Event Notification Report for November 20, 2003

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE

At 0925, while performing the HPCI time to rated flow surveillance, operators discovered the HPCI flow controller to be operating sluggishly in the automatic mode. The surveillance was stopped and HPCI was declared inoperable.

The licensee entered a 24-hour LCO per Technical Specification 3.5.5.2 due to Torus Cooling being in service on RHR loop "A". The licensee is now in a 14-day LCO as a result of securing Torus Cooling and restoring RHR LPCI loop "A". Troubleshooting was performed with I&C prior to securing HPCI. I&C is pursuing controller restoration to operability.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE ON 01/15/04 @ 1035 BY DAVID HALLONQUIST TO C GOULD * * * RETRACTION

BASIS FOR RETRACTION:

NRC Notification 40343 was conservatively made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73 were met pending the evaluation of an atypical condition observed with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Flow Controller while performing scheduled preventative maintenance testing for the HPCI System. After the off-site vendor lab completed testing the circuit board, the HPCI Flow Controller performed sluggishly, and it was determined that the initial NRC Notification was not required.

During surveillance testing on 11/20/03, the HPCI System was started and met or exceeded the Technical Specification minimum requirements designed to demonstrate HPCI System Operability. While testing the specific components of the system, the HPCI Flow Controller was observed to be behaving erratically. Although the HPCI System was still capable of performing its required design safety function, the Shift Manager declared the system inoperable with a concern that further degradation of the flow controller "could have" prevented the HPCI System from performing its design safety function.

Troubleshooting determined that the amplifier circuit board for the controller was not performing as expected. This board was subsequently replaced with one from stock and tested satisfactorily before declaring HPCI fully operational. The faulty amplifier circuit board was sent to an off-site vendor lab for testing and analysis.

The vendor determined that the problem was due a capacitor failure on the board. The capacitor was removed, and the board was re-tested to determine the extent of the effect that this condition would have on the HPCI System performance. This testing revealed the same indications and system response that was initially observed by Vermont Yankee personnel during testing and troubleshooting. Therefore, it has been concluded that with the preventative maintenance system's surveillance as-found condition, the HPCI System was capable of performing its design safety function, and the flow controller's performance would not have degraded any further as a result of this condition.

Therefore ENS Event Number 40343, made on 11/20/03, is being retracted.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

Reg 1 RDO( Holody) was informed.

LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKER DEFECT AND NONCOMPLIANCE REPORT

Deviation related to upper stud assemblies for General Electric Nuclear AKR-30 low voltage circuit breakers. The deviation is specific to upper stud assemblies supplied under part number Q139C4632G1 and consist of an incorrect angle between the stud and pivot. Of the fifteen assemblies supplied with possible deviations to AmerenUE, five were returned and ten had been installed in Callaway Plant. The deviation will not prevent the circuit breakers from performing their design basis function at the Callaway Plant, however, the capability of the assemblies is indeterminate for severe faulted conditions. A circuit breaker could fail if an upper stud assembly with identified deviation was installed and the circuit breaker was called upon to interrupt a severe fault.

"Callaway has concluded that this deviation does not constitute a "defect" as defined in 10CFR Part 21 because the breakers would still perform their design basis requirements and would not create a substantial safety hazard. However, Callaway can not determine if the potential for a significant safety hazard or exceeding of a technical specification safety limit could exist at another nuclear power plant."

Received written documentation that the licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector.

LOSS OF SPDS FOR GREATER THAN 8 HOURS

"During the performance of the control room logs CKL ZL-003 the updating of the SPDS [Safety Parameter Display System] program on the Nuclear Plant Information System (NPIS) computer system was noted to have not changed state. With the recent restoration of the condenser off gas monitor GE RE-092 the computer log had not updated and indicated that the computer was not updating. A review of the computer services backlogs indicates the program has not updated since 11/14/2003 @ 10:29 [CST].

"This condition is being reported as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The loss of NPIS affects Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). SPDS is considered a significant portion of the WCGS emergency assessment capability. Because SPDS has been lost for longer than a short period of time, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation is making this notification pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no other loss of normal procedures and are taking local readings of equipment normally monitored by the NPIS computer. Current plant status is still Mode 5, 0%."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED TO JEFF ROTTON FROM DAVE DEES ON 11/21/2003 AT 1255 * * *

SPDS function was restored at time of initial notification and no other compensatory measures are required.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. Notified Kriss Kennedy - Region 4 Duty Officer.

TOTAL DOSE DELIVERED DIFFERS FROM PRESCRIBED DOSE BY MORE THAN 20 PERCENT

On 10/16/2003, patient underwent surgery to implant 89 I-125 seeds for treatment of prostate cancer. X-rays taken after surgery appeared to be normal. On 11/17/2003, a routine follow up CT scan was performed and the results were made available to Radiation Oncology on 11/20/2003. Review of the CT scan showed that approximately 80% of the implanted seeds were in adjacent tissue and not in the intended location. The original prescribed dose to the prostate was 145 Gray. The estimated dose to the prostate with the existing seed location is 18.6 Gray. On 11/21/2003, the medical center left multiple messages with the patient providing applicable contact numbers. The treating physician has been notified. The hospital will be conducting an investigation into the cause of the error and determining appropriate treatment for the patient.