Event Notification Report for October 03, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/02/2003 - 10/03/2003
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40221
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE EARLES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE EARLES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/03/2003
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2003
Event Time: 15:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2003
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2003
Event Time: 15:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
MARK LESSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM DEGRADED DUE TO BOTH TRAINS OF AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 10/03/2003, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 was in Mode 6 during a refueling outage with core re-load in progress. At 1516 [hrs EDT], the control room became aware that an activity in preparing for an upcoming test had placed the B Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) 480v Breaker in the off position. An operator was immediately dispatched to close the ABGTS breaker and the breaker was closed at 1521 [hrs], restoring the train to OPERABLE status. The opening of this breaker at about 1324 [hrs] caused the B ABGTS train to be INOPERABLE at a time when the A ABGTS train was available to start but technically INOPERABLE due to the emergency power supply ( A Train Diesel Generator) and a room cooler being out of service.
"The ABGTS system is required for the mitigation of a postulated fuel handling accident. Site emergency procedures require the operator to promptly confirm ABGTS is in operation, indication is provided in the control room on ABGTS status and breaker restoration can be quickly performed. In addition, with off site power available, the A ABGTS train would have immediately responded to an event and begun to perform the filtration function while the otherwise operable B train was manually restored. However, at the time of discovery, the system could not have performed its function in the event of a postulated accident coincident with a loss of off site power. Accordingly, TVA has determined this event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 10/03/2003, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 was in Mode 6 during a refueling outage with core re-load in progress. At 1516 [hrs EDT], the control room became aware that an activity in preparing for an upcoming test had placed the B Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) 480v Breaker in the off position. An operator was immediately dispatched to close the ABGTS breaker and the breaker was closed at 1521 [hrs], restoring the train to OPERABLE status. The opening of this breaker at about 1324 [hrs] caused the B ABGTS train to be INOPERABLE at a time when the A ABGTS train was available to start but technically INOPERABLE due to the emergency power supply ( A Train Diesel Generator) and a room cooler being out of service.
"The ABGTS system is required for the mitigation of a postulated fuel handling accident. Site emergency procedures require the operator to promptly confirm ABGTS is in operation, indication is provided in the control room on ABGTS status and breaker restoration can be quickly performed. In addition, with off site power available, the A ABGTS train would have immediately responded to an event and begun to perform the filtration function while the otherwise operable B train was manually restored. However, at the time of discovery, the system could not have performed its function in the event of a postulated accident coincident with a loss of off site power. Accordingly, TVA has determined this event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40220
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: STORK SW LABORATORIES
Region: 4
City: Beaumont State: TX
County:
License #: L05269-002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HELEN WATKINS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: STORK SW LABORATORIES
Region: 4
City: Beaumont State: TX
County:
License #: L05269-002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HELEN WATKINS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/03/2003
Notification Time: 19:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2003
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2003
Notification Time: 19:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2003
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received from Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control via facsimile:
"Troxler model 3440, serial # 31623
"8 [millicuries] Cs-137 source, sn [serial number] 7506418
"40 [millicuries] Am-241/Be, sn 4728354
"A technician removed the gauge from the back of the pick up truck to wash the truck. The gauge was placed outside the wash bay. The gauge was stolen while the technician was busy washing the truck. The gauge was locked inside the storage container. Some tools were inside. No other items were stolen or left unattended. The licensee notified the local police. The incident was reported to the Agency by the Beaumont site RSO.
"The Agency is investigating the incident."
Texas Incident Number I-8060.
The following information was received from Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control via facsimile:
"Troxler model 3440, serial # 31623
"8 [millicuries] Cs-137 source, sn [serial number] 7506418
"40 [millicuries] Am-241/Be, sn 4728354
"A technician removed the gauge from the back of the pick up truck to wash the truck. The gauge was placed outside the wash bay. The gauge was stolen while the technician was busy washing the truck. The gauge was locked inside the storage container. Some tools were inside. No other items were stolen or left unattended. The licensee notified the local police. The incident was reported to the Agency by the Beaumont site RSO.
"The Agency is investigating the incident."
Texas Incident Number I-8060.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40364
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF PEASE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF PEASE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/01/2003
Notification Time: 14:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2003
Notification Time: 14:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2003
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
WILLIAM BECKNER (NRR)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
WILLIAM BECKNER (NRR)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NONCOMFORMANCE NOTIFICATION FOR SOLID STATE PROTECTION MASTER RELAY
Failure of Master Relay K507 (MidTex Part Number 15614D200) in the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) was attributed to corrosion caused by off-gassing of chlorine contamination from paper used to wrap the relay coil, or the adhesive used to attach the paper wrap to the coil. Master Relays must change state, upon energization, to actuate various safety related equipment in the plant. The failure of Master Relay K507 is considered to be a manufacturing defect in a basic component that could cause a loss of safety function.
The majority of MidTex relays investigated had cloth wrapped coils and these relays showed no evidence of corrosion.
The number of affected relays and installed locations was not available at the time of the initial notification.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Failure of Master Relay K507 (MidTex Part Number 15614D200) in the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) was attributed to corrosion caused by off-gassing of chlorine contamination from paper used to wrap the relay coil, or the adhesive used to attach the paper wrap to the coil. Master Relays must change state, upon energization, to actuate various safety related equipment in the plant. The failure of Master Relay K507 is considered to be a manufacturing defect in a basic component that could cause a loss of safety function.
The majority of MidTex relays investigated had cloth wrapped coils and these relays showed no evidence of corrosion.
The number of affected relays and installed locations was not available at the time of the initial notification.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.