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Event Notification Report for October 06, 2003

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/05/2003 - 10/06/2003

EVENT NUMBERS
40227

Power Reactor
Event Number: 40227
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GLEN MORROW
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 10/07/2003
Notification Time: 06:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/2003
Event Time: 22:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH O'BRIEN (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 86 Power Operation 86 Power Operation
Event Text
HPCI SYSTEM INOPERABILITY DUE TO FAILED SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL SWITCH AT DRESDEN UNIT 2

"The Unit 2 HPCI system has been declared INOPERABLE due to the failure of a pressure suppression pool high-level switch during surveillance and being unable to maintain the HPCI pump suction lined up to the pressure suppression pool in standby lineup.

"Per technical specification 3.3.5.1. required action D.2.2. with the high level switch INOPERABLE the HPCI system must have the pump suction aligned to the suppression pool with in 24 hours or declare the HPCI system INOPERABLE when the required action completion time can not be met. The function of the suppression pool high-level switch causes the HPCI pump suction to automatically realign to the suppression pool when the suppression pool reaches the high level set point during an accident.

"When the pump suction swap to the suppression pool was performed the HPCI gland seal leak off pump began to run automatically. Further investigation determined that there was an unknown input into the HPCI gland seal leak off condenser (GSLO). Normally the GSLO does not have an input while in standby lineup and therefore does not normally operate while the pump suction is aligned to the Pressure Suppression Pool. The GSLO pump would have a discharge flow path with the HPCI system running and therefore would have the ability to maintain its design function. However in the standby line [-up] with the pump suction aligned to the suppression pool the GSLO pump did not have a discharge flow path. This inability to pump the GSLO condenser required the suction be realigned to the condensate storage tank and with the combination of a failed suppression pool high-level switch requires declaration of INOPERABITY of the HPCI system. This is a 14 day LCO. This is a single train system and reportable under SAF 1.8 Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. The INOPERABLE HPCI system function can be manually initiated from the main control room. Investigation and troubleshooting into the unknown HPCI GSLO input has been initiated in parallel with the repairs to the failed suppression high level switch."

The licensee intended on notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.