Event Notification Report for January 12, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/11/2004 - 01/12/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40437
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/12/2004
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2004
Event Time: 10:48 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2004
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2004
Event Time: 10:48 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 68 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL SCRAM FOLLOWING INVALID CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL
"On 01/12/04 at 1048 hours, the Hope Creek Generating Station reactor was manually scrammed following an invalid containment isolation signal on Reactor Building High-High Radiation. The invalid signal was caused by the combination of a scheduled sensor calibration on channel 'C', coincident with an emergent failure on channel 'A.' This combination of trip signals made up the two out of three trip logic for the Reactor Building High-High Radiation containment isolation signal. While recovering from the spurious isolation signal, the operating crew observed two of the inboard MSIV's drifting closed from a loss of pneumatic pressure as a result of the isolation signal. In response to this condition, the operating crew manually scrammed the reactor. A low reactor water level scram signal was received at 12.5 inches as expected, and reactor level was subsequently returned to the normal band using the reactor feedpumps. At the time of this event, the 'A' Control Room Ventilation Train was inoperable but available pending emergent corrective maintenance. The 'C' channel Reactor Building Radiation monitor has been returned to service and is operable, and the 'A' channel remains failed in the tripped condition. All other systems functioned as expected, and a post-transient review team is being assembled to investigate the event."
Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The condensate and feedwater system is in operation maintaining reactor vessel water level. No SRVs lifted during the transient and the electrical system is stable in a normal lineup.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the LAC Township.
"On 01/12/04 at 1048 hours, the Hope Creek Generating Station reactor was manually scrammed following an invalid containment isolation signal on Reactor Building High-High Radiation. The invalid signal was caused by the combination of a scheduled sensor calibration on channel 'C', coincident with an emergent failure on channel 'A.' This combination of trip signals made up the two out of three trip logic for the Reactor Building High-High Radiation containment isolation signal. While recovering from the spurious isolation signal, the operating crew observed two of the inboard MSIV's drifting closed from a loss of pneumatic pressure as a result of the isolation signal. In response to this condition, the operating crew manually scrammed the reactor. A low reactor water level scram signal was received at 12.5 inches as expected, and reactor level was subsequently returned to the normal band using the reactor feedpumps. At the time of this event, the 'A' Control Room Ventilation Train was inoperable but available pending emergent corrective maintenance. The 'C' channel Reactor Building Radiation monitor has been returned to service and is operable, and the 'A' channel remains failed in the tripped condition. All other systems functioned as expected, and a post-transient review team is being assembled to investigate the event."
Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The condensate and feedwater system is in operation maintaining reactor vessel water level. No SRVs lifted during the transient and the electrical system is stable in a normal lineup.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the LAC Township.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40440
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: CARL SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: CARL SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2004
Event Time: 15:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2004
Event Time: 15:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
24 HOUR NOTIFICATION BULLETIN 91-01 CRITICALITY CONTROL
"Reason for Notification: Thirteen polypaks of uranium powder were dumped into a bulk container without a documented visual inspection of the bulk container. A visual inspection is performed prior to introducing SNM into a bulk container.
"Upon recognizing that the documentation was missing, the operator confirmed that a visual inspection had been performed prior to introducing SNM, but had not been documented. The operator then re-inspected the bulk container and found no trace of moderator. The powder dumped into the container was previously documented to contain leas than 0.3 weight percent moisture.
"Double Contingency Protection: Double contingency protection for the ADU Bulk Blending System is assured by preventing moderator from entering a bulk container. Empty bulk containers are inspected for the presence of moderator prior to introducing SNM. Failure to document the inspection left less than previously documented double contingency protection for the system. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification.
"Summary of Activity: Bulk blending operations were discontinued. Training was performed for each shift prior to resuming operations.
"Conclusions: Less than previously documented double contingency protection remained. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal analysis will be performed."
"Reason for Notification: Thirteen polypaks of uranium powder were dumped into a bulk container without a documented visual inspection of the bulk container. A visual inspection is performed prior to introducing SNM into a bulk container.
"Upon recognizing that the documentation was missing, the operator confirmed that a visual inspection had been performed prior to introducing SNM, but had not been documented. The operator then re-inspected the bulk container and found no trace of moderator. The powder dumped into the container was previously documented to contain leas than 0.3 weight percent moisture.
"Double Contingency Protection: Double contingency protection for the ADU Bulk Blending System is assured by preventing moderator from entering a bulk container. Empty bulk containers are inspected for the presence of moderator prior to introducing SNM. Failure to document the inspection left less than previously documented double contingency protection for the system. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification.
"Summary of Activity: Bulk blending operations were discontinued. Training was performed for each shift prior to resuming operations.
"Conclusions: Less than previously documented double contingency protection remained. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal analysis will be performed."