Event Notification Report for December 03, 2003

Cs-137 SOURCE CONTAINED WITHIN A LIQUID SCINTILLATION COUNTER WAS FOUND TO BE LEAKING

The following is taken from a facsimile received from Texas Department of Health [TDH], Bureau of Radiation Control:

"Event Description: A 30 microcurie cesium-137 source located in a scintillation counter was found with 430,000 cpm counts on a swab leak test conducted by a serviceman. No contamination was found outside the source assembly.

"Texas Incident No. I-8024

The Licensee's report to TDH was also faxed to the NRC and is identified, in part, below:

"On December 3, 2003, the Radiological Safety Officer at Texas A&M University (TAMU) was notified by a service representative of Beckman Coulter that a Cs-137 source contained within a liquid scintillation counter was leaking. After obtaining information from the service representative, the RSO then made a telephone notification to the Texas Department of Health-Bureau of Radiation Control, informing Ms. Helen Watkins of the situation.

"This letter is a written notification of the leaking sealed source, in accordance with TAC 289.202 (ddd). The following information identifies the liquid scintillation counter and specifies of the source:

Location: Chemistry Bldg., Room 2516
Manufacturer: Beckman
Model: LS 6000 SE
S/N: 7060437
Source: Cs-137
Activity: 30 uCi [microcuries]

"The device user, a professor at TAMU, noticed that the device was not operating properly and contacted Beckman for service. The service representatives performed diagnostics on the device including a smear (cotton swab) of the plastic sphere source. The swab was counted with a result of approximately 430,000 cpm [counts per minute]. No parts have been removed from the device, but the intention is to replace the source, source housing, and source elevator. These components will then be returned to Beckman. Repair parts have been ordered. The device has been removed from service with signage indicating 'No Usage' and 'Contact Radiological Safety.' In addition, Environmental Health and Safety Department (EHSD) personnel performed contamination surveys on the device, the service representatives, and within the room. No contamination was detected."

PLANT HAD AN AUTO REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO STEAM GENERATOR LOW LEVEL

The "2 D" steam generator Lo-2 level was caused by the loss of the "2C" feedwater pump while performing the "2 BWOS" feedwater weekly surveillance of the HP stop valve. Both trains of the aux feed actuated as expected on the "2D" Lo-2 s/g level signal. The plant is currently in mode 3 with all rods fully inserted. No ECCS or safety relief valves actuated.

Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector

BACKWARD INSTALLATION OF CONTAINMENT LOOP SEAL PENETRATION VACUUM BREAKERS

"Vacuum breakers 1WL980 and 2WL980 are installed backwards. In their current orientation, the valves will not lift from their seats to break a siphon into the corresponding unit's Ventilation Unit Condensate Drain Tank (VUCDT).

"The VUCDT input line is a 6-Inch pipe. There is a loop seal between the outboard containment isolation valve and the VUCDT. Since the VUCDT is vented to the auxiliary building environment, the purpose of the loop seal is to provide a barrier between the containment atmosphere and the auxiliary building atmosphere during normal unit operations. The purpose of the vacuum breaker is to prevent siphoning water out of the loop seal. In its current configuration, the vacuum breaker will not open. The loop seal is not needed to provide a barrier between the containment atmosphere and the auxiliary building atmosphere during a large break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) because valves 1(2)WL867A and 1(2)WL869B will close on a Phase B containment isolation signal on high-high containment pressure (3.2 psig in containment, accounting for instrument error). During certain small break LOCAs, however, a high-high containment isolation signal may not occur, since pressure might not reach the setpoint. In this scenario, the loop seal is needed to isolate the containment atmosphere from the auxiliary building atmosphere.

"Given the size of the VUCDT inlet piping, the only mechanism that could form a siphon out of the loop seal is a large flow of water that would push the air out of the top of the loop seal. In this instance, a siphon could form and pull water out of the low point of the loop seal. If this were to occur, a vent path from the containment atmosphere to the auxiliary building atmosphere would be open. However, during normal operation, there is not sufficient flow into the tank to make this a plausible scenario.

"For a large break LOCA, containment pressure would rise quickly to the high-high setpoint; then the inoperable VUCDT loop seal would be isolated by its containment isolation valves. For smaller LOCAs, particularly, for a rod ejection accident resulting in a LOCA, containment pressure would rise slowly- from 2.81 psig (the pressure at which the loop seal isolation function would fail), until 3.2 psig (the maximum high-high containment pressure setpoint, accounting for instrument error), the inoperable loop seal would represent a containment leak path. The rod ejection accident does result in a high level of fuel clad failure; therefore, the unisolated containment leak path represents a source of release to the environment until such time as the high-high containment pressure setpoint is reached (if it is reached). The dose consequences associated with this potential leak path have not been evaluated.

"Upon discovery of the incorrectly installed vacuum breakers, the containment isolation valves associated with this penetration flow path were closed to isolate the path. The Unit 2 loop seal configuration has since been modified to correct this situation. The Unit 1 loop seal configuration will be modified prior to the completion of the current end of cycle 14 refueling outage."

The incorrect installation of the vacuum breakers was identified on 11/03/03, and it is being investigated on how long this condition has existed. It is possible that it has existed since construction.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, state and local regulatory agencies.

*****RETRACTED ON 1/8/03 AT 1615 FROM COY TO LAURA*****

"The subject EN was made on 12/3/03. Following additional review by the licensee, this event was determined to not meet the reportability requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. The event was determined to not result in a degraded or unanalyzed condition, as the consequences of the event were determined to be bounded by transients currently analyzed and described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). In addition, the event did not represent a failure of structures, systems, or components utilized to control the release of radiological material or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee is therefore retracting the subject EN."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (P. Fredrickson)

EMERGENCY PROCEDURE DEFICIENCY CAUSES UNANALYZED CONDITION

"While reviewing operator emergency response times contained in Callaway Plant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), it was determined that emergency procedure E-0 did not contain specific guidance for actions to be taken when one train of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) failed to properly operate. In FSAR Chapter 15A, the limiting single failure analyzed for the CREVS is the failure of a filtration fan within one train of CREVS. In this accident analysis scenario, a Control Room Filtration Unit fan fails and the train must be secured to prevent inadequately filtered Control Building air from being introduced into the Control Room. If the train is not isolated within 30 minutes, postulated dose to Control Room staff could potentially exceed GDC 19 limits.

"While procedure E-0 addressed identifying faulted CREVS equipment and an attempted restoration of the faulted equipment, it did not contain sufficient guidance to ensure the Control Room staff would isolate the faulted train of CREVS if the equipment restoration attempt failed.

"A revision to procedure E-0 has been issued to correct this procedural deficiency."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * * RETRACTION FROM E. HENSON TO M. RIPLEY 1425 ET 2/2/04 * * * *

"This notification is being retracted. Further evaluations concluded that a local area radiation monitor would have alerted the Control Room staff to a developing adverse condition in sufficient time for operators to have identified and isolated the faulted CREVS train prior to exceeding regulatory dose limits. This event does not represent an unanalyzed condition reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)." The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

Notified R4 DO (A. Gody)

LOUISIANA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST Ir-192 RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

An IR-100 industrial radiography camera, serial number 4470, Spec model G40F, with a 33 curie Ir-192 source, serial number KG2801, was reported lost while being transported by the licensee from a work-site to the licensee's office. On December 3, 2003 at approximately 1700 CST the licensee, Bayou Inspection Service, 318 Degravelle Road, Amelia, LA was transporting the radiography camera from a work-site located at 1081 Highway 70, Pierre Port, LA to the Amelia, LA address, a distance of approximately 20 miles. Upon arrival at the office, the camera was noticed missing from the pickup truck being used to transport it from the worksite. The route of travel was from the work-site on Highway 70, through Morgan City, and to the Amelia exit on Highway 90 . The licensee notified the State of Louisiana of the event on 12/04/03 at 0940 CST and has notified local law enforcement along the route of travel.

* * * * UPDATE FROM J. NOBLE TO M. RIPLEY 1710 12/11/03 * * * *

The Louisiana Radiation Protection Division reported that, at approximately 1500 CST on 12/11/03, the radiography camera was turned in to the licensee at his facility in Amelia, LA by a private citizen. The citizen found the camera along the side of Highway 70 in Belle River, LA on 12/03/03. The licensee performed a leak check of the source and no leakage was found.

Notified R4DO (D. Graves), NMSS EO (T. Essig), and DHS Ops Center (E. McDonald)