Event Notification Report for January 10, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/09/2004 - 01/10/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
40434404354043640445
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40434
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: AL HARTNER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: AL HARTNER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 01/10/2004
Notification Time: 04:40 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2004
Event Time: 01:27 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2004
Notification Time: 04:40 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2004
Event Time: 01:27 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 72 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN INITIATED AND SUBSEQUENTLY TERMINATED
"During a surveillance of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 Solid State Protection System (SSPS) train "B" on 01/09/2004, a master relay contact exhibited unacceptable high resistance and was declared inoperable at 2042 hours. Corrective action was initiated to replace the relay, which requires that the "B" train of the reactor trip system be transferred from the reactor trip breaker to the bypass reactor trip breaker and the "B" train of SSPS be de-energized. Action 40.b of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, Table 3.3-1, Item 21 requires the Unit to be in at least Hot Standby within 6 hours with one reactor trip breaker inoperable as a result of something other than an inoperable diverse trip feature. Bypassing the reactor trip breaker in order to replace the SSPS master relay makes the reactor trip breaker inoperable as a result of something other than an inoperable diverse trip feature.
"The 'B' train Reactor Trip System reactor trip breaker was bypassed at 00:28 hours on 01/10/2004. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 initiated a plant shutdown at 01:27 hours on 01/10/2004 in response to entering Action 40.b of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, Table 3.3-1, Item 21.
"Action to replace the SSPS master relay was completed and the reactor trip breaker was returned to operability at 02:55 hours and the plant shutdown was terminated at 72% power. The Unit is scheduled to return to full power operation.
"Source Range N-31 re-energized when source range high voltage switch was restored to "Normal" position. Investigation is currently underway to determine the cause of this."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During a surveillance of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 Solid State Protection System (SSPS) train "B" on 01/09/2004, a master relay contact exhibited unacceptable high resistance and was declared inoperable at 2042 hours. Corrective action was initiated to replace the relay, which requires that the "B" train of the reactor trip system be transferred from the reactor trip breaker to the bypass reactor trip breaker and the "B" train of SSPS be de-energized. Action 40.b of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, Table 3.3-1, Item 21 requires the Unit to be in at least Hot Standby within 6 hours with one reactor trip breaker inoperable as a result of something other than an inoperable diverse trip feature. Bypassing the reactor trip breaker in order to replace the SSPS master relay makes the reactor trip breaker inoperable as a result of something other than an inoperable diverse trip feature.
"The 'B' train Reactor Trip System reactor trip breaker was bypassed at 00:28 hours on 01/10/2004. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 initiated a plant shutdown at 01:27 hours on 01/10/2004 in response to entering Action 40.b of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, Table 3.3-1, Item 21.
"Action to replace the SSPS master relay was completed and the reactor trip breaker was returned to operability at 02:55 hours and the plant shutdown was terminated at 72% power. The Unit is scheduled to return to full power operation.
"Source Range N-31 re-energized when source range high voltage switch was restored to "Normal" position. Investigation is currently underway to determine the cause of this."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40435
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW OHRABLO
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW OHRABLO
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 01/10/2004
Notification Time: 13:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2004
Event Time: 05:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2004
Notification Time: 13:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2004
Event Time: 05:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ACCIDENT MITIGATION - CREFS INOPERABLE
This Notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D).
On January 8, 2004 at 17:35 CST with the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) inoperable for planned maintenance, CREFS failed post work testing due to system flow being higher than that allowed by technical specifications. It was originally believed that the failure was connected with the planned maintenance because the system flow rate was initially within the specifications during surveillance testing the previous day.
Following system troubleshooting, at 05:00 CST on January 10, 2004, it was determined that the cause of the high flow rates was indeterminate. Based on this evaluation, it could not be determined whether the CREFS failure was independent of planned maintenance or not. Additionally, it is not immediately clear if the high flow condition would result in a loss of safety function. It was therefore conservatively determined that the condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a failure of a single train system which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
CREFS flow rates are currently within specifications, but the system will remain inoperable until the proper surveillances have been completed.
The senior NRC Resident has been notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/15/04 AT 1729 HOURS EST FROM JAMES DEDIC TO GERRY WAIG * * *
The licensee retracted this event and provided the following information:
"On January 10, 2004, Cooper Nuclear Station [CNS] made an eight hour event notification report to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.72.(b)(3)(v)(D), failure of a single train system which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. In particular, testing to restore the Control Room Emergency Filter System (CREFS) to operable status following planned maintenance indicated the flow rate was greater than that allowed by Technical Specifications. It was not known whether the high flow condition would result in a loss of safety function. Flow rate was restored to within Technical Specification Limits and CREFS was returned to operable status on January 11, 2004 at 1803 hours
"Subsequent evaluation determined:
"1. the high flow condition did not impact the system safety functions to maintain the Control Room at a positive pressure with respect to adjoining areas or to isolate the outside air intake on relevant Group isolation signals.
"2. the CREFS safety function to limit the radiation exposure to Control Room personnel during any one of the postulated design basis events to within regulatory limits (10CFR50, Appendix A, GDC 19) was maintained during the high flow condition.
"3. the design functions of CREFS for the CNS toxic hazards assessment and Fire Protection Program requirements were not affected by the CREFS high flow.
"The evaluation concluded the safety function of the CREFS during the high flow condition was maintained. Therefore, CNS is retracting this 10CFR50.72 Event Notification."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Jeffery Clark)
This Notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D).
On January 8, 2004 at 17:35 CST with the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) inoperable for planned maintenance, CREFS failed post work testing due to system flow being higher than that allowed by technical specifications. It was originally believed that the failure was connected with the planned maintenance because the system flow rate was initially within the specifications during surveillance testing the previous day.
Following system troubleshooting, at 05:00 CST on January 10, 2004, it was determined that the cause of the high flow rates was indeterminate. Based on this evaluation, it could not be determined whether the CREFS failure was independent of planned maintenance or not. Additionally, it is not immediately clear if the high flow condition would result in a loss of safety function. It was therefore conservatively determined that the condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a failure of a single train system which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
CREFS flow rates are currently within specifications, but the system will remain inoperable until the proper surveillances have been completed.
The senior NRC Resident has been notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/15/04 AT 1729 HOURS EST FROM JAMES DEDIC TO GERRY WAIG * * *
The licensee retracted this event and provided the following information:
"On January 10, 2004, Cooper Nuclear Station [CNS] made an eight hour event notification report to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.72.(b)(3)(v)(D), failure of a single train system which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. In particular, testing to restore the Control Room Emergency Filter System (CREFS) to operable status following planned maintenance indicated the flow rate was greater than that allowed by Technical Specifications. It was not known whether the high flow condition would result in a loss of safety function. Flow rate was restored to within Technical Specification Limits and CREFS was returned to operable status on January 11, 2004 at 1803 hours
"Subsequent evaluation determined:
"1. the high flow condition did not impact the system safety functions to maintain the Control Room at a positive pressure with respect to adjoining areas or to isolate the outside air intake on relevant Group isolation signals.
"2. the CREFS safety function to limit the radiation exposure to Control Room personnel during any one of the postulated design basis events to within regulatory limits (10CFR50, Appendix A, GDC 19) was maintained during the high flow condition.
"3. the design functions of CREFS for the CNS toxic hazards assessment and Fire Protection Program requirements were not affected by the CREFS high flow.
"The evaluation concluded the safety function of the CREFS during the high flow condition was maintained. Therefore, CNS is retracting this 10CFR50.72 Event Notification."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Jeffery Clark)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40436
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: FRANK PAYNE
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: FRANK PAYNE
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 01/10/2004
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2004
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 1 | Startup | 1 | Startup |
TS REQUIRED SHUTDOWN AT NMP1 DUE TO INOPERABLE MSIV
"During the performance of a normal orderly planned shutdown for maintenance a packing leak was discovered on Main Steam Inboard Isolation Valve 01-02 (01-02). Drywall inspection results revealed MSIV 01-02 operator gear housing degraded allowing grease to be lost. Engineering assessment of the condition of the limitorque operator of MSIV 01-02 is not able to provide enough information to support operability of MSIV 01-02. Declaring MSIV 01-02 inoperable. Entering T.S. 3.2.7(b and c). Action required to close one valve in the line having an inoperable valve or initiate a normal orderly shutdown with in one hour and be in cold shutdown within ten hours. Entering T.S. 3.3.4(b and c). Action required to close one valve in the line having an inoperable valve within four hours or reduce reactor coolant temperature to a value less than 215 degrees F within ten hours. Most limiting action required in current condition is 10 hours to be in cold shutdown. 01-02 will be closed as soon as all rods are in."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"During the performance of a normal orderly planned shutdown for maintenance a packing leak was discovered on Main Steam Inboard Isolation Valve 01-02 (01-02). Drywall inspection results revealed MSIV 01-02 operator gear housing degraded allowing grease to be lost. Engineering assessment of the condition of the limitorque operator of MSIV 01-02 is not able to provide enough information to support operability of MSIV 01-02. Declaring MSIV 01-02 inoperable. Entering T.S. 3.2.7(b and c). Action required to close one valve in the line having an inoperable valve or initiate a normal orderly shutdown with in one hour and be in cold shutdown within ten hours. Entering T.S. 3.3.4(b and c). Action required to close one valve in the line having an inoperable valve within four hours or reduce reactor coolant temperature to a value less than 215 degrees F within ten hours. Most limiting action required in current condition is 10 hours to be in cold shutdown. 01-02 will be closed as soon as all rods are in."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40445
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORP
Region: 4
City: OILDALE State: CA
County:
License #: 0144-15
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORP
Region: 4
City: OILDALE State: CA
County:
License #: 0144-15
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 23:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2004
Event Time: 18:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 23:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2004
Event Time: 18:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
Jeffrey Clark (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
Jeffrey Clark (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE
On 01/12/04, the State of California received a report from Schlumberger Technology of an incident that occurred about 1800 PST on 01/10/04. A 1.3 curie Cs-137 source fell off of its tool. A rig hand picked up the source with his fingertips thinking it was the base of a lightbulb. A Schlumberger crew member told the worker to leave it on the deck. The source was recovered with the source handling tool, and returned it to the shielded container.
Touching exposure was estimated to be 20 mrem with calculations based on maximum touching time of 10 seconds. Whole body exposure was estimated to be 2.9 mrem with calculation exposure based on beginning at 6 feet from the source and closest distance at 2.5 feet for maximum of 2 minutes. The source has exposure characteristics of 2 mrem/hr at 200 inches (min) from shielded (dovetail) end, and 2 mrem/hr at 680 inches (max) from the non-shielded end.
On 01/12/04, the State of California received a report from Schlumberger Technology of an incident that occurred about 1800 PST on 01/10/04. A 1.3 curie Cs-137 source fell off of its tool. A rig hand picked up the source with his fingertips thinking it was the base of a lightbulb. A Schlumberger crew member told the worker to leave it on the deck. The source was recovered with the source handling tool, and returned it to the shielded container.
Touching exposure was estimated to be 20 mrem with calculations based on maximum touching time of 10 seconds. Whole body exposure was estimated to be 2.9 mrem with calculation exposure based on beginning at 6 feet from the source and closest distance at 2.5 feet for maximum of 2 minutes. The source has exposure characteristics of 2 mrem/hr at 200 inches (min) from shielded (dovetail) end, and 2 mrem/hr at 680 inches (max) from the non-shielded end.