEDICAL EVENT

On 1/28/04, the patient was to receive a total dose of 50.4 Grays to the 'vaginal cuff' region using a 6 Curie Ir-192 sealed source. The dose was to be administered using a Microselectron Remote Afterloader HDR manufactured by Nucletron, serial number 31021.

The plan was to administer 3 radiation treatments using a catheter that is 1500 millimeters (mm) long. The treatment planning software system uses a default value of 995 mm for the catheter length. When preparing the treatment plan for the first of the 3 planned radiation treatments, the medical physicist did not notice that the catheter length in the treatment plan was incorrect (995 mm instead of the actual 1500 mm catheter that would be used). When the radiation oncologist and the medical physicist were doing a pretreatment review and ensuring that the important parameters of the planned treatment were correct, they did not check the catheter length in the treatment plan to ensure that it was correct.

The first radiation treatment was conducted, but instead of the radiation source traveling approximately 1500 mm in the catheter and providing radiation treatment to the 'vaginal cuff' region on the patient, it traveled only about 995 mm, and never entered the patient's body. When the medical physicist began to plan the second of the three radiation treatments, he noticed the error in the treatment plan for the first treatment. The radiation oncologist notified the patient on the same day the error was discovered.

The records of all patients previously treated by this medical physicist and radiation oncologist were reviewed to determine if a similar error had occurred during any other high dose rate remote afterloader treatments, but no other errors of this type were found. To prevent future errors, both the medical physicist and the radiation oncologist have reviewed the treatment planning software and have agreed on a program of formal cross checking of the pretreatment printout that would include verifying that the catheter length specified in the treatment plan is correct.