Event Notification Report for November 19, 2003

TWO FAILURE MODES NOT PREVIOUSLY POSTULATED COULD BE INTRODUCED BY A FIRE IN EITHER FIRE ZONE 19 OR FIRE ZONE 20.

"At approximately 1330 hours (EDT) on November 19, 2003, during reviews being conducted on H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit 2 No. 2, Appendix R fire scenario safe shutdown circuit analysis, it was concluded that two failure modes not previously postulated could be introduced by a fire in either Fire Zone 19, Cable Spreading Room, or Fire Zone 20, Emergency Switchgear Room. The suction source to the charging pump could spuriously close during a fire in one of these zones, which could cause a loss of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) make-up capability of the "A" Charging Pump were operating at the time if the event. The other failure mode involves spurious operation of both pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs), which could cause a loss of RCS inventory. Each of these failure modes could result in loss of safe shutdown capability. Therefore, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in safe shutdown condition.

"Short term corrective actions for this situation include procedure changes to establish preemptive actions that will provide reasonable assurance that safe shutdown can be achieved and maintained. The procedure changes will include rapid verification at the onset of a fire scenario that the "A" Charging Pump is not operating, and will direct closure of the pressurizer PORV block valves. Additionally, the Fire Protection Program (FPP) requirements for loss of detection or suppression in these zones were reviewed. The FPP requires establishment of a continuous fire watch in these areas for loss of detection or suppression capability. Additional administrative controls will be implemented or transient combustibles to further reduce the probability of these failure modes occurring.

"Long term corrective actions are being developed via the Corrective Action Program and will be implemented to further reduce the likelihood of these failure modes"

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

MEDICAL TREATMENT INVOLVING CONTAMINATION

On 11/19/03, a contract worker at the licensee's facility fell from a ladder breaking his shoulder while working in a contaminated area. The worker was transported to the hospital with the licensee's RSO while wearing his protective clothing. The protective clothing had removable contamination measured at 1380 dpm/100 cm2 (disintegrations per minute per 100 square-centimeters). The employee was released from the hospital and the contaminated clothing was recovered by the licensee.