Event Notification Report for October 05, 2003

INOPERABLE TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION AT HOPE CREEK

"While performing common mode failure testing of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), the 'C' EDG was declared INOPERABLE for planned installation of required test equipment. Concurrent with the inoperability of the 'C' EDG, the 'B' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System has been INOPERABLE for emergent corrective maintenance since 10/2/03 at 0502. Because the 'C' EDG is the emergency power supply for the 'A' CREF train, 'A' CREF was also declared INOPERABLE and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered as of 0300 hrs on 10/05/03. At 0430 hrs on 10/05/03, the test equipment was removed from 'C' EDG, thereby restoring it and 'A' CREF to an operable status, and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. Testing did verify the absence of a common mode failure and all EDG's are operable. The Control Room Ventilation System provides heating, cooling, ventilation, and environmental control for the control room and adjacent areas. Under accident conditions, CREF ensures that the control room will remain habitable during and following all design basis accidents. Because the CREF system is required to automatically respond in the event of a design basis accident, having both trains of CREF inoperable at the same time impacted the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The plant is currently in HOT SHUTDOWN for repair of an emergent turbine hydraulic fluid leak, with decay heat removal to the main condenser via turbine bypass valves."

The NRC resident inspector was notified by the licensee.


* * * * UPDATE ON 11/19/03 @ 1640 BY RITA BRADDICK TO C. GOULD * * * *

"At the time of the original notification, both trains of Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) were declared inoperable impacting the ability of CREF to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The "B" train was inoperable for emergent corrective maintenance and the "A" train was declared inoperable when test equipment was connected to the "C" emergency diesel generator (EDG). The "C" EDG provides emergency power to the "A" train of CREF. Subsequent to this event, an evaluation of the test equipment impact to the "C" EDG was performed and determined that the "C" EDG would still be capable of providing emergency power to the "A" CREF train in the event offsite power is lost. Therefore, the "A" CREF train remained available to respond to a design basis accident. Thus, the safety function would have been fulfilled." R1DO (Brain McDermott) notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this retraction by the licensee.

OSCILLATION POWER RANGE MONITORS (OPRM) DECLARED INOPERABLE

See event # 40223, Part 21 reported on 10/04/03 by GE Nuclear Energy for background information.

"On October 5, 2003, Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. received notification from General Electric of a Part 21 involving the potential for numerous, unexpected confirmation count (CC) resets in the event of an instability condition. These CC resets may result in the inoperability of TS Table 3.3.1.1-1,'Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, Function 2. f, OPRM Upscale.'

"All Unit 1 and Unit 2 OPRM channels have been declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, Action I requires an alternate method of detecting and suppressing thermal hydraulic instabilities to be implemented within 12 hours. The alternate methods of detection and suppression are currently in place.

"Due to the implementation of Technical Specification required compensatory actions, there is minimal safety significance."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

Also see similar events reported by NMP Unit 2 (event # 40217) and Fermi Unit 2 (event # 40215)