Event Notification Report for January 25, 2004

HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE IN AUXILIARY BUILDING

"On January 25, 2004, during troubleshooting of high differential pressure in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building, the 1ABF13 fire damper was found closed at approximately 1700 (EST) hours. The 1ABF13 fire damper was re-opened and system flows and differential pressure were verified to be normal at approximately 1950 hours."

"On January 26, 2004, at 1500 hours, a determination was made that with the 1ABF13 fire damper closed, filtration of the effluents from the pipe chase and RHR areas could not be processed through the HEPA-Charcoal absorber. This condition did not meet the assumptions of the Salem dose analysis and is being reported under the requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNPLANNED AUTO START OF TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP

"At 0316, EST, on 25 January 2004, the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP) was automatically started upon receipt of a valid start signal. The start of the pump was unplanned. At the time, the Unit 2 reactor was critical at [approximately] 0.001 % power as indicated on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Instruments (Unit 2 is emerging from a forced outage following main generator repairs). The steam generators were being supplied water by the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.

"Shift operators were in the process of aligning the Unit 2 condensate system for cleanup and closed both (out of service) main feedwater pumps' suction isolation valves, as required by the procedure. Closure of a main feedwater pump's suction valve generates a main feedwater pump trip signal. Trip of both main feedwater pumps generates an automatic auxiliary feedwater system start signal.

"The start of the TDAFWP had no adverse effect on the unit. Operators reset one of the main feedwater pumps and secured the TDAFWP."

The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

*****RETRACTION ON 2/25/04 AT 1215 EST FROM JONES TO LAURA*****

"Background: On January 25, 2004, Unit 2 was being returned to operation following a maintenance outage. Unit 2 was critical (Mode 2) with auxiliary feedwater pumps 2A and 2B in service and both MFW pumps trip buses energized. Operations continued to align the condensate system, on long cycle for clean-up. This alignment requires the closure of the main feedwater pumps suction valves. The main feedwater pumps had already been aligned for service with the trip buses energized. The plant design results in an automatic start of the auxiliary feedwater pumps when both MFW pumps trip buses trip. On January 25, 2004 at approximately 0316 hours, the Unit-2 TDAFW pump automatically started when an operator inappropriately closed the suction valves to both MFW pumps. The closure of the pumps suction valves initiated an invalid AFW pump start signal, resulting in the start of the TDAFW pump and the steam generator level control valves went to automatic. The two motor driven AFW pumps received a start signal though they were already in service for plant startup. This actuation was not the result of actual plant conditions or parameters (there was no feedwater flow through the MFW pumps); rather it was the result of an inappropriate action in closure of the MFW pumps suction valves with both MFW pumps trip buses energized.

"This event was originally reported on January 25, 2004 as a valid auxiliary feedwater system start signal. Further review has determined the signal to be invalid as described above.

"REPORT:

"This event was originally reported on January 25, 2004 as a valid auxiliary feedwater system start signal. Further review has determined the signal to be invalid as described above. The following information is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A):

"1. Both the Unit 2 Train A and B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were running, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump started and the steam generator level control valves went to automatic.

"2. Complete train actuation occurred.

"3. The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump start and the steam generator level control valves going to automatic were successful."

Notified the R2DO (OGLE). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

INOPERABLE REFUELING INTERLOCK

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Maintain Safe Shutdown and Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During Unit 1 refueling operations, it was discovered at 1110 hours 1/25/04 CST that the Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock was inoperable. Because this interlock is credited for mitigating the 'Control Rod Removal Error During Refueling' event evaluated in the UFSAR, this is reportable as an 8 hour ENS notification.

"With the Unit 1 Mode Switch in REFUEL, the one-rod-out interlock function was tested per LaSalle Operating Surveillance LOS-RD-SR4. Since the acceptance criterion of this surveillance was not met, the interlock was declared inoperable and the required actions of Technical Specification 3.9.2 entered. Currently all control rod withdrawals are suspended and all control rods are fully inserted in core cells containing fuel assemblies. The Unit 1 Mode Switch is in Shutdown. Actions are in progress to restore the One-Rod-Out Interlock to an operable status."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM BAILEY TO GOTT AT 1617 EST ON 1/26/04 * * *

"During further investigation, it was determined that the system design is such that whenever the Mode Switch is placed in the REFUEL position with a rod withdrawn, no select block is received but a rod withdrawal block is generated. This design feature allows control rods to be inserted should the Mode Switch be placed in REFUEL with any rod out. The LaSalle Operating Surveillance (LOS-RD-SR4) used to demonstrate operability of the Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Block does not currently recognize this design feature and its acceptance criteria is based solely on receipt of the select block. The subject procedure will be revised to ensure all rods are fully inserted prior to performing the surveillance thereby ensuring the logic initial conditions are met to satisfactorily demonstrate the select block function. With these initial conditions satisfied, the Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock was satisfactorily tested on 1/25/04 at 1935 hours CST. Therefore, the Refuel Position One-Rod-Out interlock performed as designed and was capable of performing its safety function. Thus, this occurrence was not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Louden).

LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE COMMUNICATIONS DUE TO FAILED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY

"At approximately 22:36 hours EST, on January 25, 2004, the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) computer system became inoperable due to a loss of the uninterruptible power supply (UPS). The ERFIS computer system provides monitoring and communications capability for plant data systems including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Meteorological Data link system, FAX modems for Emergency Preparedness functions, and the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM). The loss of ERFIS requires alternate methods as described in plant procedures to be used for these functions, as necessary. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still have been made as necessary, if required, during the time that the ERFIS was inoperable. The ERFIS computer system was restored at approximately 01:47 hours EST on January 26, 2004, using a back-up power supply. The cause of the loss of the ERFIS UPS has not yet been determined. Plant personnel are continuing to investigate the loss of the power supply and are in the process of repairing the UPS. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. As previously stated, alternate means remained available to assess plant conditions, make notifications, and accomplish required communications, as necessary."

The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.