Event Notification Report for November 29, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/28/2003 - 11/29/2003
EVENT NUMBERS
40469
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40469
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: Ken Russell
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: Ken Russell
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/23/2004
Notification Time: 14:05 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2003
Event Time: 15:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2004
Notification Time: 14:05 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2003
Event Time: 15:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
On November 29, 2003, at 1526 hours, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant experienced an actuation of several Division 2 Balance-of-Plant (BOP) inboard isolation valves as a result of the loss of the normal power supply to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) B. At the time of the event, the plant was in mode 1(Power Operations) at about 100% power. The isolation closed one or more valves in each of the following Division 2 subsystems: Main Steam line drains, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup, Liquid Radwaste Sumps, Containment Vessel Chilled WATER, Reactor Water Sampling, Drywell and Containment Radiation Monitoring, and Control Room Ventilation. Instrumentation that receives electrical power from RPS B also lost power. Division 1 components and valves were not affected.
The event is considered an invalid system actuation, and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The isolation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters, and was not a manual initiation. It meets the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) as a general containment isolation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Therefore, notification is being provided via 60-day optional phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). All systems functioned as expected for an inboard isolation. Repositioning of the valves did not present operational concerns; and the valves were re-opened per restoration procedures. The BOP isolation was attributed to the loss of power to RPS B as a result of a blown fuse. The blown fuse was the result of the failure of a GE CR105 contactor due to age related degradation (insulating varnish degradation resulting in a winding to winding short circuit). This event was documented in the corrective action program. Remedial actions included replacement of the failed fuse and the RPS A and B normal power supply contactors and the RPS A alternate power supply contactor. The RPS B alternate power supply contactor will also be replaced.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
On November 29, 2003, at 1526 hours, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant experienced an actuation of several Division 2 Balance-of-Plant (BOP) inboard isolation valves as a result of the loss of the normal power supply to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) B. At the time of the event, the plant was in mode 1(Power Operations) at about 100% power. The isolation closed one or more valves in each of the following Division 2 subsystems: Main Steam line drains, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup, Liquid Radwaste Sumps, Containment Vessel Chilled WATER, Reactor Water Sampling, Drywell and Containment Radiation Monitoring, and Control Room Ventilation. Instrumentation that receives electrical power from RPS B also lost power. Division 1 components and valves were not affected.
The event is considered an invalid system actuation, and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The isolation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters, and was not a manual initiation. It meets the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) as a general containment isolation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Therefore, notification is being provided via 60-day optional phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). All systems functioned as expected for an inboard isolation. Repositioning of the valves did not present operational concerns; and the valves were re-opened per restoration procedures. The BOP isolation was attributed to the loss of power to RPS B as a result of a blown fuse. The blown fuse was the result of the failure of a GE CR105 contactor due to age related degradation (insulating varnish degradation resulting in a winding to winding short circuit). This event was documented in the corrective action program. Remedial actions included replacement of the failed fuse and the RPS A and B normal power supply contactors and the RPS A alternate power supply contactor. The RPS B alternate power supply contactor will also be replaced.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.