Event Notification Report for December 21, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/20/2003 - 12/21/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40404
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JEFF TUFTS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JEFF TUFTS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/22/2003
Notification Time: 00:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2003
Event Time: 20:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2003
Notification Time: 00:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2003
Event Time: 20:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL IMPACT TO SAFE SHUTDOWN DUE TO CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION INOPERABILITY
"On 12/21/03 at 2021, it was discovered that the temperature control valve for the Division 1 Emergency Closed Cooling system had two blown fuses. This results in the Division 1 Control Complex chiller becoming inoperable. Concurrent with this the Division 2 Control Complex chiller was inoperable for planned maintenance. With this configuration both trains of safety related ventilation have been declared inoperable. This results in a loss of safety function for AC and DC distribution systems. Additionally this results in all Emergency Core Cooling systems being inoperable.
"This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (ii) (b) and (b) (3) (v) (a, b & d) for unanalyzed condition and loss of a single train safety system."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 12/21/03 at 2021, it was discovered that the temperature control valve for the Division 1 Emergency Closed Cooling system had two blown fuses. This results in the Division 1 Control Complex chiller becoming inoperable. Concurrent with this the Division 2 Control Complex chiller was inoperable for planned maintenance. With this configuration both trains of safety related ventilation have been declared inoperable. This results in a loss of safety function for AC and DC distribution systems. Additionally this results in all Emergency Core Cooling systems being inoperable.
"This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (ii) (b) and (b) (3) (v) (a, b & d) for unanalyzed condition and loss of a single train safety system."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 40463
Rep Org: CT DEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Licensee: PEPPERIDGE FARMS
Region: 1
City: NORWALK State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE FIRSICK
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: PEPPERIDGE FARMS
Region: 1
City: NORWALK State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE FIRSICK
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 01/21/2004
Notification Time: 18:10 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2004
Notification Time: 18:10 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
MISSING DOUGH DENSITY GAUGE
The State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection reported that the Pepperidge Farm bakery facility in Norwalk, CT reported that a generally-licensed Kay-Ray (now Thermo Measure Tech, Inc) Model 7060BP density gauge used to measure bakery dough density is missing and presumed sent to a scrap recycler in South Norwalk, CT sometime within the last 4 weeks. Pepperidge Farm is in the process of relocating their facility and the gauge will no longer be used. The gauge contains a 50 millicurie (as of August 1983) Cs-137 source. The State plans on notifying recipients of processed scrap shipped by the scrap recycler. In addition, the State will be conducting a radiation survey of the Pepperidge Farm facility to help confirm that the gauge is no longer at the facility.
The State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection reported that the Pepperidge Farm bakery facility in Norwalk, CT reported that a generally-licensed Kay-Ray (now Thermo Measure Tech, Inc) Model 7060BP density gauge used to measure bakery dough density is missing and presumed sent to a scrap recycler in South Norwalk, CT sometime within the last 4 weeks. Pepperidge Farm is in the process of relocating their facility and the gauge will no longer be used. The gauge contains a 50 millicurie (as of August 1983) Cs-137 source. The State plans on notifying recipients of processed scrap shipped by the scrap recycler. In addition, the State will be conducting a radiation survey of the Pepperidge Farm facility to help confirm that the gauge is no longer at the facility.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40496
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ELBERFELD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ELBERFELD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/02/2004
Notification Time: 10:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2003
Event Time: 22:04 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2004
Notification Time: 10:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2003
Event Time: 22:04 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GEORGE KUZO (R2)
GEORGE KUZO (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
INVALID REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST RADIATION MONITOR SIGNAL RESULTING IN PCIS ISOLATIONS
"This report is being made in accordance with §50.73 (a)(1), which states, in part, 'In the case of an invalid actuation reported under §50.73 (a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event Instead of submitting a written LER.' These invalid actuations are being reported under §50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A). NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, states that the report should provide the following information:
- The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated
- Whether each train actuation was complete or partial
- Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"On December 21, 2003, at 2204 hours, the Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor (i.e., 1-D12-RM-K609B) signal input spiked resulting in the invalid actuation of the logic associated with the instrument channel. The actuations included the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems) valves, the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation) and the automatic start of both Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System trains A and B. The actuations of PCIS Group 6 valves and Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation were complete and the affected equipment responded as designed to the invalid signal (i.e., the valves and dampers that were open, at the time of the event, closed). Additionally, SGT System trains A and B started and functioned successfully. After verification of the expected equipment responses, 1-D12-RM-K609B was reset, the actuation logic was reset, and the equipment/systems were returned to the status required by plant conditions. A radiological survey of the monitored area was completed with no abnormal conditions noted.
"Discussion of the causes and corrective actions associated with this event are documented in the corrective action program in action request (i.e., AR) 114005. The resident inspector has been notified."
"This report is being made in accordance with §50.73 (a)(1), which states, in part, 'In the case of an invalid actuation reported under §50.73 (a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event Instead of submitting a written LER.' These invalid actuations are being reported under §50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A). NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, states that the report should provide the following information:
- The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated
- Whether each train actuation was complete or partial
- Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"On December 21, 2003, at 2204 hours, the Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor (i.e., 1-D12-RM-K609B) signal input spiked resulting in the invalid actuation of the logic associated with the instrument channel. The actuations included the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems) valves, the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation) and the automatic start of both Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System trains A and B. The actuations of PCIS Group 6 valves and Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation were complete and the affected equipment responded as designed to the invalid signal (i.e., the valves and dampers that were open, at the time of the event, closed). Additionally, SGT System trains A and B started and functioned successfully. After verification of the expected equipment responses, 1-D12-RM-K609B was reset, the actuation logic was reset, and the equipment/systems were returned to the status required by plant conditions. A radiological survey of the monitored area was completed with no abnormal conditions noted.
"Discussion of the causes and corrective actions associated with this event are documented in the corrective action program in action request (i.e., AR) 114005. The resident inspector has been notified."