Event Notification Report for December 12, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/11/2003 - 12/12/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40389
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/12/2003
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2003
Event Time: 11:19 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2003
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2003
Event Time: 11:19 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
JAY HENSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF AUXILIARY FEEWATER WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE FOR ONE HOUR AND 22 MINUTES.
Surry Power Station has determined that an unanalyzed condition related to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) isolation during a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event exists. The existing accident analysis for a SGTR requires that AFW to the ruptured steam generator (SG) be isolated prior to the water level in that SG rising into the main steam pipe. Failing to take these actions could result in a radioactive release or failure of equipment important to safety, which has not been previously analyzed.
The current configuration of the AFW system has six motor operated valves (MOVs), two for each SG, which are used to control flow from one of two AFW headers. Three MOVs are powered from "H" emergency bus and three MOVs are powered from "J" emergency bus. The MOVs are maintained normally open. With a loss of emergency power to either train of AFW MOVs, the control room operators are not able to close the three MOVs from the de-energized emergency bus without manual action inside containment. A review of the plant safety analysis design basis indicates that with this AFW configuration, isolation of AFW to a ruptured SG would not be possible within the time frame specified in the analysis.
Unit One and Unit Two entered a TS 3.0.1 clock at 1119 hours on December 12, 2003 due to the AFW systems being declared inoperable. The station took immediate actions to address the configuration control issue in order to meet the assumptions made in the SGTR accident analysis and both Unit One and Unit Two exited the TS 3.0.1 clock at 13:41 hours on December 12, 2003.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Surry Power Station has determined that an unanalyzed condition related to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) isolation during a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event exists. The existing accident analysis for a SGTR requires that AFW to the ruptured steam generator (SG) be isolated prior to the water level in that SG rising into the main steam pipe. Failing to take these actions could result in a radioactive release or failure of equipment important to safety, which has not been previously analyzed.
The current configuration of the AFW system has six motor operated valves (MOVs), two for each SG, which are used to control flow from one of two AFW headers. Three MOVs are powered from "H" emergency bus and three MOVs are powered from "J" emergency bus. The MOVs are maintained normally open. With a loss of emergency power to either train of AFW MOVs, the control room operators are not able to close the three MOVs from the de-energized emergency bus without manual action inside containment. A review of the plant safety analysis design basis indicates that with this AFW configuration, isolation of AFW to a ruptured SG would not be possible within the time frame specified in the analysis.
Unit One and Unit Two entered a TS 3.0.1 clock at 1119 hours on December 12, 2003 due to the AFW systems being declared inoperable. The station took immediate actions to address the configuration control issue in order to meet the assumptions made in the SGTR accident analysis and both Unit One and Unit Two exited the TS 3.0.1 clock at 13:41 hours on December 12, 2003.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40390
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: GALLETT AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: ATLANTA State: GA
County:
License #: GA 1316-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERIC JAMESON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: GALLETT AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: ATLANTA State: GA
County:
License #: GA 1316-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERIC JAMESON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 12/12/2003
Notification Time: 14:36 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2003
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2003
Notification Time: 14:36 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2003
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
GEORGIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
On 12/12/03 at 1100 ET, a licensee's pickup truck was stolen with a moisture density gauge locked in the bed of the truck. The truck was parked at a construction site on Northside Drive in downtown Atlanta, GA. The gauge is a CPN Model MC Porta-Probe, Serial Number MD60703301. The gauge contained two sources: 50 milliCuries Am241/Be and 10 milliCuries Cs-137. The licensee has reported the theft to the Atlanta Police Dept. and the Atlanta Field Office of the FBI.
On 12/12/03 at 1100 ET, a licensee's pickup truck was stolen with a moisture density gauge locked in the bed of the truck. The truck was parked at a construction site on Northside Drive in downtown Atlanta, GA. The gauge is a CPN Model MC Porta-Probe, Serial Number MD60703301. The gauge contained two sources: 50 milliCuries Am241/Be and 10 milliCuries Cs-137. The licensee has reported the theft to the Atlanta Police Dept. and the Atlanta Field Office of the FBI.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40391
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES BAPTIST
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES BAPTIST
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/12/2003
Notification Time: 14:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2003
Event Time: 12:24 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2003
Notification Time: 14:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2003
Event Time: 12:24 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
MARK RING (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE.
"On 12/12/2003 , at 1224 both trains of Component Cooling System were declared inoperable. The governance by the KNPP Technical Specification (3.3.d) requires that actions commence within an hour to place the plant in Hot Standby within 6 hours, Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours, and to achieve the RCS Tavg less than 350 degrees F by use of alternate heat removal methods within an additional 36 hours. The issue stemmed from the discovery of liquid on R-17 (Component Cooling Radiation Detector) detector housing at the location of a air port. Liquid from this port was chemically tested to contain chemicals (molybdates and sulfites) currently found in the Component Cooling system. It was determined that this leak violated guidance in Generic Letter 90-05 and thus rendered both trains of component cooling inoperable due to this being in a common header. A Technical Specifications guided background has commenced at 1315 on 12/12/2003."
At the time of the call, reactor power was 84% and decreasing. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if need. The electrical grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"On 12/12/2003 , at 1224 both trains of Component Cooling System were declared inoperable. The governance by the KNPP Technical Specification (3.3.d) requires that actions commence within an hour to place the plant in Hot Standby within 6 hours, Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours, and to achieve the RCS Tavg less than 350 degrees F by use of alternate heat removal methods within an additional 36 hours. The issue stemmed from the discovery of liquid on R-17 (Component Cooling Radiation Detector) detector housing at the location of a air port. Liquid from this port was chemically tested to contain chemicals (molybdates and sulfites) currently found in the Component Cooling system. It was determined that this leak violated guidance in Generic Letter 90-05 and thus rendered both trains of component cooling inoperable due to this being in a common header. A Technical Specifications guided background has commenced at 1315 on 12/12/2003."
At the time of the call, reactor power was 84% and decreasing. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if need. The electrical grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.