Event Notification Report for October 16, 2003

CALIBRATOR SAFETY INTERLOCK FAILED TO FUNCTION DURING OPERATIONAL TEST

The licensee RSO reported that the electrical interlock between the access door and the source position on a J. L. Shepherd Model 89-400 calibrator failed to function during the daily pre-operational test. With the door open, the interlock should have prevented raising the source, but did not. The source (400 Curie Cs-137) was lowered and the door re-closed without further incident. Radiation levels were normal and no personnel exposure occurred.

UNUSUAL EVENT AT COOPER DUE TO SMALL FIRE AT A TURBINE BEARING

The licensee declared an Unusual Event at 12:30 CDT pertaining to a small fire, located at the high pressure turbine number 1 bearing, which was burning greater than 10 minutes. There were no injuries and the turbine continues to operate at full power while the fire brigade attempts to extinguish the fire. Subsequently, the licensee extinguished the fire; however, several minutes later, the fire restarted. The licensee decided to lower power to approximately 65% power to lower general area radiation levels for the fire brigade personnel. The fire was extinguished and reflashed a few times. The fire brigade used water, dry chemicals and foam when fighting the fire. The source of the fire at the bearing is under investigation by the licensee.

*****UPDATE ON 10/16/03 AT 1700 FROM FISCHER TO LAURA*****

The licensee reports that the fire is out and the investigation determined that the most likely source of the fire was oil pooled under the bearing pedestal. No current oil leakage was found. The licensee planned on contacting the turbine vendor prior to returning the plant to full power. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1541 CDT.

Notified R4DO (G. Sanborn), DIRO (D. Weaver), NRR EO (T. Reis), DHS (J. Clardy) and FEMA (J. Dunker).

24 HOUR BULLETIN 91-01 NOTIFICATION FROM WESTINGHOUSE COLUMBIA FUEL FACILITY

"Double Contingency Protection: Double contingency protection for the ADU Bulk Blending System is assured by (1) preventing moderator from becoming available to a bulk container, and (2) preventing moderator from entering a bulk container. The first contingency did not occur because the moderator was never available to a bulk container. Moderator is prevented from entering a bulk container by preventing high moisture polypaks from being dumped into the bulk container. The polypaks are processed through a scan and dump interlock, which prevents unacceptable polypaks from being dumped. The software malfunction left less than previously documented double contingency protection for the system. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5a), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification.

"As Found Condition: See Reason for Notification above.

"Summary of Activity: Immediately after all packs were dumped into the bulk container to complete the blend of material, Operations noticed that the packs had not been denoted as "consumed" by the data base, and notified the computer system administrator and Nuclear Criticality Safety. The computer system administrator stopped all dumping operations. The computer system administrator immediately checked all packs that had been dumped into the blend. All moisture values were acceptable. All operations that use the same PLC interface program for criticality controls were stopped.

"Conclusions: Less than previously documented double contingency protection remained. All moisture values for the material involved were acceptable, and the total amount of moderator in the blend was very low, far less than criticality limits. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal analysis will be performed."

10 CFR 21.21 POTENTIAL FAILURE OF SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE TO CLOSE AT ELEVATED AIR PRESSURE

The following is taken from a facsimile from Automatic Valve:

"Describe Problem (Initial Concern and Symptoms):
On 10/16/2003 Paul Chenell of Dresden reported that a B7122-145, serial number 64065 shipped on 12/11/2002, valve failed to exhaust air with both solenoids de-energized causing the CRD valve to remain in the open position.

"On 10/17/2003 the valve was delivered to Automatic Valve for analysis of the problem. Contain Symptom (Action):
Re-inspect all existing 6910-001 plungers to verify the correct overall length (Done 10-17-03). Rebuild, retest, and return the B7122-145 valves to Dresden (Shipped 11-26-03).
Notify customers potentially impacted, by Fax, to inspect plunger lengths (10/24/03).
Inspect all units installed at Dresden station (completed 10-30-03, 15 of 274 plungers found out of specification)
Inspect all units installed at Cooper station (completed 10-29-03, 0 of 64 plungers found out of specification)
Hold shipment for all 6910-001 plungers from suspect lot.

"Root Cause/s of Problem: 10 CFR Part 21 Report Required: Yes
The valve was first functionally tested in the normal manner- that is at 35 psig low pressure & at 145 psig high pressure. The valve functioned without problems at low pressure but failed to return to its normally closed position at 145 psig when both solenoids were de-energized. Further functional testing revealed that at an inlet pressure of approximately 100 psig the valve would fail to return when de-energized.

"When the valve was disassembled, the plunger in the number 2 solenoid, the left hand solenoid when facing the exhaust port, was found to be approximately .020 too long - 1.315" compared to the specified length of 1.290 +.005/-.003. Because the plunger only has a total stroke of less than .030, the natural expansion of the seal material in the plunger, due to a combination of heat and pressure, combined with the out of specification length created a situation where the plunger had no room to move and thus exhaust pilot air when the solenoid was deenergized.

"The root cause of the failure is the out of spec plunger. Procedures require the lengths of all plungers to be inspected prior to use.

"Analysis of the results of measurement testing revealed an unexpected degree of variation In recorded lengths.
Variation was traced to the use of different types of equipment and the inherent difficulty in measuring compressible material with pressure sensitive measurement devices. This may have lead to some units being categorized as In specification initially and out of specification at subsequent inspection. (Refer to corrective action 5.1).

"Notwithstanding measurement variation, the primary root cause of the observed plunger dimensions is changes to the length of the fluorocarbon insert after it is pressed into the plunger body. This variation is detectable and beyond measurement uncertainty.

"Dissection of returned plungers revealed abnormal compression set among all plungers which were beyond specification limits and normal compression set among plungers which were within specification limits.

"Chemical analysis and durometer testing did not show any significant differences In the chemical properties or material hardness of the lot or in previous lots of identical insert material.

"However, the following results were obtained when plunger insert samples were compressed by 23 for 24 hours at 230 degrees F:

"Scenario [Average Set %, # tested]
Unused insert, suspect lot, visible set, as received [92%, 3]
Unused insert, suspect lot, visible set, post cured at 260 F [11%, 2]
Unused insert, previous lot no visible set, as received [10%, 3]
Unused insert, suspect lot no visible set, as received [9%,, 2]
Field return Insert, suspect lot, visible set [36%, 4]
Field return Insert, suspect lot, no visible set [10%, 2]

"From this we concluded that there is a cure problem with a portion of the suspect lot and that post cure takes place when the solenoid is continuously energized. Based on the test results, we believe that a portion of the lot was not properly post cured.

"The degree of growth of the plunger insert due to compression set is observed to be variable. This depends on exact dimensions of the molded insert when installed, the ID of the plunger retaining the insert and the exact cure duration variation of the bad plunger inserts.

"The degree of growth also seems to be terminal. Returned plungers (field failure) and other samples from the suspect lot on hand) at Automatic Valve have not changed dimensions during the period of study. Five plungers tested at 200 degrees F for five days exhibited thermal expansion and did not detectably change size when cooled down. Ten plungers subjected to 230 degrees F for ten days exhibited thermal expansion and did not detectably change size when cooled down. (Refer to corrective action 5.2, 5.3)

5. Corrective Action:
5.1) Specific individual measurement equipment is specified for plunger measurement.
5.2) Specific lot definition based on curing process (as opposed to pre-vulcanized rubber lot) to define lot homogeneity for all plunger inserts
5.3) A sample of each homogeneous processed sample to be tested for compression set as part of dedication process.
Test Conducted to Verify It: Test samples to be placed under worst case temperature and pressure characteristics for a period of 10 months.

"6. Implementation (Describe: Include Applicable CN Numbers):
CN 8897 defines lot and compression set and measurement characteristics for 6910-001 plungers..

"7. Corrective Action to System to Prevent Recurrence: To be determined.

"The following plants have components containing the suspected lots as follows:

Nebraska Public Power - Cooper Station
Exelon - Limerick, Peach Bottom, Quad Cities, Dresden"