Event Notification Report for December 09, 2003

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING FIRE WITH RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

"On December 10, 2003, [the licensee's RSO at] Waste Control Specialist reported a fire involving radioactive material that occurred on December 9, 2003. There was no excessive exposure to individuals nor was there any off-site airborne release.

"The waste processing company believes reactive metals (lithium, sodium, potassium) oxidized in water to start the fire. Packing materials were placed in a shredder that feeds into a hopper containing mixed waste. The system is closed with HEPA filters in place. Vibrations from the hopper may have resulted in the ignition. The material burned for about 20 seconds and was extinguished. When more materials were poured into a mix pan, the fire reignited and again was quickly extinguished.

"According to the Licensee's preliminary calculations, the affected or burned radioactive material exceeded the reportable quantity of five times an ALI [annual limit on intake]. The total radioactive material in the mix pan was under 50 microcuries. The shredder contained about 2.4 microcuries. There were 12 to 14 radionuclides involved. The Licensee will send a detailed written report within 30 days to include specifics on radionuclides and activities.

"The most serious consequence was the unplanned fire. The building is pressurized and the smoke from the fire was pulled through HEPA filters and a monitored exhaust system. The workers wear PPE [personal protective equipment) and airlines with protection factors of 1000."

Texas Incident # I-8024.

* * * * UPDATE ON 1/21/4 AT 1651 EST TO M. RIPLEY FROM HELEN WATKINS VIA FACSIMILE * * * *

The following information was provided in a letter dated 1/6/2004 from Waste Control Specialists (WCS) to the Texas Department of Health:

"On December 9, 2003 at approximately 1400 hrs a small fire occurred in the Permacon building at our facility located 30 miles West of Andrews, Texas. This fire occurred in the hopper beneath the waste shredder. There was a small quantity of untreated water reactive radioactive waste (WP-019224) that caught fire after passing through the shredder above. Two employees at the scene quickly extinguished the fire within the hopper using hand-held halon fire extinguishers. The hopper was pulled from underneath the shredder and then the waste was put into the mix pan where it re-ignited. It was extinguished by dropping water on the materials using the prentice arm.

"The personnel who were in the immediate area were wearing anti-contamination clothing and respiratory protection equipment in accordance with the Radiation Work Permit. The air sample that was being collected at the time of the incident indicated approximately 85% of the DAC for Th-228. The respiratory protection equipment used has a protection factor of 1000. There was no significant internal or external radiological exposure to personnel."

"The radioactive distribution of the material involved is enclosed."

Additionally, the licensee provided the following information to the State in response to a question about any action the licensee may have taken to prevent a reoccurrence of a fire. The licensee stated the following in an email to the State:

"WCS issued a Stop Work Order on December 9, 2003. The Stop Order included a corrective action of 'Evaluate the treatment methodology for reactive metals prior to receipt of new shipments of reactive metals for processing.' WCS will not receive any new shipments of reactive metals for processing until such time that a different treatment methodology is developed to process these wastes without subsequent ignition of waste materials."

Notified R4DO (L. Howell) and NMSS EO (L. Kokajko)

UNABLE TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN USING NATURAL CIRCULATION AT A COOLDOWN RATE OF 50 DEGREES PER HOUR

"At 1538 on 12/09/03, it was determined that the plant could not achieve cold shutdown using Natural Circulation with the available volume of the Auxiliary Feed Water Storage Tank [AFWST] and at an allowed plant cooldown rate of 50 degrees F/hour. The plant has a functional objective to achieve Plant Shutdown from Operating Condition to Cold Shutdown Condition with the Natural Circulation Cooldown process with the volume of water available in the AFWST. Natural Circulation cooldown is required during Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP), long term cooling, Safety Grade Cold Shutdown and Appendix R type fire with LOOP. This condition also applies to Unit 2.

"STP [South Texas Project] changed from a Reactor Vessel Head (RVH) T-Hot Plant to a RVH T-Cold Plant after replacement of the plant's steam generators. As a result, the plant cooldown rate under natural circulation conditions was changed from 25 degrees F/hour to 50 degrees F/hour based on a Westinghouse evaluation.

"While performing confirmatory calculations to address a fire safe shutdown issue, it was determined that the plant can be cooled down with two steam generators using natural circulation. However, at a cooldown rate of 50 degrees F/hour, the two steam generators not being used for cooldown would stagnate with hot water in the primary side tubes. During the depressurization process, the hot water flashes to steam such that depressurization below approximately 1000 psig is significantly challenged. This results in filling the pressurizer and a loss of RCS pressure control. The fluid in the RCS [Reactor Coolant System] loops not receiving AFW will remain at saturated conditions until cooling is achieved by other means.

"Cooldown and depressurization of the RCS in this configuration will take substantially longer than assumed in the current analyses. Although there is adequate core cooling, the plant will be in a condition that is outside the existing design basis and not specifically addressed by the Emergency Operating Procedures. Therefore, this condition resulted in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.

"Thermal Hydraulic Analyses at a cooldown rate of 25 degrees F/hr demonstrated that natural circulation will occur in the two steam generators that are not being used for cooldown such that the stagnated hot water conditions would not occur in these steam generators. This would allow for depressurization of the reactor coolant system and successfully meet the functional objective. A compensatory action is in place to limit natural circulation cooldown rate to no greater than 25 degrees F/hr."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION ERROR DURING EMERGENCY PLAN DRILL

"On December 9, 2003, at 1900 hours, an unannounced emergency planning staff augmentation drill was initiated via a staff augmentation vendor. An incorrect message was inadvertently sent out. The message described a chemical spill and advised people to take shelter. The message did not indicate that there was an emergency at Palisades. It named a chemical plant in another town. An attempt to send the correct message was made, and the same erroneous message was sent. The erroneous message was only sent to plant personnel, however, several responders who received the message called local agencies to find out more about the emergency described in the message. (Note there was NO actual emergency at Palisades or at a chemical plant.) Various agencies then called the plant to request information. Courtesy calls were made later to state and local agencies that might be affected to explain the error in the message. Information was also FAXed to the agencies so they could make further courtesy calls. The error was also discussed with local media, although no press release had been issued.

"There was no impact on plant operations.

"This report is not being made within the required time period. The original review for reportability was made before the outside agencies were notified, and the error was believed to be an internal communication error. The Senior Resident Inspector was notified of the communication error. Plant staff had not planned on discussing it with outside agencies. However, once subsequent discussions were initiated, it was not immediately recognized that the NRC should be notified."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

INFORMATION ONLY - SEISMIC ACTIVITY FELT AT NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

At 1559 EST on 12/09/03, Seismic activity was felt at North Anna Power Station (NAPS). Both units continue to operate at 100 percent power with no problems. Seismic monitoring systems did not pick up the event. The earthquake was centered 15 miles Southeast of Colombia, VA (29 miles from NAPS) and registered 4.5 on the Richter Scale. Initial plant walk downs have identified no issues. Operations and engineering are continuing to walk down the units to identify problems that are undetectable from the control room.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.