Event Notification Report for January 11, 2004

SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILS TO FUNCTION

"At 1810 [CST] on 01-11-04 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-360 #4 Autoclave High Pressure Isolation System. Water was observed leaking from the autoclave head-to-shell interface near the six o'clock position shortly after initiating a cylinder heat cycle. At the time of discovery, the autoclave was in TSR mode 5 and the High Pressure Isolation System was required to be operable while in this mode. This system is designed to provide containment of the autoclave and prevent an external release of UF6 during a system breach while heating a UF6 cylinder. The PSS declared the system inoperable and TSR LCO 2.1.3.1 .C1 actions were implemented to remove the autoclave from service and place it in Mode 2, 'Out of Service.' The event is reportable as a 24 hour event, as required by 10 CFR 76.120 (c)(2)(i); An event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a preestablished safe condition after an accident. The equipment was required by TSR to be available and operable and no redundant equipment was available to perform the required safety function."

"PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-04-0095; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-02; Event Worksheet Responsible Division; Operations"

Operations has notified the Senior NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 1/16/04 AT 1536 EST FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO GERRY WAIG * * *

This event has been retracted and the following update information provided:

"Subsequent to the report, plant engineers inspected the autoclave sealing surfaces and O-ring. The O-ring and autoclave sealing surfaces were found to be in good condition with no problems noted that would cause the water leak observed by the operators. The autoclave was subjected to a head-to-shell alignment (pinch) test. The test determined that the autoclave sealing surfaces were within acceptable alignment tolerances and no adjustments were made. To determine the autoclave's ability to perform its containment function, the TSR surveillance (pressure decay test) was performed with the autoclave In the as-found condition, i.e., without any maintenance or changes in the autoclave condition. The autoclave passed this test with approximately half the maximum allowable leak rate. The successful performance of the autoclave pressure decay test indicates that the autoclave HPIS [High Pressure Isolation System] would have been able to perform its designed containment function on January 11, 2004, had it been necessary. Thus, the 10CFR76.120 reporting criteria were not met.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction."

PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-04-0095; PGDP Event Report No. PAP-2004-02; Event Worksheet 40438
Responsible Division: Operations

Notified R2DO (Robert Haag), NMSS (Tom Essig), DIRO (Richard Wessman).

INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(1), which states, in part, "in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER." These invalid actuations are being reported under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, states that the report should provide the following information:

-The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated
-Whether each train actuation was complete or partial
-Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.

"On January 11, 2004, at 0637 hours, the Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor (i.e., 1-D12-RM-K609B) signal input spiked resulting in the invalid actuation of the logic associated with the instrument channel. The actuations included the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems) valves, the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation) and the automatic start of both Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System trains A and B. The actuations of PCIS Group 6 valves and Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation were complete and the affected equipment responded as designed to the invalid signal (i.e., the valves and dampers that were open, at the time of the event, closed). Additionally, SGT System trains A and B started and functioned successfully. After verification of the expected equipment responses, 1-D12-RM-K609B was reset, the actuation logic was reset, and the equipment/systems were returned to the status required by plant conditions. A radiological survey of the monitored area was completed with no abnormal conditions noted.

"Discussion of the causes and corrective actions associated with this event are documented in the corrective action program in action request (i.e., AR) 115087. The resident inspector has been notified."