Event Notification Report for October 14, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/13/2003 - 10/14/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40245
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/14/2003
Notification Time: 05:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2003
Event Time: 04:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2003
Notification Time: 05:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2003
Event Time: 04:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2003
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
MICHAEL CASE (NRR)
TIM MCGINTY (IRO)
JEFF GLICK (DHS)
MR AUSTIN (FEMA)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
MICHAEL CASE (NRR)
TIM MCGINTY (IRO)
JEFF GLICK (DHS)
MR AUSTIN (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED - LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING
At 0404 EDT on 10/14/03, Millstone 2 lost shutdown cooling due to the loss of power to vital power bus VA10. Power and shutdown cooling were restored at 0414. Millstone declared an Unusual Event at 0423 due to a greater than 10 degree increase in reactor coolant system temperature. Reactor coolant system temperature increased from 101 degrees to 113 degrees.
Power was lost to VA10 while attempting to swap power supplies from inverter 1 to inverter 5. Inverter 1 is now supplying power to VA10.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM STRICKLAND TO GOTT ON 10/14/03 AT 0740 * * *
Millstone 2 exited their Unusual Event at 0532, after completing the abnormal operating procedure and stabilizing plant conditions.
Notified R1DO (Bellamy), NRR (Reis), DIRO (McGinty), DHS (Rick DaSilva), and FEMA (David Barden)..
* * * UPDATE 10/14/03 @ 12:02 BY WILL CHESNUTT TO JEFF ROTTON * * *
An update to event notification 40245 is being made to reflect that the loss of shutdown cooling is also considered reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Additionally, further review of plant response following the loss of VA10, indicates that due to an equipment performance issue (failed relay) the containment isolation valves did not respond as expected and were manually closed per procedure. This issue will be investigated and addressed as needed in the LER.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified
Reg1 RDO(McDermott) was notified.
At 0404 EDT on 10/14/03, Millstone 2 lost shutdown cooling due to the loss of power to vital power bus VA10. Power and shutdown cooling were restored at 0414. Millstone declared an Unusual Event at 0423 due to a greater than 10 degree increase in reactor coolant system temperature. Reactor coolant system temperature increased from 101 degrees to 113 degrees.
Power was lost to VA10 while attempting to swap power supplies from inverter 1 to inverter 5. Inverter 1 is now supplying power to VA10.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM STRICKLAND TO GOTT ON 10/14/03 AT 0740 * * *
Millstone 2 exited their Unusual Event at 0532, after completing the abnormal operating procedure and stabilizing plant conditions.
Notified R1DO (Bellamy), NRR (Reis), DIRO (McGinty), DHS (Rick DaSilva), and FEMA (David Barden)..
* * * UPDATE 10/14/03 @ 12:02 BY WILL CHESNUTT TO JEFF ROTTON * * *
An update to event notification 40245 is being made to reflect that the loss of shutdown cooling is also considered reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Additionally, further review of plant response following the loss of VA10, indicates that due to an equipment performance issue (failed relay) the containment isolation valves did not respond as expected and were manually closed per procedure. This issue will be investigated and addressed as needed in the LER.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified
Reg1 RDO(McDermott) was notified.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40246
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: CARL SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: CARL SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/14/2003
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2003
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2003
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2003
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
TRISH HOLAHAN (NMSS)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
TRISH HOLAHAN (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING IMPROPER MASS CONTROL
Improper Filling of Dry Combustible Trash Drum
"Facility: Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, low enriched less then or equal 5.0 wt.% U-235) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.
Time and Date of Event: October 14, 2003
Reason for Notification: Dry combustible trash was placed into a single 55-gallon drum without proper mass control. Dry combustible trash drums are positioned on scales for filling. An operator removed a single drum from a scale and then filled the drum with dry combustible trash.
The filling of drums on scales prevents exceeding the critical mass limit of [DELETED]. The scales actuate a visual alarm at 66 lbs.; and visual and audible alarm at 90 lbs. If the 66 lbs. limit is reached, operators are required to remove trash from a drum. If the 90 lbs. Limit is reached, operators are required to remove trash and write a Redbook.
Double Contingency Protection: Double contingency protection for dry combustible trash is assured by preventing [DELETED] of UO2 from becoming available to a single combustible trash drum, and preventing the total weight of a drum from exceeding the [DELETED]. Criticality limit. The removal of the drum from the scale and subsequent filling left less than previously documented double contingency protection for the system. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5a), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification.
As Found Condition: During a routine checking of drums for spacing (i.e., U-235 gram counts), a second operator noticed that a dry combustible trash drum had a net weight of 95 tbs. The operator recognized that a drum weight of 95 lbs. Exceeded the scale limit of 90 lbs. and generated the required Redbook. The drum indicated an assay value of 5.285 grams of U-235.
Summary of Activity:
- When the second operator found the drum, it was placed on hold. Both process engineering and EH&S were notified.
- The drum contents were examined and no improper material types were found in the drum. It was also determined that the material was not compacted.
- The drum was weighed and assayed and found to match the values on the drum label.
Conclusions:
- Less than previously documented double contingency protection remained.
- Less than a critical mass was involved.
- At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
- The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
- A causal analysis will be performed."
The licensee will inform the Region 2 Office.
Improper Filling of Dry Combustible Trash Drum
"Facility: Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, low enriched less then or equal 5.0 wt.% U-235) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.
Time and Date of Event: October 14, 2003
Reason for Notification: Dry combustible trash was placed into a single 55-gallon drum without proper mass control. Dry combustible trash drums are positioned on scales for filling. An operator removed a single drum from a scale and then filled the drum with dry combustible trash.
The filling of drums on scales prevents exceeding the critical mass limit of [DELETED]. The scales actuate a visual alarm at 66 lbs.; and visual and audible alarm at 90 lbs. If the 66 lbs. limit is reached, operators are required to remove trash from a drum. If the 90 lbs. Limit is reached, operators are required to remove trash and write a Redbook.
Double Contingency Protection: Double contingency protection for dry combustible trash is assured by preventing [DELETED] of UO2 from becoming available to a single combustible trash drum, and preventing the total weight of a drum from exceeding the [DELETED]. Criticality limit. The removal of the drum from the scale and subsequent filling left less than previously documented double contingency protection for the system. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5a), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification.
As Found Condition: During a routine checking of drums for spacing (i.e., U-235 gram counts), a second operator noticed that a dry combustible trash drum had a net weight of 95 tbs. The operator recognized that a drum weight of 95 lbs. Exceeded the scale limit of 90 lbs. and generated the required Redbook. The drum indicated an assay value of 5.285 grams of U-235.
Summary of Activity:
- When the second operator found the drum, it was placed on hold. Both process engineering and EH&S were notified.
- The drum contents were examined and no improper material types were found in the drum. It was also determined that the material was not compacted.
- The drum was weighed and assayed and found to match the values on the drum label.
Conclusions:
- Less than previously documented double contingency protection remained.
- Less than a critical mass was involved.
- At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
- The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
- A causal analysis will be performed."
The licensee will inform the Region 2 Office.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40247
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: C. McFEATERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: C. McFEATERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/15/2003
Notification Time: 01:56 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2003
Event Time: 23:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2003
Notification Time: 01:56 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2003
Event Time: 23:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 39 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW "B" STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL.
"Automatic Trip due to low (21%) B Steam Generator Level (all rods fully inserted into the core).
"While decreasing power for heater drain pump repairs, the B main feedwater regulating valve did not respond properly. Manual attempts to restore level were not effective. Steam generator level decreased to the low level trip setpoint.
"Auxiliary feedwater systems automatically started due to low post trip steam generator levels. This includes the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. The steam discharge of this pump is considered to a gaseous release due to trace amounts of tritium in the secondary system. These trace amounts are well below limits. The pump was shutdown after 16 minutes of operation, terminating the discharge. The Rad Waste & Effluents Section will assess the impact during the event response review.
"Plant is currently stable in Mode 3 with steam generator levels restored to post shutdown values. The steam dumps and main unit condenser are available for heat removal. All normal and emergency busses are energized from offsite power."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event by the licensee.
"Automatic Trip due to low (21%) B Steam Generator Level (all rods fully inserted into the core).
"While decreasing power for heater drain pump repairs, the B main feedwater regulating valve did not respond properly. Manual attempts to restore level were not effective. Steam generator level decreased to the low level trip setpoint.
"Auxiliary feedwater systems automatically started due to low post trip steam generator levels. This includes the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. The steam discharge of this pump is considered to a gaseous release due to trace amounts of tritium in the secondary system. These trace amounts are well below limits. The pump was shutdown after 16 minutes of operation, terminating the discharge. The Rad Waste & Effluents Section will assess the impact during the event response review.
"Plant is currently stable in Mode 3 with steam generator levels restored to post shutdown values. The steam dumps and main unit condenser are available for heat removal. All normal and emergency busses are energized from offsite power."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event by the licensee.