Event Notification Report for November 18, 2003

PORTABLE TROXLER GAUGE RUN OVER BY BULLDOZER

A portable Troxler Model 3411B S/N 6581, was run over by a bulldozer on 11/18/03. The probe was intact and was returned to inside of the gauge housing and moved to a secure location to be leak tested and transported back to the office awaiting recommendations from Troxler. The gauge contained 40 millicuries Am-241 and 8 millicuries Cs-137. A second licensee, Englehard #Ga178-1, was also involved.

STOLEN MOISTURE-DENSITY GAUGE

The Arizona Agency was informed on 11/19/03 @ 1230 of a stolen moisture density gauge which was taken when the pickup truck it was in was stolen. The gauge was a CPN Model MC3, S/N M390404988 containing 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 40 millicuries of Am:Be-241. Avondale, AZ police are investigating (report # 0327274) the incident. A press release will be issued and the licensee will notify the FBI, States of CA, NV, NM, CO and the Country of Mexico.

* * * UPDATE ON 12/17/03 AT 1501 EST FROM A. GODWIN TO E. THOMAS * * *

The Phoenix Police Department recovered the truck on 12/16/03. The driver door indicated a forced entry and the ignition switch key area was damaged. As of 12/17/03, the licensee reported the only item missing is the CPN moisture/density gauge. Other equipment, including cement testing equipment, was not removed from the truck.

The Licensee issued a press release offering a reward for the recovery of the gauge. The release was not carried by the media.

The Agency has an active investigation into the circumstances surrounding the loss of this device.

The FBI, States of California, Nevada, New Mexico, Colorado, and the country of Mexico are being notified of this event.

Notified R4DO (P. Harrell), and NMSS EO (J. Hickey).

LICENSEE MADE OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO AN OIL SPILL

A notification was made to the Pollution Emergency Alert System (PEAS) and Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) due to an oil spill. This occurred during activities associated with replacing a transformer that is located in the owner controlled area, when oil within the transformer spilled to the ground. The quantity of oil was approximately 75 gallons. The spill was contained to the soil and never reached the surface water. Cleanup is in progress.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY

"On 11/18/03 at 0435 EST, it way discovered that the ENS phone system was inoperable when the NRC was unable to contact the Limerick Generating Station Control Room for a routine plant status update. The NRC was able to contact the Limerick Control Room via a normal station telephone. The cause of the communication loss was investigated and determined to be an ENS phone in TSC that was "off the hook". The TSC ENS phone had a headset connected that was inadvertently turned on and resulted in the busy signal when the NRC attempted to call. The TSC ENS phone headset was turned off restoring the communication line. Communications were verified with the NRC at 0459 via the ENS phone. This condition is being reported as an 8 hour notification per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for loss of offsite communications capability."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

LICENSEE MADE A NOTIFICATION TO THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Approximately 1 quart of transmission oil spilled from a privately owned vehicle onto the soil at the lower parking area which is about 200 yds from the industrial area(old PA). No oil went into the water and cleanup is in progress. The licensee made an off site notification to the state of Connecticut

Licensee notified Reg 1

24 HR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 DUE TO CRITICALITY CONTROLS DEGRADATION

At approximately 3:55 p.m. on November 18, 2003, the storage of miscellaneous items was noted in a hood in the chemical area. The items included valves, small diameter pipes, and other objects wrapped in plastic.

The criticality safety basis for the hood is based upon not exceeding the UO2 limit and the geometry of the objects in the hood. Since the geometry control is based upon only a single type of process component in the hood (e.g.: a limited number of 1" valves, or a maximum length of 1" pipe), the as found condition was not consistent with the documented analysis (only one type of component can be processed at a time).

An assay confirmed less than 4 killograms uranium was contained in the components. Therefore, the mass limit was not exceeded. The mass control was not violated and no unsafe condition existed. The situation was corrected in less than four hours.

This condition is reported within 24 hours pursuant to NRC bulletin 91-01 due to a degradation of criticality controls.

Activities in the affected area have been suspended and the equipment tagged out until an investigation to determine the root cause and necessary corrective actions has been completed.