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Event Notification Report for October 17, 2003

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/16/2003 - 10/17/2003

EVENT NUMBERS
4025640265

Power Reactor
Event Number: 40256
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By:
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 10/17/2003
Notification Time: 11:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2003
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
Event Text
STEAM AND FEEDWATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEM UNANALYZED CONDITION AT DAVIS BESSE

"System Affected : Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS)

"Actuation / Initiator Affected: Main Steam Line Rupture on Steam Generator

"Effect of event on plant in current Mode - None

"Actions Taken or planned: Declared SFRCS Actuation Channels 1 and 2 inoperable. Will track as a Mode 3 restraint against T.S. 3.3.2.2 (SFRCS Instrumentation). Will resolve, correct and retest prior to entry into Mode 3.

"Discovered SFRCS Logic Channel 1 block upon restoration and repowering after maintenance activities on 10/16/03. After discussions with Engineering Department representatives it has been determined that a design issue exists with the SFRCS system where it would be possible that SFRCS Channels 1 and 2 low pressure trips could be blocked during a scenario where a Main Steam Line Rupture would be followed by a loss of off-site power. This would result in the potential that the OTSG [once through steam generators] with the main steam line rupture would be fed by the AFW system. This requires an 8 hour notification to the NRC per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40265
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: ROD LIKES
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 10/21/2003
Notification Time: 10:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2003
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
MATTHEW KORMANN (TAS)
Event Text
LOSS OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE OF LOCATION OF FUEL ROD

Westinghouse provided the following information via facsimile pending resolution as to whether material has been lost:

"Facility:
Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, low enriched < 5.0 wt.% U-235) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.

"Reason for Notification:
The Westinghouse Columbia Site Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan requires NRC notification of unresolved indications of missing uranium. Current knowledge of the location of Fuel Rod Id #18768319, has been lost. The fuel rod in question contains 85 grams U-235.

"Description of Event:
Columbia Site Rod Manufacturing employees could not locate fuel rod ID # 18768319 when verifying locations of items that showed up on a listing of items that had not moved through any process stages on the item control tracking system within the previous 7 days of when the report was generated.

"The last transaction recorded for the item was on 8:31 am on October 2, 2003 indicating that the fuel rod was seal welded in the Chemical area after having been loaded with fuel pellets. No additional transactions were recorded for the fuel rod after this time. The next step in the process would have been an over check of the weld by the production line operator who would record the status of the weld via a transaction in the tracking system. The operator would apply a defect code to the rod in the system if a problem were noted with the weld. If the weld passed the overcheck inspection, it would have been transferred to the mechanical manufacturing area of the facility and be weighed and undergo a series of quality assurance inspections. No evidence was found to indicate that the fuel rod was transferred out of the chemical area of the facility. It is believed at this time that the rod most likely was scrapped [fuel removed and reused] and the necessary transactions were inadvertently not performed.

"The manager of EH&S and the safeguards co-ordinator were notified of the on-going situation at approximately 10:00 am on October 17, 2003 and the investigation and search activities were intensified and are on-going.

"Summary of Investigation/Search Activity
- Rod area manufacturing employees searched for the fuel rod in the rod scrap areas of the facility and examined every fuel rod in the area.
- Fuel rods in the storage areas of the facility were examined.
- Containers of Low Level Radioactive Waste that may contain traceable portions of the fuel rod have been searched and continue to be searched.
- Areas previously checked were re-checked and those areas not checked are in the process of being examined."

* * * UPDATE AT 1009 EDT ON 10/22/03 FROM R. LIKES TO E. THOMAS * * *

"Current knowledge of the location of Fuel Rod ID #18768319 was re-established on October 21, 2003 at approximately 19:30 hours, when a fuel rod manufacturing employee located the item. The fuel rod was found under a fuel rod handling conveyer in a position that was not readily visible to individuals performing search activities. The cause of how the fuel rod came to be in the location it was found is currently being investigated.

"Because the fuel rod remained in controlled areas of the facility, this event is not considered safety significant and health and safety has not been compromised."

Notified R2DO (J. Munday), NMSS EO (D. Broaddus), DIRO (D. Weaver), TAS (M. Kormann), DHS (R. Dasilva)